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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE TO THE 
LAW ON CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF CHILDREN IN INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW  
by 
Ana Paula von Bochkor Podcameni 
Florida International University, 2017  
Miami, Florida 
Professor Harry Gould, Major Professor  
The revision of laws and the application of culpability to those most responsible 
for serious humanitarian law violations has functioned as a necessary condition for 
achieving peace in most post-war societies. However, there is an embarrassing silence 
when it comes to addressing the question of whether children are to be subjected to the 
principle of individual criminal responsibility. As morally controversial as it is, the 
question remains fundamental. Unfortunately, children have been involved in armed 
conflicts, as victims primarily, but not exclusively. Children are among those accused of 
having committed brutal and terrible international crimes in times of armed conflict when 
part of armed groups or armed forces. And with no consensus within the international 
community regarding their status within International Criminal Law — no established 
law within International Law and no consistent practice among states on the issue— the 
problem of criminal accountability of children accused of international crimes remains 
unanswered. 
 viii 
The current work conducts a legal positivist analysis with the focus of 
investigating the contribution of the Special Court for Sierra Leone to the current debate 
on children’s criminal responsibility under International Criminal Law. Among 
significant contributions, the Statute of the Special Court brought one interesting 
innovation to the debate on children’s potential criminal responsibility. Juveniles starting 
at age fifteen would be considered viable for prosecution if among those most responsible 
for the Special Court, as established in Article 7.1. The above innovation translates into 
two essential contributions to the debate on children criminal responsibility for 
international crimes: first the Special Court was the first international court to elect a 
minimum age of criminal responsibility (MACR) at age fifteen to be operational within 
the scope of the court. Secondly, and equally important, the court reflected the position 
that children, after the stipulated MACR would be considered, at least a priori, viable 
subjects of the international criminal system. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
Summary  
 
The present research inquires into the controversial, yet unsettled, legal question of 
whether children are potentially subject to individual criminal responsibility under 
International Law (IL). As a first step, an analysis of the current state of law to the 
problem will be conducted, followed by a deeper look into the relevance of the works of 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) in determining a possible evolving rule of 
child criminality. The theoretical framework will be based on criminal law, international 
law and children’s rights. The goal of the research is to show that the SCSL has generated 
evidence of law on the issue of children’s potential prosecution which can be used by 
other international and non-international courts for future reference. 
 
Are children involved in armed conflict and accused of the commission of war 
crimes to be subjected to the international legal rule of individual criminal responsibility? 
 The present research delineates a legal positivist analysis investigation of 
International Criminal Law’s position on the controversial, necessary and unsettled issue 
of child criminal responsibility.  To date, the problem has remained unanswered by 
international law. 
 The present analysis delineates a positivist legal investigation, therefore, primary 
sources of law are given precedence over secondary and non-binding documents. More 
specifically, I will be looking into treaty and customary law because these are binding 
sources of law. 
 Next, the work will focus on the jurisdictional contributions coming from the only 
court that has included juveniles as viable subjects of international criminal law: The 
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Special Court for Sierra Leone. I intend to show the existence of legal precedent created 
by the Special Court that can be used by international courts or national courts on the 
issue of child criminal responsibility under international law. 
 The dissertation will conclude with suggestions for future research, in which the 
author will explore complementary venues sourced from the minimum age of legal 
recruitment as established by International Humanitarian Law, the minimum age of 
criminal responsibility as set by the SCSL, as well as the concomitant relationship 
between the liberty right of early enlistment, legal competence and individual criminal 
responsibility for children lawfully recruited by armed forces. Preliminary theoretical 
findings suggest that when legal competence is presumed, it fulfills a priori the criteria 
for the exercise of individual criminal responsibility.  
Statement of the problem 
The existing laws against child soldiers in International Law, more specifically, 
International Humanitarian Law, allows the recruitment and use of children by the armed 
forces of states starting at age fifteen; however, if the underage recruited is accused of 
international crimes while in the line of duty, International Law has no position on 
whether these children are criminally responsible for his or her acts. 
 
Explaining the problem 
 
 The laws prohibiting states from recruiting and using children under the age of 
fifteen in armed conflicts are contained in the Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
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International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol I) of 8 June 1977, more 
specifically Article 77, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol II), of 8 June 1977 (Additional Protocol II), specifically part 4 and Article 38 
of  the Convention of the Rights of the Child  (CRC) of 1998 which are deemed to be 
customary law and are liable to be used as residual law by international courts. There are 
no prohibitions in customary International Humanitarian Law against states recruiting 
and using children age fifteen and above. The only rule in the above conventions 
protecting the young recruit is circumstantial, expressing that states, when recruiting and 
using those between age fifteen and seventeen, are to give priority enlistment to those 
who are older. These legal rules have achieved wide support within the international 
community, and are currently viewed as reflecting obligations extending to all states and 
individuals. The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict (OPAC) of 2002 is currently the only 
international human rights treaty prohibiting the recruitment and use of persons under 
eighteen, yet it has not been recognized as customary law, thus creating the obligation of 
compliance exclusively to its State parties. 
 Early enlistment is seen as problematic, mostly by academics and child specialists 
who call attention to the lack of maturity and de facto competence of a child below 
eighteen to enlist in such a dangerous and challenging task as taking arms. Despite the 
fact that it is important to acknowledge these rules may not reflect morally constituted 
opinions regarding children’s capacities, the goal of the current work is not to challenge 
the current law related to early recruitment, but expose the fact that international 
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humanitarian law allows it, thus deeming these young people legally competent to engage 
in combat training and hostilities.  
 Also equally problematic, if the child who has reached the minimum age of 
military recruitment (set at fifteen) by International Humanitarian Law, happens to be 
involved in the commission of a war crime (or any other international crime) 
international law does not hold a consensus position regarding whether he or she is to 
respond criminally for his or her act.  
 Despite the facts that all individuals are obligated to observe international 
humanitarian law, and that children under eighteen perpetrate serious violations of 
international humanitarian which would give rise to criminal accountability for an adult, 
there are no international legal provisions, documents, or previous rulings from 
competent international tribunals that specify if a child is subject to the principle of 
individual criminal responsibility under international criminal law if accused of a grave 
breach of international humanitarian law. 
 The drafters of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court intentionally 
excluded individuals who were under the age of eighteen at the time the act was 
committed from the Court’s jurisdiction.1 No other international court has yet brought a 
juvenile to justice for violations of International Humanitarian Law. No domestic court 
has tried a juvenile for grave breaches of international humanitarian law. The turning 
point was the Statute of the SCSL which, for the first time, attributed criminal 
responsibility to those fifteen years of age or older.   
                                               
1 Schabas, William. The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 72. 
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 Before then, jurisdiction over crimes committed by child soldiers was been 
exercised at the domestic level (and not at the international level) with three attempts to 
prosecute former child soldiers – two rulings in the Democratic Republic of Congo and 
one in Uganda.2 These children were brought to court charged with violations of 
domestic law, not international crimes. No courts, international or national, have ever 
tried child soldiers for violations of international law. 
In International Law, children are mostly the victims of international crimes, even 
if they are the ones who committed them. 3 When serious violations that amount to 
international crimes are carried out by children, the “responsibility passes entirely to the 
adult abductor, enlister, recruiter or commander.”4 “The fact that children are capable of 
violence falls outside the entrenched modernist formulations of childhood” that 
consequently feeds into the development of legal rules.5 As a result, serious violations, 
which would amount to international crimes if committed by adults, do not receive the 
same legal treatment when perpetrated by children. This is problematic because, when it 
                                               
2 Happold, Matthew. “The Age of Criminal Responsibility for International Crimes Under International 
Law,” From Peace to Justice Series International Criminal Accountability and Rights of Children, eds. 
Karin Arts and Vesselin Popovski (Hague Academic Press, 2006), 69-84. 
3 Mark Drumbl calls attention to how constructed images of child soldiers directly affect their legal 
treatment. Within the existing available discourse of child soldiers (produced mainly in the West), the 
overwhelming image of the child soldier as a faultless passive victim prevails. The child is seen as a victim 
of violent recruitment and training by their commanders. Facing such violence and hardships of the war 
children are helpless, and this innocence “fills the international legal imagination, influencing the substance 
of international law and policy” (Drumbl, Mark A., Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and 
Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 9. 
4 Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy, 18. 
5 Honwana, Alcinda . “Innocent and Guilty: Child-Soldiers as Interstitial and Tactical Agents,” Makers & 
breakers: children & youth in postcolonial Africa, eds. Alcinda Honwana and Filip Boeck (Africa World 
Press, 2005), 31, 37. 
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comes to international crimes, the nature and the seriousness of the crimes should not 
outweigh the conditions of the accused, and the victim still has the rights to justice. 
And what if the armed group was commanded by children, and not adults? As 
strange as this may sound, the leaders of an armed rebel group, God’s Army, composed 
of approximately 200 men, formed in 1997 to fight against the Burmese government, was 
led by twin brothers, age nine. The boys operated the armed group until 2001 (age 13) 
when they surrendered to the Thai government.6 In this case, when the leaders are/were 
minors, where does criminal responsibility of those who ordered the crimes stands?  
 
Ongwen’s ICC trials: a possible glimpse of the court’s position on the criminal 
responsibility of former child soldiers 
 
Dominic Ongwen’s criminal case, currently taking place at the ICC, may force the 
Court to further elaborate its position whether former child soldiers are to be deemed 
criminally responsible under International Criminal Law. Despite the fact that the ICC 
has so far avoided discussion of the criminal responsibility involving acts committed by 
child soldiers by deliberately avoiding the question of whether children can be submitted 
to the principle of individual criminal responsibility when accused of international 
crimes.  Article 26 of the Rome Statute entitled “Exclusion of jurisdiction over persons 
under eighteen” expresses clearly that the “The Court shall have no jurisdiction over any 
person who was under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged commission of a crime.”  
                                               
6 For more information, see: “Two little boys,” The Guardian, (London) July 07, 2000, 
https://www.theguardian.com/g2/story/0,3604,347432,00.html. 
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The trial of Ongwen, however, has touched on the matter by asking whether a 
former child soldier, raised in an armed group, is to be held responsible for his criminal 
acts?  Ongwen’s case is interesting and important because “[Ongwen] is the first former 
child soldier to face trial at the institution, and the first defendant to be both alleged 
perpetrator and victim of the same crimes.”7 Ongwen’s case, despite not directly 
addressing the issue of criminal acts committed by children (Ongwen is an adult at the 
time of the judgement), nonetheless highlights the necessity for the Court to discuss if 
and how much coercive conditions and young age affect criminal responsibility. 
    Ongwen’s story starts similarly to the stories of many child soldiers in Uganda; 
he was abducted by the LRA at the age of ten, and forced to endure brutal training and 
violence. Ongwen learned and suffered the violent life of a child soldier, yet as the years 
passed, he was raised to more prominent positions within the group, and later, as a 
commander, was in charge of ordering and committing human atrocities. 
 Ongwen is now facing criminal charges for all 70 counts brought by the 
prosecution: 
 The alleged crimes were purportedly committed against internally 
displaced persons in northern Uganda between 2002 and 2004. They 
include attack against the civilian population, murder and attempted 
murder, rape, sexual slavery, torture, cruel treatment, and outrages upon 
personal dignity. Others are enslavement, forced marriage as an inhumane 
act, persecution, destruction of property, pillaging, and the conscription 
                                               
7 “Trial of ex-child soldier Dominic Ongwen to hear prosecution case,” The Guardian, January 16, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/jan/16/trial-ex-child-soldier-dominic-ongwen-to-hear-prosecution-
case-icc-uganda.  
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hostilities.8  
 
Most of the charges against Ongwen focus on attacks on refugee camps between 
2002 and 2005 in northeastern Congo in December 2009, in which about 350 civilians 
were killed and another 250, including at least 80 children, were abducted.9  
The defense has concentrated on the fact that Ongwen was brutalized and 
traumatized after being abducted: “He was tortured ... forced to watch people being 
killed, used for fighting as a child soldier” … Such conditions would at least serve as “a 
serious mitigating factor,” explained Thomas Obhof, a US lawyer based in Uganda and 
part of the defense team.10  
So, the central question for the court to decide, as framed by the defense team is 
how much the experience of being an abducted and brutalized as a child and made into a 
soldier unwillingly mitigates (if it does mitigate) the individual criminal responsibility of 
the adult he became? That is the discussion brought forth by the present case. It will be 
the first time that the ICC will hopefully be discussing and position itself regarding the 
criminal responsibility of someone that is considered a perpetrator, yet was made a victim 
by the same organization. 
  
 
                                               
8 Wairagala Wakabi, “Ongwen Trial to Open in December but Defense Cites Challenges”, International 
Justice Monitor, LRA Trials (May 31, 2016), https://www.ijmonitor.org/2016/05/ongwen-trial-to-open-in-
december-but-defense-cites-challenges/). 
9 “Trial of ex-child soldier Dominic Ongwen to hear prosecution case,” The Guardian (January 16, 2017). 
10 “Trial of ex-child soldier Dominic Ongwen to hear prosecution case,” The Guardian (January 16, 2017). 
and use of children under the age of 15 to participate actively in 
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The trial is ongoing, with the prosecution currently making submissions, and it 
only a matter a time before the final adjudications are out, and hopefully the ICC will 
provide an indication of where it stands in relation to cases of criminal accountability of 
former child soldiers.11  
Numbers of active child soldiers. How many? Difficult to know 
‘Any person under eighteen years of age who is part of any kind of regular or 
irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity’ is to be considered a child soldier 
according to the Cape Town Principles and Best Practices of 1997. As of 2007, the Paris 
Principles have instead suggested a new term which would theoretically include a wider 
protection for children involved in armed conflict, and this was labeled: ‘children 
associated with armed forces and armed groups.’ Nonetheless, the academic literature 
and jurists alike have continued to treated children involved in armed conflicts using the 
nomenclature of child soldiers, as it will be done in the present work. 
 According to the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, child soldiers have 
been used in most armed conflicts and almost every region of the world; “tens of 
thousands of children under the age of eighteen continue to serve in government forces or 
armed opposition groups. Some of those involved in armed conflict are under ten years 
old.”12 Despite international organizations’ worldwide advocacy toward putting an end to 
                                               
11 Lino Owor Ogora,”To Punish or to Pardon? Perspectives on Accountability and Forgiveness in the Case 
of Dominic Ongwen, International Justice Monitor, LRA Trials, March 30, 2017, 
https://www.ijmonitor.org/2017/03/to-punish-or-to-pardon-perspectives-on-accountability-and-forgiveness-
in-the-case-of-dominic-ongwen/. 
12 Child Soldiers International, an independent human rights organization previously associated with a 
coalition of leading human rights and humanitarian organizations, Amnesty International; Defense for 
Children International; Human Rights Watch; International Federation Terre des Hommes; International 
Save the Children Alliance; Jesuit Refugee Service; the Quaker United Nations Office—Geneva; and 
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the recruitment and use of child soldiers, the number of governments employing children 
has not decreased since 2004 (from ten situations of 2003 to nine situation of 2004 in 
which governments used children).13 
Child Soldiers International has declared:  
Since January 2011, eighteen states were reported to have used girls or 
boys in hostilities. In some cases, children were deployed as members of 
official state armed forces including, national armies, paramilitaries, civil 
defense, police and other forces established by law (Afghanistan, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo/DRC, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Thailand and Yemen). In 
others they were part of state–allied armed groups such as irregular 
paramilitaries and “self–defense” groups which were backed by, or allied 
to, government forces but were not officially part of them (Central African 
Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen).14 
  
                                                                                                                                            
World Vision International. http://www.child-soldiers.org/our_history.php and “About the issue” and 
“Frequent Asked Questions”: At Child Soldier International: http://www.child-
soldiers.org/about_the_issues.php ; http://www.child-soldiers.org/faq.php. 
13 “Summary”, Child Soldier Global Report, https://www.child-soldiers.org/shop/global-report-2008-1 
(United Kingdom, 2008). 
14 According to Child Soldiers International:  
There are, some states which, contrary to best practice, still permit the voluntary 
recruitment of under-eighteens. According to the latest available information seventeen 
year olds can enlist in the armed forces of Algeria, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, 
Bolivia, Brunei, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Cuba, Cyprus, France, Germany, Israel, 
Jamaica, Lebanon, Malaysia, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, and the USA continue to permit the voluntary 
recruitment at the lower age of sixteen years are: Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, El 
Salvador, India, Iran, Ireland, Jordan, Mauritania, Mexico, Pakistan (with exception of 
aero-technicians), Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, the 
United Kingdom, and Zambia. In a few states, there is no minimum age, or it has been set 
below sixteen years. Such states include Barbados, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Pakistan 
(aero-technicians only), and the Seychelles. 
(“Frequent Answers, and Questions”,  Child Soldier International, http://child-soldiers.org/faq.php and 
http://www.child-soldiers.org/theme_reader.php?id=1). 
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The recruitment of young soldiers is not an approach exclusively perpetuated by 
developing countries; developed countries such as the United Kingdom and the United 
States enlist children (individuals under the age of eighteen) in their military forces. 15  
 Whether forced into service or simply by volunteering to join, it is indisputable 
that children become part of armed forces and armed groups. UNICEF’s data states that 
around 300,000 children–boys and girls under the age of eighteen–are today involved in 
more than 30 conflicts worldwide.16 
 Rachel Brett and Margaret McCallin in 1966 called child soldiers ‘invisible 
soldiers.’17 They are the unseen soldiers; with no precise number of how many child 
soldiers are currently engaged in armed conflicts. There are also no numbers of former 
child combatants. One of the reasons being non-state armed groups, which are the largest 
recruiters of child soldiers, work mostly illegally, with no concern for accountability, 
making it impractical to know how many child soldiers they recruit. Also, it is very 
common for armed groups and armed forces to deny the presence of child soldiers, in an 
attempt to avoid moral and legal consequences: 
                                               
15 In an article published by The Independent regarding the British army, in 2014. “...more than one in 10 
new Army recruits are boy soldiers of just 16 years old, according to the latest figures released by the 
Ministry of Defense. And more than one in four of all new Army recruits is under 18—too young to be sent 
into combat. “UK under fire for recruiting an ‘army of children”, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/uk-under-fire-for-recruiting-an-army-of-children-
9431966.html (May 24, 2014). 
The US also recruits under age soldiers as shown in Sherwood, Ross, “America’s Child Soldiers: US 
Military Recruiting Children to Serve in the Armed Forces,” http://www.globalresearch.ca/america-s-child-
soldiers-us-military-recruiting-children-to-serve-in-the-armed-forces/11210 (November 29, 2008). 
16 “Fact Sheet: Child Soldiers“, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/emergencies/files/childsoldiers.pdf. 
Accessed on November 201 
17 Rachel, Brett, and Margareth McCallin, Children: The Invisible Soldiers. Ed. Radda Barnen (Stockholm: 
Save the Children, 1998). 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
the presence of children in military ranks is not officially acknowledged – 
in fact, is often denied – no measures are taken to prevent their 
deployment. As a result, children are used extensively in hostilities both in 
combat and non-combat roles by national armies of DRC, Myanmar, 
Sudan and Yemen…In some countries, ‘age blindness’ can also be the 
product of not knowing. In Uganda and the Philippines, for example, low 
rates of birth registration result in the likelihood that children are present 
among voluntary recruits.18  
 
Brett and McCallin have acknowledged “there is a wide variation in the estimates 
of the number of child soldiers involved. The total number of child soldiers in each 
country, let alone the global figure, is not only unknown but unknowable. The figures 
presented in their book functions as a ‘best guess’ as of May 1998.”19  
Most of the websites and publications concerning child soldiers borrowed their 
numbers from Graça Machel’ report “Impact of Armed Conflict on Children” requested 
by the UN Secretary-General and submitted under General Assembly resolution 48/157 
of 1996. In her report, she initially indicated that: “an estimated 300,000 children under 
18 are participating in conflicts -- fighting on the front lines, abused as sex slaves or used 
for portering.”20 However, oddly, this estimation is no longer present in her original 
report. As it seems the original passage was substituted by: “…over the past 30 years, 
                                               
18 “Report Louder than Words: An agenda for action to end State Use of Child Soldiers.” Child Soldier 
International, https://www.child-soldiers.org/shop/louder-than-words-1 (United Kingdom, 2012), 24. 
18 Kassier, Glenn. “The zombie claim that 300,000 children are used as child soldiers, The Washington Post 
(January 22, 2016) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/01/22/the-zombie-claim-
that-300000-children-are-used-as-child-soldiers/). 
19 Kassier, Glenn. “The zombie claim that 300,000 children are used as child soldiers, The Washington Post 
(January 22, 2016) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/01/22/the-zombie-claim-
that-300000-children-are-used-as-child-soldiers/).  
20 UNICEF, Press Release Graça Machel calls for an end to impunity for war crimes against children and 
women http://www.unicef.org/newsline/00pr64.htm.  
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government or rebel armies around the world have recruited tens of thousands of 
children.  Most are adolescents, though many child soldiers are ten years of age…”21 
 In conclusion: “…providing authoritative figures for the number of child soldiers 
worldwide today is nearly impossible – all numbers we quote are estimates, and even 
estimates are not available for all situations of conflict,” said Nick Scarborough, 
administrative officer of Child Soldiers International.22  
 With regard to young soldiers recruited by armed forces: 
a survey conducted by Brett and McCallin’s (1998) shows that while most 
state practice tends towards establishing recruitment policies starting at 
age eighteen, a substantial minority (thirty-four, about a third of the total 
surveyed) still recruited from the ages of fifteen, sixteen or seventeen. 
This second group includes some states with significant regional or global 
military capacities (Germany, Indonesia, Israel, South Africa, the UK, the 
USA, and Yugoslavia) and contains representatives of all regions of the 
world and the developing and developed states.23 
  
 More recent data collected by Child Soldier International shows that in the decade 
between 1998 and 2008: “there was evidence that at least 25 states had used children in 
                                               
21 Kassier, The Washington Post, 2016: “Melanie Sharpe, a UNICEF spokeswoman told the Washing Post 
that ‘the 300,000 figure is the only estimate of child soldiers globally, but it is indeed a timeworn stat, and 
we encourage colleagues and partners not to use it.’ Sharp reported that the 300,000-figure first appeared in 
“The Impact of War on Children“ by Graca Machel, published in 2001.  
(https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/01/22/the-zombie-claim-that-300000-
children-are-used-as-child-soldiers/) The book states that “current estimates put the number of child 
soldiers at about 300,000 at any one time.” But when we examined Machel’s footnotes, it turned out that 
she had relied on another source — the second (1998) edition of a 1996 book titled “Children: The 
Invisible Soldiers,” by Rachel Brett and Margaret McCallin. So already, one can see that the 300,000-
number circulating in 2016 as a current fact was based on an estimate first published almost 20 years ago. 
(https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/01/22/the-zombie-claim-that-300000-
children-are-used-as-child-soldiers/. 
22 Kassier, Glenn. “The zombie claim that 300,000 children are used as child soldiers. The Washington Post 
January 22, 2016 (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/01/22/the-zombie-claim-
that-300000-children-are-used-as-child-soldiers/). 
23 Happold, Matthew. “Child Soldiers in International Law: The Legal Regulations of Children’s 
Participation in Hostilities,” in Netherlands International Law Review 1, no. XLVII (2000), 45  
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/26771. 
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armed conflict as part of national armies. The figure for the first half of 2012 was less 
than ten.”24 “In a few cases, an end to or reduced incidence of use of child soldiers by 
national armies is directly attributable to specific protection measures taken by states. 
However, in the majority of cases, the use of child soldiers has ceased simply because 
hostilities have ended.25  
 Some states also continue to deploy child soldiers as confirmed by the Child 
Soldier International report “Louder Than Words”:  
ten States deployed under-18s in hostilities as part of national armies 
(army, navy, air force), between January 2010 and June 2012 (Chad, Côte 
d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya, Myanmar, 
Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, United Kingdom and Yemen). But when the 
wider spectrum of forces for which states are responsible are included 
(other official elements of state armed forces and state-allied armed groups) 
a total of seventeen states are found to have used child soldiers in this 
period (the above, plus Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Eritrea, 
Iraq, the Philippines, Rwanda and Thailand). In another three States: 
Colombia, Israel and Syria children were not formally recruited but were 
nevertheless reported to have been used for military purposes including 
intelligence gathering and as human shields.26 
 
Even when legal measures are in place to avoid the recruiting and deploying of 
children under eighteen, in times of war, states can still make use of younger soldiers by 
justifying the engagement as military necessity. As a result, if a state allows the 
recruitment of young soldiers, there is no guarantee that it will cease using them if it 
needs them.  
                                               
24 Child Soldiers International, “Louder than Words,” (2012), 17. 
25 Child Soldiers International, “Louder than Words,” (2012), 17. 
26 Child Soldiers International, “Louder than Words,” (2012), 11. 
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Background and conceptual framework 
 In International Law, the term ‘responsibility’ traditionally referred (and still 
mostly does) to a ‘State responsibility,’ that is when a State is in violation of its legal 
obligations, thus needing to provide compensation to any other State injured by its 
violations.  The doctrine of State responsibility evolved through custom and had been 
codified by the International Law Commission. The Draft Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 
2001.  
 Until the end of the Second World War, the term ‘international responsibility’ 
was used almost exclusively to state’s violations of its international obligations. 
Afterwards, the term found new connotations under the workings of the International 
Military Tribunals of Nuremberg and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. 
At these Tribunals, men were brought to trial and charged individually for their alleged 
violations of international law. Individual criminal responsibility, previously applied in 
limited cases of piracy and slave trading, was henceforth attributed to war crimes and the 
new category of crimes against humanity.  
 As a result, and since the end of the Second World War, states have been 
authorized (and sometimes required) either to prosecute and punish or to extradite an 
individual accused of having committed serious international crimes.27  
According to international law, individuals unlike states, are subject to being 
accused of international crimes.28 International crimes are understood as acts that violate 
                                               
27 Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008), 3. 
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essential values shared by the international community as a whole. When breaches of this 
kind occur, each state shares the responsibility of bringing the accused to justice.29 In 
other words, international crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction; this means 
basically that any country – irrespective of whether it has a direct jurisdictional link to the 
crimes – can bring the accused to trial. states are obligated to not obstruct justice for the 
accused; therefore they should either “try or extradite” the accused so he or she can be 
brought to justice in another State. This is because international crimes are understood to 
affect the society of states as a whole, therefore allowing states to prosecute the accusers 
independent of the existence of links of nationality or territoriality.  
  
 
                                                                                                                                            
28 In the final draft of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Article 19 
entitled “International Crimes and International Delicts”, which contemplated imposing criminal 
responsibility upon states for serious breaches of IL and international crimes was deleted.  
29 According to Cassese (2008): “International crimes are breaches of international rules entailing the 
personal criminality of the individuals concerned (as opposed to the responsibility of the state of which the 
individual may act as organs). As according to Cassese 2008, International crimes result from the 
cumulative presence of the following elements: 
1. Violation of customary international rules 
2. Violation of rules intended to protect values considered important by the whole international community 
and thus binding to all states and individuals.  
3. There exists a universal interest in repressing these crimes...Under international law, their alleged authors 
may in principle be prosecuted and punished by any state regardless on any territorial or nationality link 
with the perpetrator or the victim. 
4. If the perpetrator has acted in official capacity (de jure or de facto state official) [and is not head of state, 
foreign minister, or diplomatic agent or still serving--because they enjoy complete personal immunity], the 
state on whose behalf is barred from claiming enjoyment of the immunity from the civil or criminal 
jurisdiction of foreign states accruing under customary law. (Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2008, 
11).  
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The central assumption inaugurated by these two tribunals and later serving as the 
main foundation of the newly established International Criminal Law is that individuals 
who seriously violate International Humanitarian Law by committing international 
crimes are to be submitted to the principles of individual criminal responsibility under the 
International Law. 
 Currently, the principle of individual criminal responsibility stands at the center of 
the international criminal legal system: it is to be enforceable at the national and 
international level, and it has received the status of customary law, making it mandatory 
for all states to observe.30 It is regarded as an indisputable advance towards achieving 
international justice, and a significant change from the traditional understanding of 
international responsibility in which states almost exclusively were the ones obligate to 
provide reparation in cases of non–compliance with an international rule that caused 
injury to another party.31    
 Therefore, International Criminal Law deals with the liability of individuals, 
irrespective of who they are: “…the status of the perpetrator is irrelevant, except the 
crime of aggression.” 32 Even “if the perpetrator has acted in official capacity (de jure or 
de facto state official) the state on whose behalf he has performed the prohibited act is 
                                               
30 ICRC,“Customary IHL Handbook: Rule 102. Individual Criminal Responsibility,” https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule102.  
31 International Center for Transitional Justice, “The investigation and prosecution of international crime is 
a fundamental component of transitional justice,” https://www.ictj.org/our-work/transitional-justice-
issues/criminal-justice. Last day accessed: March 22, 2017.   
32 Cryer, R at al, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 5.   
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barred from claiming enjoyment of the immunity from the civil or criminal jurisdiction of 
foreign states accruing under customary law…”33 
 There is no pre-established list of international crimes over which international 
courts exercise jurisdiction. Each international court has the authority to determine its 
jurisdictional limits subject to its constitutive instrument. The most widely accepted list 
of international crimes subject to universal jurisdiction is that found in the Rome Statute, 
and these are the crime of genocide; crimes against humanity; war crimes; the crime of 
aggression.34   
How does criminal law deal with the problem of child perpetrators? 
 
  In domestic law, children are recognized and treated as capable of responding to 
their acts, at least criminal acts, after reaching a certain stipulated age at which he or she 
is deemed legally competent to understand what he or she has done (this is the age of 
legal competence in criminal law, or  the minimum age of criminal responsibility). A 
person who has attained the minimum age of criminal responsibility (MACR) is 
considered to, at least, a priori to understand his/her act and be legally capable of being 
held criminally accountable/responsible. 
  In most systems of criminal law, in addition to the criteria of status, for a person 
to be held criminally liable, the behavior of the accused needs to meet two requirements: 
a wrongful act (actus reus) and a guilty mind (mens rea). These two requirements 
constitute the very concept of a “crime.” For one to “...be guilty of a crime, particularly 
                                               
33 Cassese, International Criminal Law, 12. 
34 Article 5 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
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about serious offenses, it is not enough simply to have done a particular prohibited act; 
there must also be the element of a guilty mind.“35 If the element of mens rea is absent, 
the person may be excused from criminal responsibility. 36 Mens rea, then is the 
subjective criterion for a crime, and consists in the accused having acted with harmful 
intention, knowledge or recklessness as to every element of the offense.37   
 Determining mens rea is one of the most challenging parts of the criminal justice 
process mainly due to the fact that it is impossible to backtrack to the moment of the act, 
get into the accused’s head, and proof harmful intention. All attributions of intention are 
extrapolated from the accused’s and only done a posteriori, of course.  
As in national law, in International Criminal Law a culpable state of mind is 
normally proved in court by circumstantial evidence. In other words, one 
may infer from the facts of the case whether or not the accused, when acting 
in a certain way, willed or was aware, that his conduct would bring about 
certain result… This is the position taken by national and international 
courts.38  
     
In most national criminal systems the lack of mens rea is mainly presumed 
(defense of infancy) in younger children below the age of criminal responsibility.39 
However, if the accused is an older child who has reached the age of criminal 
responsibility, he or she may be considered legally competent to be brought to trial. The 
trial can take place in a juvenile chamber, or depending on the age of the accused and the 
seriousness of the crime, the child can face the adult penal system. It is the prosecution’s 
                                               
35 Happold, “The Age of Criminal Responsibility for International Crimes Under International Law,” 
(2006), 2. 
36 Happold, “The Age of Criminal Responsibility for International Crimes Under International Law,” 2. 
37 Duff, Anthony. “Legal and Moral Responsibility.” Philosophy Compass 4.6 (2009), 978.  
38 Cassese, International Criminal Law, 74. 
39 Happold, “The Age of Criminal Responsibility for International Crimes Under International Law,” 2. 
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duty to “to establish by evidence or informed admission that the child defendant had 
sufficient understanding of the nature of the offense.” 40 So, determining whether a child 
meets the requirement of mens rea, besides being paramount, is widely case-specific 
(context–dependent and better set on a case–by–case basis).  
 The goal here is not to extend the discussion to the viable ways the justice system 
identifies and proves intentional harm, knowledge, or recklessness in a particular crime, 
but to assert that in all of these cases, it should be established first and foremost that the 
accused exercised legal capacity, that he or she was able to understand the act performed, 
and could foresee the possible harmful outcomes.  
How does international law deal with the problem of child soldiers?  
 
International law deal with the problem of child soldiers by utilizing two fronts: 
prohibiting states from recruiting and using children under fifteen years of age (these 
obligations found in International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights 
Law are set on states), and by bringing to justice those adult individuals directly involved 
in conscripting or enlisting children under fifteen to participate in hostilities. The adult 
recruiter is also responsible “…with respect to the acts perpetrated by the child soldier 
him/herself.”41 Both of these positions are present in rules of International Humanitarian 
Law, International Human Rights Law, and International Criminal Law.  
                                               
40 Bennion, Francis. “Mens rea and defendants below the age of discretion.” Criminal Law Review (2009), 
757.  
41 Freeland, Joseph. “How International Law Deals with Child Soldiers,” in ALTA Law Research Series, 
(2010), 3, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ALRS/2010/10.html. 
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 Since no child accused of serious violation of International Humanitarian and 
Human Rights law has been brought before an international court or national court, it is – 
at first glance – uncertain whether children are deemed legally subject to the international 
criminal system.  
Purpose of the study 
 This dissertation will focus on the contributions of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone in generating evidence of law on the issue of children’s criminal responsibility for 
serious breaches of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights 
Law. The emphasis on the Special Court serves to answer, at least partially, the more 
general question of children’s individual criminal responsibility in International Criminal 
Law. 
Research questions 
 
1- What is International Criminal Law’s position on children accused of international 
crimes? Can children old enough to be legally recruited be considered old enough to be 
held criminally responsible? Are children deemed subjects of the international criminal 
system? 
 
2- How important to the development of International Criminal Law was the Special 
Court’s decision to include children under eighteen years old as potentially liable for 
criminal prosecution?  
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Definition of terms and some more theoretical framework 
 
 ‘Children’ will be considered ‘anyone below the age of eighteen, unless 
previously granted majority by domestic law treated’ as defined by Article 1 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.  
 ‘Child soldiers’ for the current work is understood as defined by the 2007 Paris 
Principles as ‘any person below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used 
by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, 
boys and girls used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies, or for sexual purposes. 
It does not only refer to a child who is taking or has taken a direct part in hostilities’ 
(Principle 2.1). 
The terms related to engagement with military services are borrowed from the 
Report, Louder than Words (2012), published by Child Soldier International in which:  
‘Recruitment’: Refers to the means by which people become (formally or informally) 
members of armed forces or armed groups; ‘Enlistment or voluntary recruitment’ occurs 
when persons facing no threat or penalty join armed forces or groups of their own free 
will; ‘Conscription’ is compulsory recruitment into armed forces; ‘Forced recruitment’ is 
a form of forced labor: it takes place without the consent of the person joining the armed 
forces or armed groups. It is achieved mainly through coercion, abduction or under threat 
of penalty; ‘Unlawful Recruitment‘ refers to the recruitment of children under the age 
stipulated by international treaties applicable to the armed forces or armed groups.42 
                                               
42 “Louder than Words” (2012), 8-9. 
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 Responsibility in criminal law and for the purpose of this work will be treated as 
conceptualized by Duff (2007) as answerability. To be responsible is to be answerable; 
“answerable to a person or body who has the right or standing to call me to account; and I 
am thus answerable in virtue of some normatively laden description, typically a 
description of a role, that I satisfy.”43  
 Responsibility, then, is invoked when someone has acted or failed to act in a 
matter that was consistent with a certain set of rules, and thus was expected to behave in 
such a way as to not cause some form of harm to somebody. “When we hold an agent 
accountable for his actions, we do not merely demand an explanation for his actions. The 
agent’s explanations make sense only because we think that there are norms that apply to 
the agent.”44  
 The concept of accountability/responsibility is coupled with the idea that the act 
committed has caused some form of physical or/and moral damage to another person or 
institutions that can hold or request the doer to be held accountable. Accountability 
initially involves that the person assumes some form of reparation of the damage done. 
 It is a commonplace that responsibility involves a dyadic relationship: an agent is 
responsible for something. The relational conception of responsibility that concerns us 
here is not merely dyadic, but triadic: I am responsible for X, to S – a person or body who 
has the standing to call me to answer for X…45  
                                               
43 Duff, Antony, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law, (Oxford: Hart 
2007), 23. 
44 Tadros, Victor, Criminal Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 29. 
45 Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (2007), 23. 
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 Action is the main basis for attributing responsibility. When we hold a person 
responsible, we hold them responsible for some act, which can ironically include failing 
to act when it was expected thus generating some form of damage to another party.  
 Because “responsibility is fundamentally connected to answerability,” the person 
who performed the act is indeed requested to provide an answer/provide a justification 
for his actions, and if no suitable justification/explanation is provided, then he or she who 
suffered the from the act may wish to file some claim against the perpetrator.46 If an 
acceptable justification is given, then the perpetrator may have his or her responsibility 
demised or waived completely.47 
 According to Tadros (2005) when an agent is held to account for his actions, he is 
required to provide an explanation. ‘Why did you do this?’ tends to be the most intuitive 
question asked, where the person who suffered the harm is requesting an explanation 
regarding the reasons that motivated the doer’s actions. In other words, he is asked to 
show that his motivating reasons correspond to normative reasons: reasons that ought to 
have guided his actions. The relationship between motivating reasons and normative 
reasons can help us to understand something further about reactive attitude of the 
agents.48 
 As highlighted, attributing responsibility for something involves holding “reactive 
attitudes towards the person to be held responsible… such as resentment, condemnation 
                                               
46 Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (2005), 25 and Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability 
in the Criminal Law (2007), 16. 
47 Tadros, Criminal Responsibility, 25. 
48 Tadros, 2005, 25. Also see Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law 
(2007), 63.  
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as well as gratitude and approval.” And these reactive attitudes “generate the social 
practices of passing and blaming the individual.”49   
 In sum, and very broadly, responsibility is to hold someone(s) or an institution 
answerable for its acts (or negligence) when it causes some form of damage to someone 
other than to the accused. Thus, responsibility does not necessarily need to entail criminal 
responsibility. Criminal responsibility is a form of individual responsibility as we will see 
below. Most wrongful acts that give rise to responsibility on the part of the accused are 
indeed not infringements of criminal law. 
From moral responsibility to criminal responsibility 
 
 Moral responsibility and criminal responsibility are intimately related.50 
Normally, criminal laws tend to prescribe moral behavior. An act that is criminal is, with 
a few exceptions, morally condemned.51 Yet, there are some instances in which the 
infringement of a criminal rule may not carry the weight of moral condemnation. And for 
theses cases, it is common for the defense to present some form of excuse or justification 
for the action of the accused.  Excuses, in general, aim at negating criminal responsibility 
altogether, while justifications act to argue against a possible incrimination (liability) yet 
not negating responsibility. Baron makes a clear distinction between excuses and 
justifications: “[T]o say that an action is justified is to say... that though the action is of a 
                                               
49 Tadros, Criminal Responsibility, 24.   
50 Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (2007), 29. 
51 When moral behavior is equivalent to the compliance of criminal laws, which reflects the majority of 
cases, and the doer has indeed infringed moral acceptance, moral responsibility acts justifying some form 
of retribution (Waller, Bruce N, Against Moral Responsibility (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011), 2. 
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type that is usually wrong, in these circumstances it was not wrong. To say that an action 
is excused, by contrast, is to say that it was indeed wrong (and the agent did commit the 
act we are saying was wrong), but the agent is not blameworthy.”52   
 Criminal responsibility necessarily involves the breach of criminal rules. Duff 
explains that “…criminal responsibility is a particular species of responsibility” and 
Tadros adds that, in fact, responsibility is a necessary condition for criminal 
responsibility. 53 Because responsibility is understood as an act (or lack of action) which 
demands/asks for justification, Tadros continues, identifying “the practice of holding an 
agent criminally responsible for breaching the criminal law is a specific instance of the 
more general practice of holding agents responsible for what they do.”54 Thus 
responsibility is to be treated as a necessary condition for criminal responsibility.55  
 In most cases, a criminal act also carries moral condemnation thus qualifying the 
accused (by our reactive attitudes) for some form of retribution. Therefore, criminal 
responsibility functions similarly to moral responsibility, yet it is considered a more 
serious infringement of moral values, and, more importantly, a direct violation of existing 
criminal law. 
 Criminal responsibility and criminal liability 
 
 When inquiring on the topic of legal responsibility one often stumbles upon the 
                                               
52 Baron, ‘Justifications and Excuses’, Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, (2005), 389–90. 
53 Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (2007), 36 and Tadros, 
Criminal Responsibility, 63. 
54 Tadros, Criminal Responsibility, 21. 
55 Tadros, Criminal Responsibility, 63. 
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term “legal liability.”  Are ‘legal liability’ and ‘legal responsibility’ synonymous? No. 
According to Tadros (2005) and Duff (2007) responsibility is distinct and prior to 
liability. A person can be held responsible for violating a rule/law, yet may not be found 
liable he/she is able to produce an excuse that precludes his or her responsibility. Being 
liable is being subject to some form of retribution. The same applies to criminal 
responsibility and criminal liability. Duff argues that”…being held liable is equivalent to 
being condemned by the referent legal authority, or authoritative organ to respond 
punitively to the acts committed.”56 A person is considered liable after the authorized 
organ has affirmed his or her condemnation for the act in question, and no exemptions or 
excuses for their actions were presented or accepted. If an excuse or exemption has been 
in fact accepted, then the accused can be held ‘criminally responsible without being 
criminally liable’. The presenting of exemptions or excuses functions to impede the 
transferal of responsibility to liability, while not necessarily eliminating criminal 
responsibility.  In other words, the presentation of an excuse, which precludes liability, is 
what allows for the distinction between responsibility and liability, while not necessarily 
exempting criminal responsibility. 57 
 Excuses and justification tend to affect the moral aspect of criminal responsibility 
as well, describing the perception of blame. For example, when a person has acted 
heroically saving someone’s life yet damaging private/military property as an un-
calculated effect, or maybe has kidnapped a person in order to save her from a life 
                                               
56 Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law, 36. 
57 Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law, 22-23. 
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threatening situation, the damaging act was indeed performed, yet it is possible to argue 
against the existence of an intention to harm or of a violation of a moral rule.\ 
Why is this topic interesting?  
 
Criminal law tends to function by constructing clear cut distinctions between the 
victim and the perpetrator. However, in working with the issue of child soldiers and 
criminal accountability for those who have committed gross international law breaches, 
this dissertation necessarily challenges this binary configuration of criminal law. A child 
who has committed international crimes is usually framed first as a victim even though he 
or she is accused of being a perpetrator. This work, therefore, calls for the creation of a 
category of victim-perpetrator for children old enough to be considered legally capable of 
exercising criminal responsibility over their acts while still potentially victims 
themselves.    
Procedures / Methods:  
The method applied for the analysis of child criminality under international law 
will follow the lines of Legal Positivism, aiming at the delineation of the current state of 
the law on the proposed problem. As explained by Bruno Simma and Andreas L. Paulus 
in their work ‘The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights in Internal Conflicts: 
A Positivist View’ (1999): a positivist approach to in a legal investigation focuses 
primarily on an analysis of the existent sources of law: primary and secondary sources are 
given priority, followed by an interpretation and explanation of the application of the 
relevant sources to the problem. According to the authors, a positivist approach is one 
which understands international law as “a unified system of rules that, according to most 
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variants, emanate from state will. This system of rules is treated as an ‘objective’ reality 
and needs to be distinguished from its normative counterpart: ‘as it should be’.”58  
A legal positivist view of international law, implies that: 
 
all norms derive their pedigree from one of the traditional sources of 
international law, custom and treaty. Treaties embody the express consent 
of states, custom nothing but their tacit consent. The only relevant conduct 
is that of states seen as unitary actors. Treaties, including so-called 
lawmaking treaties-e.g., those creating new rules or changing old ones-are 
binding upon the contracting parties only. Whether habitual conduct of 
states amounts to legally binding customs is a question of objective 
determination of fact. 59  
 
 In practical terms, legal positivism offers a legal approach constructed based on 
the investigation of the relevant legal sources. So, first, we will be delving into 
International Humanitarian Rights and Human Rights treaties, as well as rules of law 
from these regimes that have achieved customary status regarding the recruitment and use 
of children in armed conflict. The next step then is to inquire into how international 
criminal courts define and treat the crime of child soldiering. 
 Also, when conducting an analysis in the area of International Criminal Law, I 
will be giving special attention to customary law, the law understood as binding upon all 
states. The choice is due to the fact that international criminal courts tend to utilize 
customary norms or universally binding norms as residual law, in an attempt, to fill a 
legal gap whenever there is no direct rule or ruling which may serve as guidance.  
                                               
58 Simma, Bruno, and Andreas L. Paulus, “The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in 
Internal Conflicts,” in The American Journal of International Law, (April 1999), 304. Accessed January 18, 
2016. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2997991.  
59 Simma, Bruno, and Andreas L. Paulus. “The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in 
Internal Conflicts,” 305. 
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Another reason is of using customary law is to avoid clashing with the principle of 
legality which is also understood as a “a norm of customary international law applicable 
in both international and non-international armed conflicts.”60 
 
The principle of legality expresses that:  
 
No one may be accused or convicted of a criminal offence on account of 
any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under 
national or international law at the time it was committed; nor may a 
heavier penalty be imposed than that which was applicable at the time 
the criminal offence was committed. 61 
 
 
When no customary rules are found, the analysis extends to treaty rules, followed 
by principles of international criminal law, and finally general principles of international 
law, as explained by Cassese (2008).62  Next, I will be analyzing the Statutes and case 
                                               
60 “Rule 101. The Principle of Legality”, Customary IHL, ICRC,  https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule101, (April 26, 2017).  
61 “Rule 101. The Principle of Legality”, Customary IHL, ICRC: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule101, (April 26, 2017).  
62 As explained by jurist Antonio Cassese:  
One should start by looking for treaty rules and/or rules laid down in international 
instruments considered binding, as, resolutions of the UNSC, as it is the case for the 
statutes of the international courts, when these treaty rules or resolutions contain the 
provisions conferring jurisdiction on the court and setting out the procedure. When such 
rules are lacking contain gaps, one should resort to customary law or treaties implicitly or 
explicitly referred to in the rules above.  When even this set of general or treaty rules is of 
no avail, one should apply general principles of ICL, such as the principle of non-
retroactivity or the principle of command responsibility. These principles can be inferred, 
by the process of induction and generalization, from treaty provisions or customary rules. 
When even the principles do not prove helpful, one could rely, as a fallback, on general 
principles of law (such as the principles of respect for human rights). If one still does not 
find the applicable rule or, more often, if the rule contains a gap or it is at any rate 
insufficient, one may resort to general principles of criminal law common to the nations 
of the world, such as the ban on denial of justice, the doctrine of res judicata…  
Cassese, International Criminal Law, 14-5. 
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law originated by the international criminal tribunals. A more detailed discussion of the 
methods applied here is to be found in the following chapter.  
Significance of the study 
 
While most works on the issue of child soldiers and criminal accountability focus 
on normative accounts when delving into the question of whether children should be 
subject to the principle of individual criminal responsibility under international criminal 
law for the commission of international crimes, the present work is one of the few which 
investigates the ‘black letter of the law’ to provide an answer to the above question.  
 A few authors, such as Happold (2005) and Grover (2012) affirm that the lack of 
an established minimum age of criminal responsibility in international law impedes or at 
least makes it hard for international courts to judge anyone below the age of eighteen. 
However, the research suggests that during the elaboration of the Statute of the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the UN Secretary General with authorization of the UN 
Security Council has utilized what I will call ‘the Minimum Age of Legal Recruitment’ 
(MALR) of children into the military (set at fifteen) as a reference for the establishment 
of a minimum age of criminal responsibility at the SCSL.  This suggests a correlation 
between the minimum age of legal recruitment as set by International Humanitarian Law 
and the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility (MACR) inaugurated by the SCSL’s 
Statute. 
 The research also indicates that the SCSL Statute has indeed created evidence of 
law on an MACR within international criminal law that can be used by other international 
criminal courts and national courts adjudicating against international crimes. 
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Finally, the research suggests that by including those starting at age fifteen within 
the jurisdiction of the court, the SCSL has recognized these children as a priori subjects 
of the international criminal system. 
Limitations of the study  
 
One of the main challenges when conducting this dissertation was the lack of data 
related to the numbers of child soldiers actively in duty, enlisted both in the armed forces 
and in armed groups. As stated in previous sections of this chapter, “…the total number 
of child soldiers in each country, let alone the global figure, is not only unknown but 
unknowable.”63 And “…providing authoritative figures for the number of child soldiers 
worldwide today is nearly impossible – all numbers we quote are estimates, and even 
estimates are not available for all situations of conflict.”64 The only numbers made 
available that were accessible were the names of countries that allow military recruitment 
by their armed forces below the age of eighteen. In some cases, even these numbers are 
not reliable. In some countries due to problems of birth registration, loss of paperwork, or 
even deliberate age blindness, countries may recruit under fifteens and register them as 
older.  There are no viable means of getting the information on how many children are 
involved in armed groups. Armed groups, by definition, mostly function outside of the 
law, and do not register information about their personnel.  Consequently, it must be 
                                               
63 Kassier, Glenn. “The zombie claim that 300,000 children are used as child soldiers. The Washington Post 
January 22, 2016.https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/01/22/the-zombie-claim-
that-300000-children-are-used-as-child-soldiers/). 
64 Kassier, Glenn. “The zombie claim that 300,000 children are used as child soldiers. The Washington Post 
January 22, 2016.https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/01/22/the-zombie-claim-
that-300000-children-are-used-as-child-soldiers/).  
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understood that it is infeasible to accurately estimate the number of how many child 
soldiers have been involved in the commission of serious breaches of international 
humanitarian law.   
An additional complication arising when trying to estimate the number of child 
soldiers employed is the fact that countries conceptualize the term child soldier in 
different ways. In some countries where the minimum age of legal enlistment is eighteen, 
for example, anyone below this age would be considered a child soldier, recruited 
illegally. On the other hand, if the minimum age were set at fifteen or sixteen, then a 
person within the stipulated allowed age, even though below eighteen, would be 
considered a legal soldier by the recruiting armed force. International standards set at 
eighteen the age below which one is a child soldier; however, these standards are not 
binding, and countries exercise the liberty to define their guidelines and rules. Also, the 
two international legal regimes that prohibited states recruiting children recognize ‘child 
soldiers’ differently. For example, International Humanitarian Law recognizes children 
over fifteen, recruited legally as combatants, while International Human Rights Law 
recognizes them as maintaining their status and special protection as children.  
Goals  
1. Call attention to the underrepresented and unproblematized issue of child soldiers 
recruited legally into the armed forces 
2. Highlight the Statute of the SCSL as the only international legal instrument that 
directly addresses the criminal liability of children accused of serious violations of 
International Humanitarian Law, emphasizing its creation of evidence of law on the 
issue. 
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3. Theorize the decision of the SCSL to set fifteen as the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility, asking if and how the SCSL decision to grant criminal responsibility 
for juveniles affects, more generally, the development of a possible rule of MACR set 
at fifteen in International Criminal Law.  
4. Develop a theoretical approach which explains the relationship between the liberty 
rights to enlist and individual criminal responsibility (to be developed for future 
research) 
Organization of the study 
 
 The work is organized in eight relatively brief chapters. Following the 
introduction, chapter two problematizes how international discourses (sources from 
international organizations, international non-governmental organizations, media outlets 
and certain academics) represent the figure of the child soldier as a single story of a 
young child from the developing world who has been pressured or forced by means of 
violence to engage in an armed conflict, mostly against his or her will. This 
representation feeds into the primary discourse of the victimhood of children in the 
debates about child soldiers and their potential criminal accountability. The end of the 
chapter calls attention to the dangers of a single story representation, thus making it 
unfeasible to conceive other descriptions of child soldiers.  
Chapter three begins setting the terms of the debate, making it clear that the 
research proposes a legal positivist investigation aiming at identifying, through an 
analysis of the legal sources of International Law and International Criminal Law, the 
current state of the law on the issue of children involved in the commission of 
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international crimes. The chapter  also clarifies that despite the importance of moral and 
political debates on child prosecution and the goals of international law, the research will 
not be delving deep into these areas.   
 In chapter four, the reader is introduced to a brief illustration of how currently the 
concept of childhood is understood in the human sciences (more specifically in 
Psychology) as a non-adult being in an adult-centric world, and how such descriptions 
affect the ways by which law makers create and enforce legal standards for children. It 
will be identified an overwhelming tendency of current existing debates on child soldiers 
of presenting themselves in normative accounts founded by liberal and universal 
conceptions of childhood, focusing on children’s incompetence, lack of legal and moral 
agency, victimhood.  
In chapter five, the dissertation delves into the legal analysis. Emphasis will be 
given to treaty and customary law developed for the protection of children, below the age 
of fifteen, from recruitment and use in armed conflict. This chapter calls attention to the 
failure of international law’s provisions in completely banning the use of children 
between the ages of fifteen and eighteen by armed forces and armed groups, thus framing 
the recruitment of these children, in most cases, as complying with international 
customary humanitarian law, and therefore as lawful.    
 After having illustrated the main provisions protecting children from early 
military recruitment and use, chapter six presents an overview of how international law 
scholars structure the issue of how international law deals with the issue of child soldiers 
and criminal accountability. Here, it is possible to identify a shift in interpretation from a 
more traditional account of children’s victimhood and lack of criminal responsibility 
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compatible with what was presented in chapter three, into new positions which focus on 
interpretations of international law which license criminal accountability to those fifteen 
or older who have been accused of international crimes.  
 Chapter seven comprises the second part of the legal analysis. In it, I will present 
how international law, via the works of international courts, addresses those individuals 
who are accused of the commission of serious breaches of International Humanitarian 
Law and International Human Rights Law. Special emphasis is given to the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone for being the first international court to recognize juveniles as legally 
capable of infringing international law, and to include them, starting from age fifteen, 
within the jurisdiction ratione personae of the court.  
The chapter concludes by suggesting these inclusions in the SCSL Statute 
reflected the UN Security Council and the UN Secretary- General’s acknowledgment that 
juveniles accused of serious violations of international law are at least a priori considered 
viable subjects of the international criminal system.  
 The final chapter begins with a brief discussion of what it means to be a subject in 
the international legal system, that is, being deemed capable of infringing the rules of a 
legal system and thus responsible for those infringements.  
 It must be pointed out that International Humanitarian Law and International 
Human Rights Law create obligations for all individuals qua individual irrespective of 
age, which fulfills the most evident criterion of legal personality under international 
criminal law. (We will have already established in previous chapters that children are 
granted international legal rights under International Human Rights and International 
Humanitarian Law regimes). Next, the dissertation turns to a complementary line of 
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thought that supports the arguments that children legally recruited according to the 
criteria specified by International Humanitarian Law are to be deemed legally competent 
to exercise both the “liberty right” of military enlistment and being subject to the 
principle of criminal responsibility for acts committed while in the field. The rationale 
sustaining this conclusion rests on the concomitant relationships between liberty rights, 
legal competence, and individual responsibility. 
 I intend to explore with greater depth the suggested relationship between the 
minimum age of legal recruitment and the minimum age of criminal responsibility, to 
develop a possible hypothesis regarding why the SCSL chose fifteen as their minimum 
age for criminal prosecution.  It will be suggested that the underlying foundation for the 
linkage between the minimum age of recruitment and the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility is the relationship between responsibility rights and liberty rights.  
 Cipriani’s and Hohfeld’s respective theories of rights, as well as theoretical 
contributions from Tadros’ and Duff’s work on responsibility will be important sources 
when extending the represent research in an attempt to build a theoretical foundation to 
argue that liberty rights granted by International Humanitarian Law to children 
voluntarily starting at age fifteen is ultimately founded on the presumption of legal 
competence. The same presumption of legal competence is also what embodies and 
qualifies the juvenile for criminal responsibility. Therefore, liberty rights and 
responsibility coexist in a direct relationship, one enabling the other, as explained by 
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Cipirani (2009) in Children’s Rights and the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility.65 
In simple terms: competence for early enlistment when granted to a young recruit, even 
though only presumed, gives rise, at least legally, to individual responsibility. 
  
                                               
65 Cipriani, Don, Children’s Rights and the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility: A Global Perspective 
(Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishers, 2009). 
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Chapter 2: Overview of how child soldiers are represented by UN officials, international 
organizations and academics 
 
 
At first blush, the concept of the child soldier seems an unnatural 
conflation of two contradictory and incompatible terms. The first, child, 
typically refers to a young person between infancy and youth and connotes 
immaturity, simplicity, and an absence of full physical, mental, and 
emotional development. The second, soldier, generally refers to men and 
women who are skilled warriors.66 
  
This chapter offers an initial exploration on the topic of child soldiering and how 
international law and academics set the terms of the debate. More specifically, the 
chapter will show how most accounts of child soldiers presuppose universal narratives of 
childhood, ineptitude and victimhood ‘de-territorializes’ the experiences and varieties of 
the experiences of children and their involvement in armed conflicts. By de-
territorialization I mean a type of characterization that fails to honor the diversity that 
arises from the multiplicity of cases of child soldiering, by creating a simple narrative, or 
limited narratives of the experience of child soldiering. To illustrate the lack of variance 
on how the phenomenon of child soldier is portrayed, I will be illustrating the main 
discursive constructions / images of child soldiers reproduced by the media, legal experts 
and academics, emphasizing how they tend to reproduce certain stereotypes which 
override and restricts the viability of other narratives of child soldiering and child 
soldiers. The difficulty of assessing the numbers of children employed in armed conflicts 
will also be highlighted.  
                                               
66 Rosen, David M, Armies of the Young: Child Soldiers in War and Terrorism (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press, 2005), 3. 
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Images of child soldiers  
When we think of child soldiers, what usually comes to mind is an image of an 
African child, frequently young, holding a firearm, and with a sense of lost childhood 
reflected in his or her eyes. This image is widely portrayed in media outlets as depicting 
the phenomenon of child soldiering, yet it is not necessarily accurate.  Although 40% of 
the cases of child soldiering are indeed placed in Africa, the rest of the countries and 
armed groups outside of Africa are responsible for  60% of child soldiers, despite being 
less visible. 67 Drumbl calls attention to the need to resist “tiresome tendencies that 
Africanize a global phenomenon and pathologize African conflicts.”68 Neither are all 
child soldiers from poor, economically debilitated countries; developed countries such as 
the UK, Australia, and the US allow recruitment of individuals under the age of eighteen 
for military duty. Most of the children used in armed conflicts are from armed groups 
which mostly operate unlawfully; yet a significant portion of these child recruits are from 
governmental forces, and some have been recruited lawfully.   
 In order to work towards de-pathologizing the phenomenon of child soldiering 
away from an exclusively African or third world country experience, and widen the 
perspectives of the debate by providing a more diverse typology, Drumbl in 
‘Reimagining child soldiers’ (2012) offers four main categories of child soldiers as 
represented by what he calls “transnational discourses.”69 These are 1) the faultless 
                                               
67 Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy, 6.   
68 Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy, 6.   
69 Transitional discourses are discourses emanating from entities influential to the characterization and 
treatment of the issue at hand. In the case of child soldiers I would say, particular IOs and NGOs dealing 
with child soldiers, children’s rights, the ICRC, UN agencies, the UN organs, government officials, media, 
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victims; 2) damaged goods; 3) the hero, 4) a demon and bandit. It is important to 
emphasize that these categories are ideal types. Therefore, it is highly likely to identify 
one or more images interposing on single cases. Fortunately, Drumbl is among the few 
who identifies the viability of more than one characterization of a child soldier. 
 The most common characterization of child soldiers delineated by Drumbl is that 
of a child victim: a victim of the externalities of the war, of poverty, misery, and 
suffering, of adults‘ abuses, and of their own vulnerabilities. The image of the ‘faultless 
passive victim’ abducted, coerced into service, manipulated by the adult who lacks moral 
rectitude, and who forces children to fight and to kill is the most widely spread image of 
child soldiers, especially among IOs, NGOs and media outlets. “The faultless passive 
victim images binds communities of conscience” and feeds into the narrative of Western 
humanitarianism, reinforcing the discourse that besides faultless for their acts, these 
children have not choice but being rescued/saved by the good will of international 
agencies.70  
  The second image is that of the children involved in the armed conflict as 
‘damaged goods’; part of a lost generation, physiologically injured, traumatized and in 
need of being rescued. This characterization is mostly utilized by international 
organizations involved with the rescue and rehabilitation of child soldiers. Below, is a 
                                                                                                                                            
academics…they all feed into what Drumbl calls the construction of a “legal imagination”: “a normative, 
aspirational, and operational mix of international law, policy, and practice—constituted as it is directly and 
indirectly by a broad constellation of actors.” (Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law 
and Policy, 9).   
70 Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy, 8-9. 
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part of a letter sent by Human Rights Watch Executive Director, Peter Takirambudde, to 
Sierra Leonean President Kabbah in 1999 on the recruitment of child soldiers.  
Emotionally and physically immature, children are ill-equipped to deal 
with the harsh realities of armed conflict. Because of their inexperience 
and lack of training, child soldiers suffer far higher casualty rates than 
their adult counterparts. Those who survive may be permanently 
disabled or bear psychological scars from being forced to both commit 
and witness horrific atrocities. Former child combatants often require 
much more intensive rehabilitation and reintegration services than adult 
soldiers following a conflict. Often denied an education and the 
opportunity to learn skills that are beneficial to civilian society, former 
child combatants are often drawn back into conflicts and are easy prey 
for armed groups and criminal gangs.71 
 
  The third image is of a demon and / or bandit, a child who is: irredeemable, 
baleful, or sinister; an instrument of war manipulated by adult malefactors. Child soldiers 
can be regarded as beasts with no mercy and no moral standing. Some are even framed as 
delighted by the power that comes from holding the position of a soldier and owing a 
firearm, while others seem entertained by all of the violence they are capable of 
executing. Child soldiers were “… feared by many for their brutality.”72 “These new 
soldiers are not simply children; they can also be callous killers capable of the most 
terrible acts of cruelty and brutality.”73 The image of a child soldier as a demon and 
bandit is mostly commonly promoted by people and societies who have witnessed and 
suffered the violence committed by these young soldiers.  
                                               
71 “Letter to Sierra Leonean President Kabbah on the Recruitment of Child Soldiers” (1999), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/1999/05/03/letter-sierra-leonean-president-kabbah-recruitment-child-soldiers. 
72 Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, S/2000/915 (4 
Oct. 2000), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Establishment/S-2000-915.pdf. 
73 Singer, Peter W, “Child Soldiers: The New Faces of War,” in Brookings Institution (2005), 14.    
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 The fourth and last image is of a child soldier as a hero. Someone who has 
sacrificed himself to join a morally urgent fight, for example, a young soldier who has 
joined the resistance to fight against external oppression. Commonly, the images of 
young soldiers as heroes are mostly propagated by armed forces and armed groups to 
target possible recruits in similar hardship. 
I have chosen to use Drumbl’s typology because it is possible to identify these 
‘ideal type’ characterizations in most discourses about child soldiers.  Overall, Drumbl’s 
typology calls attention to the overwhelming presence of the first two images of child 
soldiers: the ‘faultless victims’, and ‘damage goods;’ as we will see in the section below.  
Child soldiers as described by international organizations  
Specialized IOs and NGOs working with child soldiers produce and publicize a 
body of literature that is considered authoritative by many, despite those groups’ political 
interest in the issue. In this section, it will be shown, as an example, how a few main IOs 
and NGOs that work with children in armed conflicts share a set of perceptions of how 
they perceive and categorize child soldiers.   
 Child Soldier International is the leading NGO addressing the problem of child 
soldiering. The organization also works towards ending the military recruitment of 
persons under eighteen. It recognizes child soldiers as “children (under eighteen) who are 
used for military purposes.”74   
                                               
74 “Who are the child soldiers?,” Child Soldiers International (Last accessed April 26, 2017),  
https://www.child-soldiers.org/child-soldiers-war-conflict-what-where-who-why 
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Child Soldier International functions with a broad definition of child soldier that aligns 
with the conceptualizations offered by the Cape Town Principles and the Paris 
Principles.75  
 The organization’s website, under the title “What are Child Soldiers?”  describes 
child soldiers as mostly victims of abused by their commanders, forced to commit violent 
acts, to kill, to follow any rule despite their moral judgment.  
Some child soldiers are used for fighting – they’re forced to take part in 
wars and conflicts, obliged to kill, and commit other acts of violence. 
Some are compelled to act as suicide bombers. Some join ‘voluntarily,’ 
driven by poverty, sense of duty, or circumstance…Child soldiers can be 
both boys and girls. While some may be in their late teens, others are as 
young as four years old.76 
 
The strategic use of the word ‘some’ to indicate the possibility that not all are 
submitted to this type of violent treatment, yet the organization fails to offer an 
alternative description of what a child soldier may encounter when they are recruited to 
duty.  
                                               
75 “Who are the child soldiers?,” Child Soldiers International, ((Last accessed April 26, 2017)  
https://www.child-soldiers.org/child-soldiers-war-conflict-what-where-who-why. 
The Cape Town Principles (1997) and the Paris Principles (2007) were the products of conventions held to 
determine State guidelines when dealing with children involved in armed conflicts. These conventions, 
despite not generating binding obligations on the part of the State “consolidated global humanitarian 
knowledge and experience in working to prevent recruitment, protect children, support their release from 
armed forces or armed groups and reintegrate them into civilian life” and were essential to set guidelines 
and principles which effectively influence the legal debate on child soldiers, as well as future treaties on the 
topic. In other words, there conventions were central in setting the stage for the development of the treaties 
aimed at the protection of children in times of war. (UNICEF, “Child protection from violence, exploitation 
and abuse: Paris principles and Paris commitments,” 
https://www.unicef.org/protection/57929_58012.html). 
76 “Who are the child soldiers?,” Child Soldiers International (Last accessed April 26, 2017),  
https://www.child-soldiers.org/child-soldiers-war-conflict-what-where-who-why  
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 The word “voluntarily” is presented between quotation marks, indicating that the 
organization does not believe that child soldiers can be entitled to a genuine choice to 
enlist. For this reason, CSI legal adviser Tomaso Falchetta has expressed the view that: 
“child soldiers should be considered as victims and the NGO opposed their prosecution, 
as emphasis should be on the criminal responsibility of the adult recruiter… The CSI 
does not advocate for a cutoff point for the prosecution of child soldiers, as it is a difficult 
issue.”77 Child Soldier International expresses the opinion that even when recruitment is 
done lawfully, it is still to de condemned because it “puts [children] at undue risk and 
jeopardizes their human rights”78 
Child Soldier International may be among the very few NGOs that recognizes the 
fact that at least one developed country, Great Britain, recruits underage soldiers into its 
armed forces as standard policy. “Child soldiers are recruited and used by both official 
government armed forces and armed groups around the world…Today, most state armed 
forces worldwide only recruit adults (from age eighteen). But some countries still recruit 
children under the age of eighteen – for example the UK, Myanmar, and Afghanistan” 
which would technically, as we will see in the coming chapters, qualify as a child 
soldier.79    
Human Rights Watch offers a more explicit victimized characterization of child 
soldiers, framing the child soldier as an underprivileged child from a developing country, 
                                               
77 IRIN, “Should child soldiers be prosecuted for their crimes?” (October 6, 2011), 
http://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2011/10/06/should-child-soldiers-be-prosecuted-their-crimes. 
78 Child Soldier International, “Child Recruitment,” https://www.child-soldiers.org/child-recruitment. 
79 Child Soldier International, “What are child soldiers?”, https://www.child-soldiers.org/about-the-issue. 
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suffering from poverty, war, fear, lacking opportunities, and more commonly than not, 
severely abused and taken advantage of. The involvement of the child with the armed 
conflict is mostly a product of abduction, forcible recruitment, or an act of desperation on 
the part of the child. The possibility of voluntary enlistment into armed conflict is 
represented as nonexistent. 
Thousands of children are serving as soldiers in armed conflicts around 
the world. These boys and girls, some as young as eight years old, serve in 
government forces and armed opposition groups. They may fight on the 
front lines, participate in suicide missions, and act as spies, messengers, or 
lookouts. Girls may be forced into sexual slavery. Many are abducted or 
recruited by force, while others join out of desperation, believing that 
armed groups offer their best chance for survival.80 
  
 The organization published several reports about child soldiers in which it 
explores the lives of child soldiers, both from armed groups and from armed forces in 
South Sudan, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, India’s Chhattisgarh State, Congo, Chad, Nepal, 
Sri Lanka, Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Colombia, Northern 
Uganda, Angola, Burma ranging from years 2003 to 2015.  All countries in the report 
were from the developing world, facing serious economic and security challenges. In 
addition, the children focused fit the stereotype of an underprivileged child suffering 
from poverty, war, fear, lack of opportunities. There were no reports of developed 
countries that enlist or recruit underage soldiers.81  
The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children 
and Armed Conflict of the United Nations characterizes child soldiers as children, in high 
                                               
80 Human Rights Watch, “Child Soldiers,” https://www.hrw.org/topic/childrens-rights/child-soldiers. 
81 List of reports published by Human Rights Watch available at: 
https://www.hrw.org/publications?keyword=UK&date[value][year]=&&topic[0]=9712. 
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numbers: “hundreds of thousands… used in armed conflicts around the world… [who] 
are abducted and beaten into submission, others join military groups to escape poverty, to 
defend their communities, out of a feeling of revenge or for other reasons.” The Office 
also holds that children who have become child soldiers are “victims” “regardless of how 
children are recruited and of their roles… “their participation in conflict bears grave 
consequences for their physical and emotional well-being. They are commonly subject to 
abuse and most of them witness death, killing, and sexual violence. Many are forced to 
perpetrate these atrocities, and some suffer serious long-term psychological 
consequences. The reintegration of these children into civilian life is a complex 
process.”82 
UNICEF, the agency of the United Nations dedicated to improving the health and 
nutrition of children and mothers throughout the world describes the urgent situation of 
child soldiers as: “Children as young as eight years of age are forcibly recruited, coerced 
and induced to become combatants. Manipulated by adults, children have been drawn 
into violence that they are too young to resist and with consequences they cannot 
imagine.”83  
 
 
                                               
82 The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict of 
the United Nations, “Child Recruitment and Use,” https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/effects-of-
conflict/six-grave-violations/child-soldiers/. 
83 Cataldi, Anna and Jimmie Briggs, “Child Soldiers” in Crimes of War (2011),  
http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/child-soldiers/. 
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When considering how children end up in armed groups and armed forces, 
UNICEF explains that “child soldiers are recruited in many different ways. Some are 
conscripted, others are press-ganged or kidnapped, and still others are forced to join 
armed groups to defend their families. Sometimes, children become soldiers simply to 
survive.”84  
Common features of how international legal discourse describes child soldiers 
 
Children are legally framed as in need of special protection due to their 
vulnerabilities. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) reaffirms the belief – as 
indicated in the Declaration of the Rights of the Child – that  
the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special 
safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well 
as after birth… [and that] the need to extend particular care to the child has 
been stated in the Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1924 
and in the Declaration of the Rights of the Child adopted by the General 
Assembly on 20 November 1959 and recognized in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (in particular in articles 23 and 24), in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (in particular in Article 
10) and in the statutes and relevant instruments of specialized agencies and 
international organizations concerned with the welfare of children. 85 
  
International Humanitarian Law affirms that children affected by armed conflict 
are entitled to special respect and protection, as first expressed in Geneva Convention IV, 
then later in Additional Protocols I and II. These conventions codify special protection 
awarded to children during conflict: “the requirement of special protection for children 
                                               
84 Cataldi, Anna and Jimmie Briggs, “Child Soldiers” in Crimes of War (2011),  
http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/child-soldiers/. 
85 Convention on the Rights of the Child, “Preamble,” para. 8 and 9 (1989). 
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relates to the provision of food, clothing and tonics, care of children who are orphaned or 
separated from their families, treatment during deprivation of liberty and the distribution 
of relief consignments and can be found throughout the Fourth Geneva Convention and 
in Additional Protocol I (Fourth Geneva Convention, Articles 23–24, 38, 50, 76 and 89 
(cited in Vol. II, Ch. 39, §§ 139–144); Additional Protocol I, Article 70(1).” Additional 
Protocol I also determines that: “children shall be the object of special respect” (Article 
77(1)) and Additional Protocol II adds that: “children shall be provided with the care and 
aid they require” (Article 4(3)).86  
Large parts of the available material on child soldiers focus on crimes committed 
against children and not by children. Identified by the UN Secretary General and 
enumerated by the Security Council in its resolutions, forming the basis of the Council’s 
architecture for protecting children during war, International law frames six grave 
violations against children during times of armed conflict.87 These six violations are: the 
recruitment and use of children; killing or maiming of children; sexual violence against 
children; attacks against schools or hospitals; abduction of children, denial of 
humanitarian access.88  
                                               
86 ICRC, “Rule 135. Children,” Customary IHL Database, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter39_rule135. 
87 The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict 
“Working Paper N.1: The Six Grave Violations Against Children During Armed Conflict: The Legal 
Foundation,” 2009, 2013 https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/publications/WorkingPaper-
1_SixGraveViolationsLegalFoundation.pdf. 
88 The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict 
“Working Paper N.1: The Six Grave Violations Against Children During Armed Conflict: The Legal 
Foundation,”  The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed 
Conflict, 2009, 2013 https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/publications/WorkingPaper-
1_SixGraveViolationsLegalFoundation.pdf. 
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The legal basis for these violations lies in relevant international law, which in turn 
encompasses international humanitarian law, international human rights law and 
international criminal law. During armed conflict, international humanitarian law 
and international human rights law must be respected, with special regard to 
children who often have no means to defend themselves against abuses. The full 
range of children’s rights, economic, social and cultural as well as political and 
civil, must be respected, protected and fulfilled. 89 
 
More specifically related to child soldiering, the Statutes of the International 
Criminal Court and the Special Court for Sierra Leone have labeled the recruitment and 
use of children under the age of fifteen by armed forces and armed groups, a war crime. 
The criminal responsibility falls exclusively upon the adult recruiter. If the child is 
accused of an international crime, international law is unclear regarding the status of the 
child as possible perpetrator; that is, whether the child is criminally responsible.90 
International courts and domestic courts applying international law have yet to bring a 
child to trial for international crimes.  
                                               
89 The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict 
“Working Paper N.1: The Six Grave Violations Against Children During Armed Conflict: The Legal 
Foundation,” 2013, 9, https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/publications/WorkingPaper-
1_SixGraveViolationsLegalFoundation.pdf. 
As established by Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed 
Conflict, Working Paper #1: The Key Legal Sources for the Six Grave Violations in International Law are 
found in: the Four Geneva Conventions (1949); Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions (1977); 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998); Customary international humanitarian law. In 
International human rights: The Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) and its Optional Protocols 
(2000/2012); UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1966); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966); Regional human 
rights instruments; ILO Conventions 29 (1930) and 182 (1999) Convention against Torture (1984); 
Customary international human rights law. In International jurisprudence established by: Case law of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone; The Rome Statute and case law of the International Criminal Court and 
Case law of the International Court of Justice Security Council Resolutions on children and armed conflict 
1261 (1999), 1314 (2000), 1379 (2001), 1460 (2003), 1539 (2004), 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009), 1998 (2011) 
and 2068 (2012).  
90 Brons, Kathryn, Assessing the Innocence and Victimization of Child Soldiers. Master’s Thesis. 
University of Alabama, 2013. Tuscaloosa, AL, 2013. 1-
59.http://acumen.lib.ua.edu/content/u0015/0000001/0001380/u0015_0000001_0001380.pdf. 
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Children are generally recognized as victims of war, even when they are 
perpetrators. They are represented as victims of abuse from adult recruiters and 
commanders and from the distress of war. International organizations have constructed a 
discourse of child soldiers that is based exclusively on the quality of victimhood of the 
child, even if the child is the one perpetrating the acts: “Children, if anyone, should be 
considered victims of armed conflict and protected accordingly. The assumption of a 
relationship between victimhood and childhood is prevalent in the literature on the status 
of children in war…  in the context of war, children are seen as a product of abuse, 
maneuvered by adult malevolence, presupposing that children are “dependent, exploited, 
and powerless.”91 
 The Paris Principles declared that if children under 18 years who are unlawfully 
recruited or used by armed forces or groups are accused of crimes against international 
law are to be considered primarily as victims of violations of international law. Even if 
they have been accused of serious offenses they are to be treated in accordance with 
international standards for juvenile justice.92  
 As exemplified, the victimization of child soldiers is a commonplace among NGO 
and UN discourses. Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, in the 2002 Report of the 
Secretary-General on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone declared that:  
although the children of Sierra Leone may be among those who have 
committed the worst crimes; they are to be regarded first and foremost as 
victims“…. More than in any other conflict where children have been 
                                               
91 Vaha, Milla , and Leena Vastapuu. “Rafting Muddy Waters: Girl Soldiers and Complex Moral 
Agencies.” Paper prepared for International Studies Association Annual Convention, Atlanta, March 16-19, 
2016, 2. 
92 Commitment 11 of the Paris Principles. 
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used as combatants, in Sierra Leone, child combatants were initially 
abducted, forcibly recruited, sexually abused, reduced to the slavery of all 
kinds and trained, often under the influence of drugs, to kill, maim and 
burn.93 
 
 
Children should not be held criminally accountable for criminal violations. The 
position against child prosecution is a common one. Rosen (2005) and Grover (2012), for 
example, both argue that children should be exempt from exercising criminal 
responsibility for any violations they have committed. For Rosen (2005) “children lack 
moral agency, [therefore] cannot be held responsible for the war crimes they commit 
because they are considered to have no legally relevant agency.”94  
 Following the same line of thought, Grover (2012) argues that children involved 
in armed forces and armed groups are to be framed exclusively as victims, even when 
they have committed hideous crimes. Their lack of responsibility is due to the coercive 
condition under which they act and the threat of violence they face if they attempt to 
refuse the order given. Even when the of the child is formally considered a volunteer, she 
or he is usually reacting to the contextual or/and explicit violence which forces them to 
serve in the first place; thus enlistment should not be seen not as the exercise of choice, 
rather a survival strategy, or a way to keep their family and loved ones safe and fed: 
The issue of duress is ever present in child soldier cases (where the child is 
accused of having committed grave conflict-related international crimes) 
even if one assumes that allegedly the child ‘voluntarily’ joined the armed 
group or force committing mass atrocities and genocide95  
                                               
93 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on the Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (2000),  http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6afbf4.html. 
94 Rosen, Armies of the Young: Child Soldiers in War and Terrorism, 297. 
95 Grover, Sonja C, Child Soldier Victims of Genocidal Forcible Transfer Exonerating Child Soldiers 
Charged with Grave Conflict-related International Crimes (Berlin: Springer, 2012), 76. 
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Finally, Grover (2012) frames the responsibility of child soldiering as falling on 
both the adult recruiters who take advantage of the fragile state of the child, and the State 
which has failed to protect the child from being recruited and used in the first place. In 
her opinion, allowing children to be recruited and used for military purposes violates 
international legal principles such as the “special protection of the child in times of 
conflict” guaranteed by Additional Protocols I and II, the CRC and the OPAC, as well as 
the principles of life, development, best interest of the child also codified by the CRC.  
Similarly, Singer argues that the entire process of recruitment and training serves 
the purpose of indoctrination, utilizing tactics of “fear, brutality, and psychological 
manipulation to achieve high levels of obedience ...harsh discipline and the threat of 
death continue to underscore the training programs of almost all child soldier groups.96 
Grover adds to Singer’s comments on harsh recruitment techniques that even when the 
service of the child is formally considered voluntary, she or he is usually reacting to the 
violence that submits them to serve in the first place, and to the violence, they have been 
submitted by the training process.97 Aptel (2010) also asserts that children who have 
participated in international crimes should also be considered primarily as victims, 
especially when the circumstances surrounding these offenses are inherently coercive. 
 
 
 
                                               
96 Singer, “Child Soldiers: The New Faces of War,” 2005, 28-9. 
97 Grover, Sonja C, Child Soldier Victims of Genocidal Forcible Transfer Exonerating Child Soldiers 
Charged with Grave Conflict-related International Crimes (Berlin: Springer, 2012), 31. 
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It is important for children to emerge as a recognized category of victims 
because the process acknowledges and empowers them. It is essential to 
break away from an adult-centric understanding of international crimes 
and recognize that, in numerous contexts, victims and witnesses of 
international crimes are children, and as children, they have specific rights 
and specific needs.98 
 
As one can see, in most of the literature dedicated to child soldiers, these children 
are framed as lacking agency, maturity, and competence, thus being considered incapable 
of choice. Such a position is evident in the discussion of voluntary enlistment, in which 
the child’s decision to join the armed conflict is greatly influenced by push and pull 
factors, and therefore cannot be representative of a genuine expression of free will. 
Children are drawn into armed conflict by both push and pull factors. 
Push factors include negatives that children escape by joining an armed 
group. Abuse suffered in the family is a push factor – the child might join 
an armed group to escape an abusive situation. They may also seek to 
escape boredom, physical insecurity, extreme poverty, and the 
humiliation associated with personal or family victimization and shame. 
These push factors are only partial causes since most children who have 
difficult family situations or live in abject poverty do not become child 
soldiers. Equally or more compelling are the pull factors, which are the 
positive rewards or incentives for joining armed groups. Analysts have 
tended to underestimate the importance of pull factors, probably because 
the emphasis of much child-soldiering literature has been on protecting 
children from exploitation. Although most analysts view child soldiering 
as a heinous form of exploitation, children who join armed groups often 
see soldiering in different terms. Many see it as entering an opportunity 
space in which they can obtain things they could not obtain otherwise – 
including a family, power, revenge, wealth, education, and a commitment 
to a cause. To understand the lure of these incentives, one has to imagine 
the attraction felt by a child who comes from a very low-income family 
and who has always felt powerless but who now carries a gun and is 
feared and respected by many.99 
                                               
98 Aptel, Cecile, “Children and Accountability for International Crimes: The Role of the ICC and other 
international and mixed jurisdiction,” Innocenti Working Paper (August 2010), vi. 
 
99 Poulatova, Chaditsa, Children and Armed Conflict, (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, United Kingdom: Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 2013), 6. Web. 3 October 2016. 
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Rivet goes beyond stating that “regardless of whether these children are forcibly 
recruited or joined the armed forces voluntarily out of fear, they are left with no choice, 
but to commit such crimes to survive.”100 
 Answering to Rivet, joining the armed forces to survive, and being left without a 
choice but to commit atrocities is too strong of a statement, and does not translate well all 
the cases of child soldering. Children who have been lawfully recruited before eighteen 
by the armed forces of developed countries like the UK, Australia, and the US, for 
example, are understood to not fit this description. 
 The current legal imagination regarding abduction and coercive recruitment as the 
major ways that children join armed forces and armed groups “leads to the under-
theorization and under exploration of youth volunteerism.”101 It is presumed that children 
are incapable of volunteering to join the armed forces due to an alleged lack of 
competence and choice, and  as a result, “the very notion of voluntary recruitment is 
largely an illusion.”102 Also, in discussions related to children’s capacity, the minors are 
mostly regarded as a uniform group; for example, in very few works authors differentiate 
between younger and older children’s capacity for decision-making, an essential point 
when discussion the young’s competence towards the genuine exercise of choice.  
                                               
100 Rivet, Annabelle Karen, The Criminal Liability of Child Soldiers in International Criminal Law: Does 
Restorative Justice Offer a Balance Between the Rights of the Victim and the Right of the Child 
Perpetrator?, LLM diss., (Pretoria: University of Pretoria, 2014), 22. 
101 Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers, 13. 
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Hart’s divergent position  
Jason Hart, in his article, “Saving Children: What Role for anthropology?”  offers 
an alternative, more critical perspective. The author calls attention to how the current 
literature on child soldiers tends to produce a discourse which de-contextualizes and thus, 
deterritorializes the experience of competence of the children involved. Hart defends the 
point that: “representational practices of child-focused humanitarianism on the grounds… 
influence popular understanding of children’s lives, as well as the political uses to which 
such representations may be put.”103 As an example, he illustrates Singer’s book 
“Children of War” (2005): 
We are given a generic account of ‘child soldiers’ in which the appalling 
experience of one individual stands for all…A tone of indignation at the 
adults who encourage children to take up arms to such effect pervades this 
prime example of a humanitarian discussion of child soldiers. Noting that 
technological developments and socio-economic conditions combine to 
make the employment of children as combatants attractive, Singer remarks 
that ‘[t]he only remaining ingredients required are groups or leaders 
without scruples[...] As the payoffs can be huge, many take this moral 
plunge.’104 
 
In Hart’s opinion, “the above statement is typical of a book in which the moral landscape 
extends only as far as the borders of the state.”105 Hart criticizes authors who engage in 
what he calls a “global account of child soldiers,” disqualifying the child for any “real 
measure of choice about recruitment.”106    
                                               
103 Hart, “Saving Children: What Role for Anthropology?” 
104 Singer, Children at War, 56. 
105 Hart, “Saving Children: What Role for Anthropology?” 6. 
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My problematization follows the line of Hart’s argument, directed against the 
urge of understanding and treating the problem of child soldiering as represented by one 
ideal type of child soldier: a young child forcibly abducted by armed groups, and thus 
victimized by war and human violence. Most traditional approaches to child soldiers and 
criminal accountability fails to provide proper representation of the numerous facets of 
child soldiering.  
Also, it is widely held that recruitment of young children (below the age of 
fifteen), besides being legally prohibited by international law, is also morally condemned 
by international society as a whole. Conversely, the early enlistment of individuals under 
the age of eighteen to the armed forces for most parts does not cause equal repugnance. 
In most cases, it is part of the official military policies and not labeled as a practice of 
child soldiering. As a conclusion, the current and most common images/descriptions of 
child soldiers are exclusionary, failing to reflect the reality of an older child (age fifteen, 
sixteen, seventeen) officially recruited to join the armed forces and which have done so 
as an exercise of choice and not as a desperate attempt to survival.  
The current chapter has provided an overview of the main characterizations of 
child soldiers, calling attention to the dominant discourses that encapsulate and reinforce 
a single perspective. 
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Chapter 3: Initial remarks and a note on methodology and the sources of International 
Law 
 
The general aim of this dissertation is to conduct a legal investigation to determine 
whether international law recognizes the individual criminal responsibility of a person 
who is under the age of eighteen. Secondly, a more specific aim is to inquire into the role 
of the Special Court for Sierra Leone‘s contribution to the development of a legal norm 
of minors’ criminal responsibility under international law. With both issues, my primary 
concern will be identifying whether there is law to guide the topic at hand, and if so, 
where the law is to be found. Lastly, I am also interested in determining whether the 
place where the law is situated affects its interpretation and use. For the present 
investigation, I will be using a legal positivist approach that understands and utilizes the 
sources of international law (as recognized by international courts) as tools of analysis.   
In practical terms, legal positivists understand the sources of law as the foundation of 
a legal system and thus valuable guideposts to where the law is to be found. This way, 
starting a legal analysis by identifying the legal sources applicable to the referent 
question/case makes good sense.  A legal positivist also views the law as a source-based 
legal system in which the validity of legal rules emanates from their legal rules. This 
affirmation, however, is not the same as saying that legal sources are the only factors 
which determine legal rulings, and legal positivism does not ignore non-legal factors such 
as accounts of morality, justice, political considerations, or how these enter into the 
making of international law and courts’ decisions on specific cases.  When non-legal 
factors are brought within legal reasoning, and used by courts, they tend to be 
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incorporated as part of the existing legal resources due to the doctrine of precedent. 107 
Nonetheless, it still makes sense to start a legal analysis by inquiring into the sources if 
one is interested in identifying whether there is law on the issue and where it is located.  
 One of the most common criticisms addressed to positivism is its disassociation 
from moral and political accounts of how law is created and operates.108 “A theory that 
insists on the facticity of law seems to contribute little to our understanding that law has 
important functions in making human life go well, that the rule of law is a prized ideal, 
and that language and practice of law is highly moralized.”109 Yet, as mentioned in the 
previous paragraph, a legal positivist approach does not ignore non-legal factors or their 
influence on courts’ decisions.  “It is beyond doubt that moral and political considerations 
bear on legal philosophy… the reasons we have for establishing, maintaining or 
reforming law include moral reasons, and these reasons, therefore, shape our legal 
concepts.110 The current analysis rather identifies the law by its sources, and not its 
merits, therefore I will not be inquiring into whether the legal rules under investigation 
are morally justified. 
In other words, by working within a legal positivist framework, I will not be 
developing a normative approach of how international law ought to be applied to reach a 
specific desired outcome on the topic of child solders and accountability.  My exclusive 
                                               
107 Green, Leslie, “Legal Positivism,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2009), 7. Accessed 
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concern is with the ‘black letter of the law’, and more specifically, with the question of 
whether international criminal law recognizes children as subjects of the principles of 
individual criminal responsibility if accused of committing serious breaches of 
international humanitarian law. 
 It should be noted that I recognize that most discussions related to child soldiers 
and accountability currently available are normatively driven. In transitional justice, for 
example, the question of children’s criminal accountability revolves around the question 
whether child soldiers should face prosecution for their legal wrongdoing, and whether 
any type of retribution is fair, and lastly if such a course is effective or detrimental for 
that society’s transition from war to peace. These interrogations lead to a moral debate 
regarding the minor’s subjection to criminal liability and, and under what criteria liability 
can exist. Experts and academics have not been able to reach a consensus on the issue; 
some assert that bringing a minor to trial for alleged crimes is neither efficient nor fair. 
They argue that children under eighteen, in most cases, do not have a full understanding 
of their actions and consequences. Therefore, if any type of accountability is 
recommended, it should be rehabilitation and not punishment. Others bring direct their 
attention to the victims, arguing that victims of minors’ violence are equally entitled to 
justice, and that bringing perpetrators to trial, besides reinforcing the institution of justice 
in that specific society, offers those who have suffered the crimes and their families a 
sense of closure. As a conclusion, most of the analysis and work published up to date 
approaches the matter as a substance of normative / principled interpretation, addressing 
the question of how the current law should be interpreted. The normative approach is due 
to the fact that high principles embedded with universal accounts of childhood, such as 
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immaturity, lack of emotional control and agency, incompetence, lack of individual 
responsibility greatly influence and inform the debate on child soldiers. On the following 
chapter, I will highlight how most approaches focus on principled interpretations of the 
law, bringing into their accounts moralized and universalized conceptions of how the 
issues should be treated legally. When I analyze the principled accounts my goal is 
simply to illustrate an existing dissonance between where the law is and where a handful 
jurists and academics argue it should be.  
Why is it important to utilize a legal positivist approach when conducting a legal 
analysis?  
 
 It is common to find in transnational discourses reflected by UN officials, other 
non UN-IOs, NGOs and specialized literature, moral, political and even presumed legal 
positions of what is to be understood as morally fair and appropriate on the legal 
treatment of child soldiers. However, most of these accounts fail to give a more careful 
consideration of the where the current black letter of the law related to these young 
combatants stands. Even if one‘s goal is to make normative statements about the law, an 
analysis of where the law stands seems to be a fundamental first step.  This being, an 
inquiry into the sources of the law pertinent to the case is customary to jurists and courts 
alike when adjudicating or even investigating a specific topic. I cannot emphasis enough 
the importance of establishing first an investigation on the sources of law before one can 
interpret and apply the fitting rules to the case at hand.  
The sources of International Law  
International law, unlike national legal systems, is a decentralized arrangement of 
legal rules mostly built by commitments states establish with each other on a voluntary 
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basis. states, therefore, chose to engage in legal relationships, for many reasons such as 
creating a cooperative structure to solve multilateral problems, prescribing certain rules to 
avoid conflict and confrontation, establishing reciprocity, instituting minimum levels of 
protection to individuals, etc. The sources of international law are the building blocks of 
the international legal system; they answer the questions “where does international law 
come from and how is it made?”111 In practice, whenever a court, jurist, or even an 
academic seeks to investigate whether there is a law on a particular issue and where that 
law is found, they work to identify which sources of law are pertinent to the issue.  
 Article 38 of the ICJ Statute lists the five primary source of international law 
considered by the Court: international treaties, customary law, general principles of law, 
judicial decisions, and the writing of publicists. Despite the ICJ indicating that there is no 
existing hierarchy among the listed sources, courts and jurists assign priority to 
international treaties and customary law when conducting legal inquiry, because these are 
lawmaking sources; that is, sources that directly generate international obligations.  The 
other sources are commonly utilized when a lack of treaty law and customary law is 
evident, and to provide complementary guidance on how the law found in treaty or 
custom is to be interpreted and applied.  The current work will also give preference to 
treaties and customary law when analyzing whether international law provides a legal 
answer to the issue of children’s criminal responsibility.  
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International treaties 
 Treaties are the most common form of written commitments developed in the 
international community. Treaties are governed by international law and are intended to 
create a legal obligation.112  A treaty needs to be ratified / acceded to by a state for it to 
create binding legal obligations for that State.  When a state has ratified a treaty, it is 
obligated to incorporate the treaty’s provisions into its domestic legal system, which 
ultimately allows state parties’ national courts to rule on questions of international law, if 
deemed necessary.  
 Evidence of the legal relationship established between states is found, for 
example, in the numerous treaties established by states throughout history. Since the 
creation of the United Nations “…more than 500 multilateral treaties have been deposited 
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.113  Many other treaties are deposited 
with governments or other entities.”114 
The development, implementation, and interpretation of treaties are regulated by 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties developed in 1969. The provisions found 
in the VCLT were mostly already customary rules. The VCLT does not apply to treaties 
established before 1969 (the VCLT does not have a retroactive effect) apart from those 
rules that had already achieved customary status.  Three fundamental principles of 
international law codified in the VCLT establish the foundations for how treaties are to 
                                               
112 Kaczorowska, Alina, Public International Law (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge) 2010, 92. 
113 Treaties are written commitments developed and engaged by states (parties of the treaty). A treaty needs 
to be ratified/accessed by the state to become an obligation. 
114 For more information, see: http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/internationallaw/. 
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be created, implemented and interpreted. These three principles are the Principle of 
Consent, the principle of pacta sunt servanda, and the Principle of Good Faith.   
 The Principle of Consent can be found in Articles 34 – 36 of the VCLT; it 
expresses that a state shall only be bound by a treaty to which it has consented to it. As a 
consequence, treaties do not bind non-party or “third” states, except for any specific 
treaty rules which have been recognized as codifying existing customary law.115 
 Article 26 of the VCLT reflects the principle of pacta sunt servanda, and it lays 
out that: “every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed in 
good faith.” In Latin, pacta sunt servanda means “agreements must be kept;” this applies 
to all legal treaty commitments made by state parties. Article 26 also mentions that states 
must observe the treaty and act in good faith, thus exposing the significant concomitant 
relationship between the principles of pacta sunt servanda and good faith.116 The 
principle of good faith, even though explicitly present in the VCLT extends beyond this 
treaty, serving as the foundation of all international obligations emanating from 
international law. 117 
 When a state wishes to become party to a treaty, but it objects to one or more 
provisions of the treaty (not wanting to be bound by them), it may register a reservation, 
the subject of Articles 19 – 15. Reservations are the way the State asks to be excused 
from the obligation to comply with the undesired clauses. Normally, reservations are 
                                               
115 The Principle of consent is also formulated as the rule pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt. 
116 Kaczorowska, Public International Law (2010), 91. 
117 Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v France), para. 46 (ICJ 1969) “…one of the basic principles governing 
the creation and performance of a larger obligation, whatever their source, is the principle of good faith.” 
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valid except in cases when: 1) they are explicitly prohibited by the treaty; 2) the 
particular clause prohibits a reservation or; 3) when the reservation is deemed 
incompatible with the objects and purposes of the treaty.  
Customary law   
 The second primary source of international law cited by ICJ Article 38(1)(b) is 
international custom. International custom, or customary law, is defined by Article 
38(1)(b) as “evidence of a general practice accepted as law.” The most common legal 
view regarding the formation of customs (reflected on the ICJ ruling of the ICJ in The 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1968)118 expresses that customs are created by the 
combination of two elements: an objective element consisting of a relatively uniform and 
constant state practice (usus); and a psychological element composed of “the conviction 
that such practice reflects, or amounts to, law (opinio juris) or is required by social, 
economic, or political exigencies (opinio necessitatis).”119 
 An interesting feature of customary law is that:  
the main feature of customs is that normally it is not a deliberate 
lawmaking process. In the case of customs, States, when participating in 
the norm-setting process, do not act for the primary purpose of laying 
down international rules. Their main concern is to safeguard some 
economic, social or political interests. The gradual birth of a new 
international rule is the side effect of States’ conduct in international 
relations.120 
 
                                               
118 The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands) (ICJ 1968), 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=295&p1=3&p2=3&case=52&p3=5. 
119 Cassese, Antonio. International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005), 156. 
120 Cassese, International Law, 156. 
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 Even though international treaties and international customary law are both 
considered primary sources of international law because they express primary rules (what 
is permitted and what is prohibited), a central difference between them is that while 
“…customary rules are normally binding upon all members of the world community (or 
of a regional group of States, in the case or regional customs), treaties only bind those 
States that ratify or adhere to them.”121 Legal obligations deriving from international 
customary law therefore applies nearly to all states indeed, with a few exceptions.122 
Although international customary law can be commonly found codified in international 
treaties, customs do not need to be written in any international document for them to be 
obligatory. The authority of customary law emanates from being reflective of the 
continual behavior of states throughout history and the shared belief that such acts were 
so important they needed to become mandatory to all states.123  The obligations created 
by treaties and customary law are equally authoritative : “rules created using bilateral or 
multilateral treaties were not stronger than, or superior to, customary or general rules, and 
vice-versa. Both sets of rule possessed equal rank and status.”124 
 When legal rules originating from different sources conflict, International Law 
applies a set of principles to determine which is to be applied: “a later law repeals an 
earlier one (lex posterior derogat priori); a later law, general in character, does not 
                                               
121 Cassese, International Law, 157. 
122 For example, not all State need to abide by customary law, when the law is not general or when the State 
has objected to the formation of the rule (persistent objector rule). For more information, see Kaczorowska, 
Public International Law, 27 and 41. 
123 Kaczorowska, Public International Law, 35. 
124 Cassese, International Law, 154. 
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derogate from a previous one which is special in character (lex posterior generalis non 
derogat priori speciali); a special law prevails over a general law or lex speciali derogat 
generali.” 125  
Jus cogens 
 Jus cogens rules or peremptory norms are “international customary rules of the 
highest status of law”; they express moral absolutes from which no State can claim an 
exemption.126 “Jus cogens are hierarchically superior to all the other rules of international 
law, and as such, the three general principles governing the relationship between 
international regulations (consent, pacta sunt servanda, good faith) do not apply to 
them.”127 
“States may not derogate from peremptory norms through treaties or customary 
rules that do not have the special legal force of such norms.”128As defined by Article 53 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: “a peremptory norm of general 
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of 
states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character.” 
                                               
125 Cassese, International Law, 154. 
126 Kaczorowska, Public International Law, 48. 
127 Cassese, International Law, 155. 
128 Cassese, International Law, 155. 
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 International society has not yet agreed upon a definitive list of jus cogens 
rules.129 Most states and international courts have recognized that grave violations of 
International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law such as war 
crimes, genocide, torture, crimes against humanity, for example, are considered 
violations of jus cogens rules.  
 Jus cogens, as peremptory obligations, extend to individuals. If and when 
infringed, a duty to prosecute violations of jus cogens rules is a placed upon states, yet 
owed to the international society as a whole. In other words, the obligation to prosecute is 
an obligation erga omnes (the obligations falls over the international community as a 
whole); any state that holds in custody someone accused of violating a rule of jus cogens 
status may prosecute, with no need of a national or territorial link to the case.  Indeed, 
under the principle aut dedere, aut judicare that State must either prosecute them in good 
faith, or it must extradite them to a state that is willing and able to do so.130 
Secondary sources of International Law 
  The secondary or subsidiary sources of international law are used to fill gaps 
when there are no primary sources of law guiding a particular case.  Despite not 
generating binding commitments themselves, these sources serve as guidance for the 
implementation and interpretation of existing treaties and customary law, and may also 
constitute evidence of law, thus being essential in any legal analysis.   
                                               
129 Kaczorowska, Public International Law, 50. 
130 Cassese, “Aut Dedere Aut Judicare”, The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice, 253 – 
254. 
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Some examples of secondary sources of law are general principles of international law, 
judicial decisions of international or national courts applying international law, and the 
writings of renowned publicists and jurists.  
General principles of International Law 
 When a court is unable to find a treaty provision relevant to a dispute, or customary law, 
and to avoid a finding of non liquet (when the law in that particular case is not clear) 
courts may apply general principles of international law.131 General principles of 
international law can either be inferred from municipal laws or deduced from the nature 
of the international community.132 There is no established consensus between jurists 
whether it is one or another. “The case law of the ICJ shows that the Court has had 
recourse to both.”133  
Judicial decisions  
Previous decisions, whether coming from the same court or another do not carry the same 
obligatory character in international law that they do in Common Law systems. “Article 
59 of the Statute of the Court provides that: the decision of the Court has no binding force 
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case” and this because not all 
states have the same international obligations.134 States’ international obligations are 
distinct, as they reflect which treaties a particular state has voluntarily engaged to follow. 
The international courts, for example, when asked to adjudicate a case, it does so by 
                                               
131 Kaczorowska, Public International Law, 50.  
132 Kaczorowska, Public International Law, 53. 
133 Kaczorowska, Public International Law, 53. 
134 Article 59 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, http://www.icj-
cij.org/documents/?p1=4&p2=2#CHAPTER_III. 
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taking into consideration which international obligations each State holds and how these 
vary from one state to another. Since there is no precedent doctrine in international law 
(stare decisis) international court and tribunal cases do not necessarily make law. The 
non-precedent doctrine is challenged in international criminal law where individuals do 
in fact follow the same international legal obligations.  
The writings of publicists and the teachings of the most highly qualified jurists of the 
various nations  
 
Examples are the International Law Commission, the American Law Institute, 
L’Institut de Droit International, the Hague Academy of International Law and the 
International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC), 135these sources function as 
subsidiary, meaning, the writings of experts do not constitute law per se, but they provide 
essential guidance in properly applying and interpreting the existing laws. The written 
work of these groups can be consulted, or their members can be called to provide expert 
testimony in a court’s ruling. 
The present chapter has served as an introductory mapping of the main sources of 
law recognized by International Law (as set by Article 38 of the International Court of 
Justice). The sources are to be considered the main tools of analysis for the current work. 
In latter chapters, I will explain how international courts utilize the sources here listed.  
  
                                               
135 Article 38 (1) (d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.  
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Chapter 4: Universal conceptions of childhood and the international regime of children’s 
rights 
 
 
 Childhood is universally described as a developmental phase between birth and 
adulthood, consisting of a period during which the individual still has limited capacities 
and should be protected and cared for by society and the law.  
 Universal conceptions of childhood delivered by the human sciences are the 
common ground that inform and influence how governments recognize and treat children 
under the law. In international law, the legal regime regarding the status of minors that 
was developed by states and international organizations is not in any way different; 
children are framed as entitled to special protections. The Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, nonetheless, marks an important starting point towards change in the discourse of 
child competence. 
Childhood 
 Childhood is generally understood as the phase between birth/infancy and 
adulthood. The exact limits of where the period of childhood starts and where it ends, as 
well as what it means to be a child, is a source of controversy and debate. One possible 
reason for the lack of consensus is that the concept of childhood is culturally defined, not 
fixed, and in constant negotiation. “Society’s notions of childhood are intrinsically linked 
to the way [children] are educated, the way they are dressed, the age at which they are 
expected to work and fend for themselves, and through common notions of responsibility 
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of parents and the state towards them.” 136 Besides being culturally demarcated, the 
definition of childhood is also an adult-centric endeavor. Specialized literature generally 
understands childhood in negative terms: that is, a child is someone who lacks adult 
capacities and competencies. 137 ‘Not yet an adult’ is the common adult-centric 
conceptualizations of what it is to be a child, despite seriously failing to characterize what 
being a child is. 
Legal policies relating to children’s capacities are also mostly influenced by the 
mainstream conception that the phase of childhood is made of a series of “separate states 
a child goes through until adulthood” which entitles them to protection due to their 
vulnerability and immaturity. 138  
For us, childhood is a stage or state of incompetence relative to adulthood. 
The ideal adult is equipped with certain cognitive capacities, is rational, 
physically independent and autonomous, has a sense of identity, and is 
conscious of her beliefs and desires, and thus able to make informed free 
choices for which she can be held personally responsible. It is on account 
of these dispositions that an adult is thought able to work for her living, be 
accountable at law for her actions, make sexual choices and help to choose 
the government of the community. It is because the child lacks these adult 
dispositions that he may not participate in this adult world.139  
 
An international human rights regime has been established with the goal of 
guaranteeing what is understood as an appropriate minimum level of protection to all 
children, despite its origins, color, nationality, sex and gender.  
 
                                               
136 Fionda, Julia, ed. Legal Concepts of Childhood (Hart Publishing, 2001), 3. 
137 Archard, David and Colin M. Macleod, The Moral and Political Status of Children. Oxford Scholarship 
Online. 2002, 13. 
138 Archard, David, Children, Rights and Childhood (London: Routledge, 2004), 40. 
139 Archard, Children, Rights and Childhood, 39. 
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The International children’s rights regime 
  Children’s rights are a part of human rights; they are human rights specifically 
addressed to children. International Human Rights Law’s point of departure is the 
underlying assumption that every human being is entitled to something, by simple virtue 
of being a human being. Human rights are universal (belonging ‘to each of us regardless 
of ethnicity, race, gender, sexuality, age, religion, political conviction, or type of 
government’) and subjective (being ‘the properties of individual subjects’). Human rights 
are laid down in various international and domestic agreements, such as the United 
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, multilateral and regional treaties, as 
well as, nationals constitutions around the world.140  
 An international regime of children rights first arose from the perception that, in 
times of war, children are among those who suffer the most. As a direct effect of 
children’s involvement and suffering during the first World War, the League of Nations 
in 1924 promulgated the Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child, considered the 
first international document to declare legal standards for the treatment of children at the 
international level. The Geneva Declaration spelled out five provisions.141 These 
provisions were formulated not necessarily “…in terms of rights of children but, rather, 
                                               
140 Ang, Fiona, A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Article 38: 
Children in Armed Conflicts (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), 9. 
141 The five rules present in the Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1924) were: 1) The child must be 
given the means requisite for its normal development, both materially and spiritually; 2) The child that is 
hungry must be fed; the child that is sick must be nursed; the child that is backward must be helped; the 
delinquent child must be reclaimed; and the orphan and the waif must be sheltered and succored; 3) The 
child must be the first to receive relief in times of distress; 4) The child must be put in a position to earn a 
livelihood, and must be protected against every form of exploitation; 5) The child must be brought up in the 
consciousness that its talents must be devoted to the service of fellow men. 
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as duties declared and accepted by men and women of all nations.”142 In the text, children 
were entitled to protection rights exclusively as a result of the adults’ exercising their 
obligation not to violate them. In other words, children’s rights were, therefore, framed 
simply as a responsibility of the adults, who held an obligation to refrain from violating 
their protection rights in times of conflict and in times of peace.143 Interestingly, even 
though the beneficiaries of the declaration were ‘children’, no definition of child was 
presented.  
The Declaration was the first platform for children’s rights at the international 
level and it marked an important landmark even though it was not legally binding. For the 
very first time “…countries of different cultures recognized universal principles and 
necessities of the Rights of the Child.”144 
 The Geneva Declaration was followed by the UN Declaration of the Rights of the 
Child (1959). This declaration was adopted “… unanimously by all 78 Member States of 
the United Nations General Assembly in Resolution 1386 (XIV),145 and it marked the 
first major international consensus on the fundamental principles of children’s rights.”146 
Ten principles were set. The General Assembly called upon “…parents, upon men and 
women as individuals, and upon voluntary organizations, local authorities and national 
                                               
142 Detrick, Sharon, J. E. Doek, and Nigel Cantwell. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child: A Guide to the “Travaux Préparatoires” (Dordrecht: M. Nijhoff Publishers, 1992), 13. 
143Detrick, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Guide to the “Travaux 
Préparatoires,” 13. 
144 Humanium, “Standard References on Child Rights,” http://www.humanium.org/en/childrens-rights-
history/references-on-child-rights/. 
145 United Nation General Assembly Resolution 1386 (XIV). 
146 Humanium, “Declaration of the Rights of the Child, 1959,” http://www.humanium.org/en/childrens-
rights-history/references-on-child-rights/declaration-rights-child/. 
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Governments to recognize these rights and strive for their observance by legislative and 
other measures progressively taken by the following principles.”147 Again, no definition 
of children was given.  
  Eleven years before the 1959 UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child, in 1948, 
the UN General Assembly took gradual steps toward establishing a universal platform for 
human rights in general, children included. Article Two of the UDHR established that:  
everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration [Universal Declaration of Human Rights] without distinction 
of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or 
another opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or another 
status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made by the political, 
jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a 
person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or 
under any other limitation of sovereignty.  
 
Although discrimination by age was not mentioned, “in the text, children (as well 
as, mothers to be) were recognized as a vulnerable social group, thus entitled to ‘special 
help and assistance’ (Article 25 (2)). It was the understanding that the rights proclaimed 
in the UDHR, would “apply equally to children and adults” which explained why the text 
did not attribute a different status to children, nor treated them as a detached social group 
with specific needs. 148   
 The UDHR (sourced by a General Assembly Resolution) was not created as a 
legally binding instrument; therefore, in order to translate the newly internationally 
delineated human rights into more precise and binding terms, aiming at increasing level 
                                               
147 UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child Proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 1386(XIV) of 
20 November 1959), (http://www.unicef.org/malaysia/1959-Declaration-of-the-Rights-of-the-Child.pdf. 
148 UNICEF, “Understanding the CRC,” (updated May 19, 2014): 
https://www.unicef.org/crc/index_understanding.html. 
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of compliance with its provisions, the United Nations promulgated two fundamental 
international human treaties - the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR). Both treaties contained provisions related to rights delineated in the 
UDHR, such as the right to the protection against economic exploitation, the right to be 
educated and the right to healthcare (ICESCR) and the right to have a name and a 
nationality (ICCPR).149 However, this time, the provisions were contained in 
international treaties that were binding upon State parties.  
Since then, most of the articles contained in the UDHR have been recognized as 
customary law, some acquiring the status of jus cogens rules, thus holding obligatory 
status for all states and people.150 As argued by Detrick, both covenants, the ICCPR and 
the ICESCR contained provisions applying to “the child,” “children,” “young persons,” 
or “juvenile persons,” however, they do not provide definitions of these terms.151 The 
author goes on to explain that the UN Human Rights Committee provided a comment on 
Article 24 of the ICCPR, stating, “the covenant does not indicate the age at which he [the 
minor] attains his majority… [because] this is to be determined by each State party in 
light of the relevant social and cultural conditions.”152  
                                               
149 Humanium, “Children’s Rights History: Historical overview of the Children’s rights evolution,”  
http://www.humanium.org/en/childrens-rights-history/ 
150 As early as 1966, the International Law Commission had already acknowledged the intrinsic 
relationship between jus cogen rules and human rights, see Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, ii, at 248, 1966, UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add. 1. 
151 Detrick, Sharon, A commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1999, 52.  
152 Detrick, Sharon, A commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1999, 52 
and Human Rights Committee, “General Comment 17,” (Thirty-fifth session, 1989). 
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 The next step toward building a greater child protection legal apparatus came 
from the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1973. The ILO established – in the 
Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment – the minimum age 
of fifteen for employment. This age limit reflected the age of completion of compulsory 
schooling (Article 2.3). The convention also set the minimum age for employment or 
work considered dangerous or possibly of jeopardizing one’s health, safety or morals to 
no less than 18 years, which includes military work (Article 3.1).153 The 1973 Convention 
also encourages states to effectively abolish child labor below the stipulated minimum 
age.  
  In 1979, in light of the United Nations’ declaration of the International Year of 
the Child, the Polish delegation proposed developing a revised international charter 
addressed specifically to children which would carry mandatory status. Poland argument 
was that it was time for a change: “…almost twenty years after the proclamation of the 
principles of the UN Declaration of 1959 it was time to take further and more consistent 
steps by adopting an internationally binding instrument in the form of a convention.”154 
Poland’s proposal led to ten years of work and the creation and adoption of the 1989 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).  
 
                                               
153 ILO, C138 - Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138),” 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:3122
83. 
154 Detrick, Sharon, A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1999, 15. 
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The CRC 
 The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)  is the most important and 
“the most widely ratified treaty in history” – with the United States being the only 
state failing to engage before full worldwide ratification.155 Approved by the UN General 
Assembly, it entered into force in 1989, and it marked the 30th anniversary of the UN 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child.  The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
of 1989 is the cornerstone of children‘s rights in the world, detailing the rights to which 
children are entitled both as people and because of their special status. 
Because it is so widely accepted, most academics, jurists, and international 
organizations treat the CRC as having attained universal ratification. UNICEF has even 
argued that “the ratification of a treaty by nearly all the States… is strong evidence that it 
has become customary international law.”156 
 State parties to the CRC are obligated to make the “appropriate legislative, policy, 
administrative, and other measures for the implementation of the rights contained 
therein…ensuring, by all appropriate means, that the provisions are given legal effect in 
the States Parties’ domestic legal systems.”157 
 The Convention was the product of ten years of negotiation, and was received as 
the realization of consistent steps towards assuring that all children of the world were 
                                               
155 Cipriani, Don. Children’s Rights and the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility: A Global 
Perspective (Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishers, 2009), 12. 
156 UNICEF, “The Convention on the Rights of the Child- Fifteen Years Later Report: The 
Caribbean,”:https://www.unicef.org/lac/cdn_15_anos_ingles_full(2).pdf). 
157 Baimu, Evarist. “International Protection of Children,” in Max Plank Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (Oxford Public International Law, July 2009, Updated in April, 2013). 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e904?rskey=kNAAma&result=1&prd=EPIL. 
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recognized as bearers of rights, and that, as a result, they were entitled to the necessary 
protections to ensure the enjoyment of a happy, safe and healthy life. The message set 
forth was that children’s rights were were recognized as holding the same rights as adults, 
interconnected and of equal importance.158  
 The CRC also provided an innovative approach to human rights, marking a 
departure from earlier instruments and traditional notions of child welfare by being the 
first international human rights treaty to contain a comprehensive set of universally 
recognized norms asserting the complementarity and interdependence of human rights: 
civil and political, economic, social and cultural.  The Convention also set a new vision 
of the child, embodying a consensus regarding the empowerment and protection of 
children.159 The goal was  “changing the way children are viewed and treated – i.e., as 
human beings with a distinct set of rights instead of as passive objects of care and 
charity.”160 
 Some parts of the CRC are essential to this dissertation. Article 1, for example, 
provides a definition of a child: “for the purpose of the convention a child would mean 
every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to 
the child, majority is attained earlier.”161 The CRC is the first international agreement to 
offer a definition for children. “The CRC’s drafters decided to … set the upper age limit 
                                               
158 UNICEF, “Understanding the CRC”, http://www.unicef.org/crc/index_understanding.html. 
159 Fottrell, Deirdre, Revisiting Children’s Rights: 10 Years of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), VII. 
160 UNICEF, “Convention on the Rights of the Child”, http://www.unicef.org/crc/. 
161 The definition was solely based on age criteria of age, and not in any other more subjective or cultural 
indicator of maturity.      
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for eighteen years…to maximize the protections offered by the CRC and to ensure that 
the rights set forth therein would uniformly apply to as large an age group as possible.”162 
  Another legal innovation was the institutionalization of the idea that children were 
bearers of rights as well. Children were seen as entitled to participation / liberty rights 
similarly to adults. Examples of such rights are: respect for the views of the child, 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, rights to privacy, access to information as 
expressed in Articles 4163, 12164, 13165, 14166, 15167, 16168, 17169. These rights, ultimately 
                                               
162 Detrick, Sharon, A commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1999, 52. 
163 Article 4 (Protection of rights): Governments have a responsibility to take all available measures to 
make sure children’s rights are respected, protected and fulfilled. When countries ratify the Convention, 
they agree to review their laws relating to children, which involves assessing their social services, legal, 
health and educational systems, as well as levels of funding for these services. Governments are then 
obliged to take all necessary steps to ensure that the minimum standards set by the Convention in these 
areas are being met. They must help families protect children’s rights and create an environment where 
they can grow and reach their potential. In some instances, this may involve changing existing laws or 
creating new ones. Such legislative changes are not imposed but come about through the same process by 
which any law is created or reformed within a country. Article 41 of the Convention points out the when a 
country already has higher legal standards than those seen in the Convention, the stricter standards always 
prevail. 
164 Article 12 (Respect for the views of the child): When adults are making decisions that affect children, 
children have the right to say what they think should happen and have their opinions taken into account. 
165 Article 13 (Freedom of expression): Children have the right to get and share information, as long as the 
information is not damaging to them or others. In exercising the right to freedom of expression, children 
have the responsibility to also respect the rights, freedoms, and reputations of others. The freedom of 
expression includes the right to share information in any way they choose, including by talking, drawing or 
writing. 
166 Article 14 (Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion): Children have the right to think and believe 
what they want and to practice their religion, as long as they are not stopping other people from enjoying 
their rights. Parents should help guide their children in these matters. The Convention respects the rights 
and duties of parents in providing religious and moral guidance to their children. Religious groups around 
the world have expressed support for the Convention, which indicates that it in no way prevents parents 
from bringing their children up within a religious tradition. At the same time, the Convention recognizes 
that as children mature and can form their views, some may question certain religious practices or cultural 
traditions. The Convention supports children’s right to examine their beliefs, but it also states that their 
right to express their beliefs implies respect for the rights and freedoms of others. 
167 Article 15 (Freedom of Association): Children have the right to meet and to join groups and 
organizations, as long as it does not stop other people from enjoying their rights. In exercising their rights, 
children have the responsibility to respect the rights, freedoms, and reputations of others.  
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guaranteed by the state party, were framed as being equally important to protective rights 
and fundamental for the development of the child into a well-established, healthy and 
happy human being.  
When applying the provisions set forth by the CRC, the Committee on the Right 
of the Child (CRC Committee) has indicated that states should be guided by four general 
principles –non-discrimination (Art. 2 CRC), the best interests of the child (Art. 3 CRC), 
the right to life, survival, and development (Art. 6 CRC; Life, Right to, International 
Protection; Development, Right to, International Protection), and evolving capacities of 
the child (Art. 5 and Art. 12, CRC). Arising from international treaty law, these principles 
are to be implemented by states within their domestic legislation.170  
The principle ‘evolving capacity of the child’ is explicitly found in Articles 5 and 
12 of the CRC as expressed in UNICEF’s report Evolving Capacities of the Child (2005):   
Article 5 of the Convention states that direction and guidance, provided by 
parents or others with responsibility for the child, must take account of the 
capacities of the child to exercise rights on his or her behalf. This principle 
has profound implications for the human rights of the child. It has been 
described as a new principle of interpretation in international law, 
recognizing that as children acquire enhanced competencies, accordingly, 
there is a reduced need for direction and a greater capacity to take 
responsibility for decisions affecting their lives.171  
                                                                                                                                            
168 Article 16 (Right to privacy): Children have a right to privacy. The law should protect them from attacks 
against their way of life, their good name, their families and their homes. 
169 Article 17 (Access to information; mass media): Children have the right to get information that is vital to 
their health and well-being. Governments should encourage mass media – radio, television, newspapers and 
Internet content sources – to provide information that children can understand and to not promote materials 
that could harm children. Mass media should particularly be encouraged to supply information in languages 
that minority and indigenous children can learn. Children should also have access to children’s books.  
170 Baimu, “Children, International Protection,” 2013. 
171 Lansdown, Gerison. The evolving capacities of the child (Stockholm: Save the Children, 2005), 3. 
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The goal of the drafters was to create a legal scenario in which “children’s capacities can 
differ according to [their maturity level and] the nature of the rights to be exercised. 
Children, therefore, require varying degrees of protection, participation, and opportunity 
for autonomy in different contexts and across different areas of decision-making.”172  
 Article 12.1 expresses that “State Parties shall assure to the child who is capable 
of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters 
affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the 
age and maturity of the child;” in other words, the greater the age and capacity of the 
child, the more seriously their views should be considered.173  
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has identified Article 12 as one of the 
central underlying principles of the Convention, demanding a fundamental shift in the 
conventional approach of casting children as passive recipients of adult protection to 
acknowledging them as active agents, entitled to participate in decisions that affect their 
lives.174 
The second principle worth highlighting that sheds light on how the provisions of 
the Convention are to be interpreted, as determined by the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child, is the “best interest of the child.”175  Found mainly in Articles 5 and 18, this 
                                               
172 Lansdown, The evolving capacities of the child, 4. 
173 CRC/C/GC/12/, “Committee on the Rights of the Child -General Comment No. 12 (2009) The right of 
the child to be heard,” http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/docs/AdvanceVersions/CRC-C-GC-
12.pdf. 
174 Lansdown, The evolving capacities of the child, 4. 
175 As stipulated by the United Nations Human Rights Office of the Commissioner, the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child “is the body of 18 Independent experts that monitors implementation of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child by its State parties. It also monitors implementation of two Optional Protocols to 
the Convention, on involvement of children in armed conflict and on sale of children, child prostitution and 
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principle identifies the child as the recipient of the protections and rights enshrined in the 
CRC. Article 5 once again stresses that the State must respect the rights and 
responsibilities of parents or other caregivers to provide “appropriate direction and 
guidance in the exercise by the child of their rights in a manner consistent with the 
evolving capacities of the child.” In other words: “parental rights and responsibilities are 
not unbounded. By inserting the word ‘appropriate,’ Article 5 removes the possibility that 
parents to have carte blanche to provide, or fail to provide, whatever guidance and 
support they deem suitable.”176  
The chapter has provided an overview on the universalized conceptions of 
childhood which influence the fields of the human sciences, as well as policies related to 
the protection of the child in an adult-centric world. The establishment of the Convention 
of the Rights of the Child (1989) can be celebrated as a successful breakpoint from older 
views of passivity and incompetence attributed to children. By framing the child as bearer 
of rights (and not only recipient of protections), and by establishing provisions which 
focus on the evolving capacity and best interests of the child, the Convention has paved 
the ground for discussions of the autonomy, legal competence, and responsibility of 
children in the international legal system.   
  
                                                                                                                                            
child pornography.” (“Committee on the Rights of the Child”, United Nations Human Rights Office of the 
Commissioner, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRC/Pages/CRCIndex.aspx). 
176 Lansdown, The evolving capacities of the child, xi. 
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Chapter 5: Analysis of treaty and customary law on child recruitment and misperceptions 
arising from them 
 
 Chapter five invites the reader to embark on the legal mapping of the current 
international rights and legal protections awarded to the child in times of peace and in 
times of armed conflict. These protections are mainly found in International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL) regimes. The first 
part of the chapter consists of a brief presentation of the main sources of these fields of 
international law. Treaties and customary law will be given priority in the analysis 
because they create obligations. Additional sources such as multilateral declarations will 
also be acknowledged, despite not usually generating obligation; their importance comes 
from the capacity to point to a possibly emerging different legal landscape. The first part 
of the chapter will also provide a brief presentation of the three international legal 
regimes which set out the protective measures granted to the child in both times of 
conflict and times of peace: International Humanitarian Law, International Human Rights 
Law, and International Criminal Law (ICL). The last one consisting on rules which 
impose punitive measures on those who violate the protective measures contained in IHL 
and IHRL. When analyzing the established law, the chapter will highlight the Minimum 
Age of Legal Recruitment (MALR) set at fifteen years of age by International 
Humanitarian Law at fifteen.   
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Finally, the section will call attention to the politically misrepresentation of lex lata177 
presented by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN Office of the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflicts. 
The legal concept of child soldier 
 The first attempt to codify the term child soldier occurred in the 1997 Cape Town 
“Symposium on the Prevention of Recruitment of Children into the Armed Forces and on 
Demobilization and Social Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Africa”, which resulted in 
the adoption of the “Cape Town Principles and Best Practices.” In this document, a child 
soldier was defined as “any person under 18 years of age (emphasis added) who is part of 
any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but 
not limited to cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups, other 
than family members. The definition includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and 
forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried 
arms.” The symposium was an initiative jointly led by the NGO Working Group on the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and UNICEF, and it aimed at “bring[ing] together 
experts and partners to develop strategies for preventing recruitment of children, in 
particular, for establishing 18 as the minimum age for recruitment and for demobilizing 
child soldiers and helping them reintegrate into society.”178   
                                               
177 Lex lata means: “the law that has been borne”, or in other words, law as it is, as it exists (“lex lata” 
Oxford References, http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100103408 (May 
1, 2017).  
178 “Cape Town Principles and Best Practices” (1997): 
http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/Cape_Town_Principles(1).pdf). 
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Ten years later, a second international convention took place that would further 
contribute to the definition of a child soldier. In 2007, as a result of the international 
conference ‘Free Children from War’ held in Paris, co-hosted by the government of 
France and UNICEF, two additional non-binding documents were added to the existing 
network of legal protection of children during armed conflict: the “Paris Commitments to 
Protect Children from Unlawful Recruitment or Use by Armed Forces or Armed Groups” 
and the “Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or 
Armed Groups.”  The Paris Principles set an important landmark in the discussion of the 
concept of a child soldier in the international legal discourse.179 Intended to extend the 
Cape Town protections, the Paris Principles abandoned the more strict focus on child 
soldiers to instead consider a wider approach to protection that would focus on all 
children associated with armed groups and armed forces. The wider and more 
comprehensive approach proposed by the Paris Principles has been the trend followed by 
most current international legal discourse to honor the notion that war affects children in 
general, despite the fact that some may carry arms, while others do not.   
 Article 2.1 of the Paris Principles presents the definition for “children associated 
with armed forces and armed groups” as:  
…any person below 18 years of age (emphasis added) who is or who has 
been recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, 
including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, 
                                               
179 The Paris Principles resulted from a cooperation between UNICEF, the European Commission’s 
Humanitarian Aid Office, NGO’s, representatives of international agencies and governments as explained 
in “Paris Conference “Free Children from War”, UNICEF: 
(http://www.unicef.org/media/media_38208.html).  
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cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual purposes. It does not only 
refer to a child who is taking or has taken a direct part in hostilities.”180 
  
Due to the fact that the concept extends to all children involved in armed groups and 
armed forces, it has been considered by a “very wide definition by some scholars.”181 
And although “the official nomenclature drifted away from child soldier as initially set 
out and defined in the Cape Town Principles, into… the somewhat tongue-trying children 
associated with armed forces and armed groups…[in practical terms] both still share 
considerable textual overlaps regarding the actual persons they protect.”182 Despite the 
nomenclature change, the term ‘child soldier’ is still mostly applied in the media and in 
specialized literature to identify those underage individuals who have been recruited to 
join an armed group or the armed forces.  
Definition of child soldier follows age criteria: fifteen or eighteen years old? 
Both the Cape Town and Paris conferences defined child soldiers as anyone 
below the age of eighteen “who is part of any regular or irregular armed force or armed 
group in any capacity” or “who has been recruited or used by an armed force or armed 
group in any capacity.” This being, eighteen years of age was the age selected to 
determine the line between legal and illegal recruitment of minors on both of these 
conferences.  
                                               
180 In Principle 2.4, the term “recruitment” refers to compulsory, forced and voluntary conscription or 
enlistment of children into any armed force or armed group.” In Principle Article 2.2, the term “armed 
forces” refers to the armed forces of a State. And in Paris Principle 2.3, the term “armed groups” refers to 
groups distinct from armed forces as defined by Article 4 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict. 
181 Waschefort, Gus, International Law and Child Soldiers (Oxford, Portland: Hart Publishing Limited, 
2014), 15. 
182 Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy, 4. 
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 In international law, the definition of children, and thus, child soldiers 
follows age criteria: “international law relates to what constitutes a child simply 
regarding age;”183, the Convention on the Rights of the Child defines a child generally as 
anyone below the age of eighteen, so logically, at least in International Human Rights 
Law, a child soldier would be characterized as a soldier under the age of eighteen. The 
provisions that regulate the recruitment of child soldiers are also based on age criteria, 
and not other more subjective criteria tied to localized maturity standards.184 Recall, 
however, that International Humanitarian Law, as set by the CRC and its Additional 
Protocols allows for the recruitment and use of children in armed conflicts starting at age 
fifteen, and that in the commentaries to the Additional Protocols, the drafters declared 
that they understood children to be individuals up to the age of fifteen.185  The logical 
conclusion to be drawn from this is that international law, and more importantly, 
Humanitarian Law allows the recruitment and use of children in armed conflicts starting 
at age fifteen despite the fact that anyone below eighteen may still be considered a child 
soldier.  
Putting it differently, there is a still an amount of confusion in regards to what 
international law considers a child soldiers when it comes to legal age of recruitment. In 
the commentaries to Additional Protocols I and II (International Humanitarian Law) 
published by the ICRC, the drafters expressed the opinion that ‘children’ is understood as 
                                               
183 Freeland, “How International Law Deals with Child Soldiers,” section III, 307-8. 
184 Freeland, “How International Law Deals with Child Soldiers,” section III, 307-8. 
185 “Commentary of 1987 to the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention (1977), “ICRC,: https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=8E174BC1926F72
FAC12563CD00436C73 
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individuals up to the age of fifteen. However, afterwards the CRC (International Human 
Rights Law) defines children as anyone below eighteen, which would lead us to conclude 
that Additional Protocols I and II as well as the CRC (Article 38) actually allow for the 
legal recruitment and use of individuals under eighteen which according to the stipulated 
age set by CRC and the definitions of child soldiers presented in both conferences on 
child soldiers would be considered child soldier.   
The confusion is further explored by Waschefort (2015) in the passage below:  
there are two ways in which to address this phenomenon [child 
soldiering]. First, one can argue that the law does not prohibit the 
enlistment of the child into the military, that child will not be deemed a 
child soldier. Or, alternatively, that the child soldier remains a child 
soldier, but that no legal norms were violated in recruitment or even using 
that child in military operations, where the relevant state has not 
subscribed to a legal obligation to the contrary. The United Kingdom, for 
example, has not subscribed to any legal norm that bars it from recruiting 
persons under sixteen years of age or older into its armed forces, and 
indeed the UK does recruit such persons. [As 2013, the UK became a 
party to the OPAC, and thus hold the obligation of not recruiting anyone 
below sixteen.] In contrast, Norway has subscribed to such international 
norms. If one were to favor an interpretation in terms of which concept of 
child soldier is the one which inherently denotes unlawfulness of the 
child‘s enlistment, conscription or use, it would mean that a sixteen-year-
old child would be deemed to be a child soldier if she or he were in the 
Norwegian Armed Forced but would not be deemed a child soldier if she 
or he were in the British Armed Forces.186 
 
Waschefort concludes by stating, “the term child soldier is thus broadly and 
legally imprecise…  As a result, a child soldier in one country may not be a ‘child soldier 
in another.”187  
                                               
186 Waschefort, International Law and Child Soldiers, 14. 
187 Waschefort, International Law and Child Soldiers, 14. 
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The dubiety in the nomenclature highlighted by Waschefort relates to the gap 
between the minimum military age adopted by certain countries and the age of majority 
set at eighteen by the CRC. As established by national law, the minimum age of 
recruitment varies from one country to another; so, in one country, a person recruited at 
age sixteen may not be considered a child soldier according to national standards, while 
in another country where the minimum age of recruitment is eighteen, that sixteen-year-
old child, if recruited, would be labeled as a child soldier. Waschefort is accurate when 
applying domestic standards to characterize whether the young recruit is considered a 
child soldier, however, the plurality of these domestic rules nonetheless increase the level 
of confusion.  
How international law deals with the problem of child soldering 
The international legal regimes aimed at protecting the child from early 
recruitment and use in armed conflicts is the subject of the present chapter. The next 
chapter delves into the other side of how international law enforces the protection against 
child soldiering by authorizing international and domestic courts to try those who are 
accused of recruiting and use children below the age of fifteen in armed conflicts.   
Legal protections against the recruitment and use of children in armed conflicts 
 
1. Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions (1977) 
 The first efforts to internationally prohibit children’s direct involvement in armed 
conflicts (international and non-international) by placing obligations on states against the 
recruitment of young soldiers are found in Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva 
Conventions (1977).  
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Before the Additional Protocols, “there is no express regulation of the participation of 
children in armed conflicts in any of the four Geneva Conventions (the GCs).  
 “Additional Protocol I (AP I) and Additional Protocol II (AP II) to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions… clearly set out the obligation under International Humanitarian 
Law of State parties to those Protocols, when engaged in armed conflict, to provide 
special protection to children of all ages caught up in the conflict as a protected class in 
and of themselves.”188 More specifically, Additional Protocol I – regulating international 
armed conflicts – determines in Article 77.2 that:  
The Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that 
children who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct 
part in hostilities and, in particular, they shall refrain from recruiting them 
into their armed forces. In recruiting among those persons who have 
attained the age of fifteen years but who have not attained the age of 
eighteen years, the Parties to the conflict shall endeavor to give priority to 
those who are oldest.  
 
Additional Protocol II – aimed at regulating non-international conflicts  – creates 
a positive obligation for states and non-State parties alike to a conflict to assure that 
“children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in the 
armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities” and “ that children who 
have not attained the age of fifteen years shall remain applicable to them if they take a 
direct part in hostilities…”189 
The drafters of the Additional Protocols understood children to be a separate 
group, more dependent and vulnerable than their adult counterparts, and because their 
                                               
188 Grover, Child Soldier Victims of Genocidal Forcible Transfer Exonerating Child Soldiers Charged with 
Grave Conflict-related International Crimes, 10. 
189 Additional Protocol II, Article 4(3)(c). 
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vulnerability intensifies during times of armed conflict, the Committee placed special 
protections directly on to children. These protections were additional to those offered 
generally to civilians not involved in the hostilities (‘protected persons’ according to 
International Humanitarian Law).  
No definition or age limitation regarding who is to be regarded as ‘children’ was 
provided in the Additional Protocols. The omission of what constitutes ‘children’ was 
intentional; “the term ‘child’ does not have an accepted definition.”190 The ICRC 
commentaries explained that: 
According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, the term “child” means a 
young human being who has not reached the age of discretion, i.e., the age 
at which one is fit to manage one’s affairs (7th edition, 1982). The Oxford 
English Dictionary (1970) defines a child as a human being up to the age 
of puberty. The French Dictionary Robert indicates that it means a human 
being from birth up to the age of thirteen; this is followed by adolescence. 
The age of puberty varies, depending on climate, race and the individual. 
However, the limit of fifteen years of age, which is given many times in 
the fourth Convention and is also given in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this 
article, seems to provide a reasonable basis for a definition. Moreover, the 
article itself in paragraphs 2 and 5 uses the word “persons” in referring to 
a limit of eighteen years. This does not prevent the fact that some 
countries have adopted a lower or higher age than fifteen years, but there 
is no doubt that all human beings under fifteen should, within the meaning 
of the Fourth Convention and [p.900] this Protocol, be considered and 
treated like children. The age of fifteen most often corresponds to such 
development of the human faculties that extraordinary measures are no 
longer required to the same degree. However, some flexibility is 
appropriate, for there are individuals who remain children, both physically 
and mentally, after the age of fifteen. Furthermore, this age of fifteen has 
been adopted in other international instruments. Thus, for example, in a 
recommendation of 1965 relating to the minimum age for marriage 
(Resolution 2018 (XX)) the United Nations General Assembly requested 
                                               
190 ICRC Commentaries 3178-9. 
 
 
 
 
 
93 
States to determine a minimum age for marriage and specified that that 
age should in no case be under fifteen years.191 
 
 As we can see in the Commentaries to the Additional Protocols of the CRC 
(1977), it was the opinion of the Committee and its predecessors that: ‘children’ is 
considered anyone up to the age of fifteen. The age of fifteen was chosen by the drafters 
to be the minimum age for the legal recruitment and use of children by armed forces and 
armed groups in international armed conflicts (found in Additional Protocol I) and non-
international armed conflicts (found in Additional Protocol II).  
  
2. Article 38 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
  Article 38 of the CRC, despite being contained within an International Human 
Rights Law convention, is applicable in International Humanitarian Law because it 
addresses the recruitment and use of children during armed conflicts, and thus, 
interestingly brings two branches of IL (International Humanitarian Law and 
International Human Rights Law) more closely together.192 This proximity explicitly 
illustrates how the drafters believed that protecting children in times of conflict closely 
was aligned with the need of protecting children also in times of peace. 
                                               
191 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. International Committee of the Red 
Cross, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. Commentary of 1987, Protection of 
Children: https://ihl 
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=8E174BC1926F72
FAC12563CD00436C73. 
  
192 Ang, Article 38: Children in Armed Conflicts, 3. 
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Article 38 is “…structured according to a typical International Humanitarian Law 
scheme: its first paragraph contains a general provision on the applicability of 
International Humanitarian Law, the second and third paragraph deal with the protection 
of children from participation in hostilities or recruitment in the armed forces, and the 
fourth paragraph reminds the states Parties to protect the civilian population. Article 38, 
as a whole, apparently covers International Humanitarian Law substance, which is 
reinforced by its explicit references to International Humanitarian Law and the 
terminology (‘hostilities,’ ‘recruiting,’ ‘civilian population’, . . .) used… Thus, Article 38 
of the CRC should be interpreted in line within International Humanitarian Law.”193 
 As explained by Ang: “Article 38 of the CRC has a hybrid character. Materially 
speaking, Article 38 of the CRC is clearly an International Humanitarian Law provision 
yet within human rights instrument.” 194 Article 38 of the CRC establishes that: 
“Governments must do everything they can to protect and care for children affected by 
war. Children under fifteen should not be forced or recruited to take part in a war or join 
the armed forces.”195 The Article reaffirms the need for states “to respect and to ensure 
respect for rules of international humanitarian law applicable to them in armed conflicts 
which are relevant to the child.”  
The rules of International Humanitarian Law applicable specifically to the child is 
found in the Additional Protocols of the Geneva Convention I and II as discussed earlier. 
                                               
193Ang, Article 38: Children in Armed Conflicts, 13. 
194 Ang, Article 38: Children in Armed Conflicts, 9. 
195 UNICEF, “Fact Sheet: A summary of the rights under the Convention on the Rights of the Child,” 
http://www.unicef.org/crc/files/Rights_overview.pdf. 
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There is no consensus regarding whether these protocols have achieved customary law 
status, thus being considered obligatory only to states parties. All three conventions, the 
Additional Protocols I and II, and the CRC allow for the recruitment and use of children 
fifteen and above by armed forces and armed groups.  
 In terms of setting legal prohibitions against child recruitment, the CRC – as we 
have seen previously – fails to completely ban the deployment of persons under eighteen 
to hostilities, only requesting that states “take all feasible measures [weak obligation] to 
ensure that persons who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part 
in hostilities.” (Article 38.2) The obligation set on states is to “refrain from recruiting any 
person who has not attained the age of fifteen years into their armed forces.” However, 
this does allow states to recruit children above the age of fifteen with the requirement that 
states are to prioritize the older children. 
  Another major downfall of the CRC is that it does not address, at least not 
directly, non-state armed groups. The CRC does not impose obligations upon armed 
groups regarding recruitment of juveniles; however, it does place a rather weak 
obligation upon states to “ensure that persons who have not attained the age of fifteen 
years do not take a direct part in hostilities” (Art. 38.2), which would include the 
criminalization of armed groups who recruit and use children under the age of fifteen.  
3. The OPAC 
 The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OPAC), established in 2000 complements the 
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CRC and offers wider and stronger protective measures against the recruitment and use 
of children (individuals under eighteen) in conflicts.196  
In the case of the the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, the protocol “is an effort to 
strengthen implementation of the Convention and increase the protection of children 
during armed conflicts.”197 Additional protections offered by the protocol include raising 
the age of conscription to eighteen; prohibiting states from deploying persons under 
eighteen to fight in direct hostilities. Another important innovation is that the protocol 
differently than the CRC, addresses armed forces and armed groups, which would 
theoretically widen the scope of protection of children involved in armed conflicts. 198 
The OPAC also raises the minimum age for voluntary enlistment to sixteen, instead of 
fifteen as set by the Additional Protocols I, II and the CRC.  Still, the Optional Protocol 
has been seen as an advance upon the Convention on the Rights of the Child regarding 
addressing and redressing the “loose” provisions of minimum age of conscription, 
deployment, and use of children by armed groups.199  
 In despite of the apparent progress, the Protocol sets a weak obligation against the 
recruitment and use of those below the age of eighteen by armed groups and armed 
                                               
196  Optional Protocols often complement human rights treaty by “providing for procedures with regard to 
the treaty or address a substantive area related to the treaty.” “What is an Optional Protocol?”, UN Women, 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/daw/index.html (May 1st 2017).  
197 UNICEF, “Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict,” 
https://www.unicef.org/crc/index_30203.html (May 1, 2017). 
198 UNICEF, “Fact Sheet: A summary of the rights under the Convention on the Rights of the Child: 
http://www.unicef.org/crc/files/Rights_overview.pdf. 
199 Vanderwiele, Tiny, A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
Optional Protocol: The Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2006), 19. 
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forces. Article 1 urges states to take “all feasible measures to ensure that members of 
their armed forces who have not attained the age of eighteen do not take direct part in 
hostilities” (Article 1). ‘All feasible measure’ is considered by many commentators as a 
fragile, and thus an inadequate means of protection, reflecting an obligation of means and 
not of result.200 This effectively translates to: states are to comply only if possible. The 
outbreak of a war and the need for manpower can be (and have traditionally been used as) 
a military necessity, and thus a viable justification for derogating from the provision to be 
fulfilled. For example, as argued by Child Soldier International:  
The USA along with countries such as Australia and the United Kingdom 
also restrict protection for children if the withdrawal of under-18s would 
adversely affect the success of a military operation. The USA defines 
“feasible measures” as only those measures which are “practical or 
practically possible, taking into account all the circumstances ruling at the 
time, including humanitarian and military considerations.” In the United 
Kingdom, deployment of members of the armed forces who have not yet 
reached 18 years is permitted where there is a genuine military need, the 
situation is urgent, it is otherwise not practicable to withdraw minors 
before deployment, or it would undermine the operational effectiveness of 
their ship or unit. In Australia “feasible measures” are required only to the 
maximum extent possible, and where it will not adversely impact the 
conduct of operations.201 
 
A definite move forwards is that the OPAC completely bans the recruitment and 
use of individual below age eighteen by armed groups. Article 4.1 states that: “Armed 
groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State should not, under any 
circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 years.” 
                                               
200 Vandewiele, A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child Optional 
Protocol: The Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts, 26. 
201 “Louder than Words Report,” Child Soldiers International (2012), 47. 
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 In sum, the OPAC rules out the possibility of an armed group legally recruiting 
and using individuals below the age of eighteen in hostilities, yet, the same level of 
prohibition does not apply to governmental armed forces which can still recruit under 
eighteens, if the recruitment is allowed by domestic law and follows the established safe 
measurements established by the treaty. The OPAC makes states responsible for 
prohibiting and to enforcing measures to prevent the recruitment and use of children 
below the stipulated age in hostilities. 
 On a last note, the convention still kept the definition of children provided by the 
CRC. As a result, the recruits below the age of eighteen who have enlisted voluntarily are 
still considered by the convention as children. Therefore, it is safe to affirm that the 
OPAC, as the previous conventions before, continues to allow the lawful recruitment of 
children; those under eighteen years to serve in the military. Another important 
characteristic of the Protocol is that it has not reached the status of customary law, being 
obligatory only to those states parties to the document.   
 
5. ILO Convention 182 concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the 
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor 
 
 The last international treaty that directly addresses the prohibition of children’s 
involvement in military actions and armed conflicts is the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) Convention 182 concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for 
the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (2012). “Under this treaty, forced or 
compulsory (but not voluntary) recruitment of children under the age of 18 for use in 
armed conflict are among the worst forms of child labor from which children must be 
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protected.”202 The treaty establishes that each state party “shall take all necessary 
measures to ensure the effective implementation and enforcement of the provisions 
giving effect to this Convention including the provision and application of penal 
sanctions or, as appropriate, other sanctions” (Article 7.1) as well as “take effective and 
time-bound measures to (7.2.a)  prevent the engagement of children in the worst forms of 
child labour” and (7.2.b) “provide the necessary and appropriate direct assistance for the 
removal of children from the worst forms of child labour and for their rehabilitation and 
social integration.” Convention 182 is considered to use stronger language to prohibit 
recruitment and use of children by the military, yet, still only applies exclusively to state 
parties. In 2017, a total of 180 states were signatories to the ILO Convention 182.  
 If a state is party to any of the instruments discussed in this chapter, its armed 
forces can continue to recruit persons under eighteen (individuals still considered 
children under CRC) while still being fully in compliance with international law if 
enlistment is considered voluntary: “Some countries using and recruiting child soldiers 
do so without violating any international legal obligation.”203 The fact that International 
Law still allows armed forces (not armed groups) to legally use persons under eighteen 
seems not to be regarded problematic, and, for the most part, not to be considered the 
crime of child soldering.  
                                               
202 “Louder than Words Report,” Child Soldiers International (2012), 17. 
203 Waschefort, International Law and Child Soldiers (Studies in International Law), 32. 
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When a child is engaged directly in the armed conflict does he or she loses the status of 
protected persons? How do International Humanitarian Law and International Human 
Rights Law treat an active child soldier?  
 
  One conceivable way to answer to the above questions is to affirm that the 
protections required by International Humanitarian Law are meant to protect all of those 
not taking direct part in the hostilities as well as a special category of vulnerable persons 
such as children. So, children due to their vulnerability, involved in armed conflict, or 
not, are per excellence protected persons.204  
Another way to look at the issue is arguing that International Humanitarian Law 
sets a limitation in relation to civilians who have engaged in the armed conflict, which 
can include children. Civilians who have ‘picked up arms’ are, in general, no longer 
deemed as protected persons under International Humanitarian Law; they have lost their 
status of protection, are now considered legitimate targets under the law of armed conflict 
because they have chosen to engage in the conflict.   
Reinforcing the second perspective, Rene Provost argues that: “If a child is 
enrolled in the armed forces of a party to an international armed conflict, there seems to 
be no apparent basis in current international humanitarian law to characterize that child as 
anything other than as a combatant.”205  Conversely, if the recruitment is by an armed 
group, and the child is not taking part of the conflict directly, then he or she keeps the 
status of “protected persons” under International Humanitarian Law.  
                                               
204 “Rule 135: Children affected by armed conflict are entitled to special respect and protection,” ICRC 
Handbook of Customary IHL: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter39_rule135. 
205 Provost, René, “Targeting Child Soldiers”: http://www.ejiltalk.org/targeting-child-soldiers/, para.5. 
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Frederic Megret offers a different position:  
It may be helpful to think creatively about a unique status for children. 
Specifically, it could be helpful to treat child soldiers as either non-
combatant members of the armed forces (akin to medical or religious 
military personnel, notwithstanding the fact that they may potentially 
engage in hostilities), or as non-combatants tout court (despite the fact that 
they are actually members of the armed forces who would normally be 
targetable as such), subject to the exception that they may be treated as 
combatants if and only to the extent that they participate in hostilities, in 
the sense that that expression is understood in relation to civilians. This is 
an intermediary position fashioned from the normative clay that is the 
basis of international humanitarian law. It is not one that is sustained by 
anybody of practice, let alone opinio juris. Nonetheless, I see it as striking 
a fair middle ground between the repulsive idea of knowingly targeting 
children who should never have been on the battlefield in the first place, 
and the evident risk to one’s troops of treating what are actual combatants 
with, as it were, “kids’ gloves. It gives child soldiers an extra chance, 
although no guarantee that if they participate in hostilities that they will 
escape unscathed; it reinforces the idea that it is the duty of all responsible 
parties to an armed conflict to protect childhood within the bounds of 
military necessity, narrowly understood.206 
 
 Both positions, despite being at variance with each other, acknowledge 
International Humanitarian Law’s position of attributing a combatant status to a child 
soldier who has been legally recruited. If the child is a regular member of the armed 
forces, the rules of International Humanitarian Law apply as it would to a regular 
combatant.   
Disagreements are common. As an illustration, Ang (2005) provides a dissenting 
position from the previous two. She asserts that the rules of International Humanitarian 
Law relevant to the child, which come from the Geneva Conventions and their Additional 
Protocols… “provide two categories of protections: on the one hand, there are rules 
                                               
206  Provost, René, Blog: “Targeting Child Soldiers”, Jan. 12, 2016. http://www.ejiltalk.org/targeting-child-
soldiers/, para.3. 
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regulating the treatment of child civilians, and on the other hand, there are those 
regulating the treatment of child combatants. About the first category Ang affirms that 
child civilians benefit from the ‘general protection’ in their capacity as civilians and from 
a ‘special protection’ in their capacity as children.”207 In the CRC, these protections are 
present in the second, third and fourth paragraphs of Article 38. However, an opinion 
shared by most scholars writing on Article 38 of the CRC is that paragraphs two and 
three under the heading ‘participation in hostilities and recruitment’ apply to child 
combatant, while paragraph 4, under the heading ‘protection and care of civilians’, 
applies to child civilians.208  In Ang‘s opinion, this dissonance does not make sense since 
“the child combatant does not benefit very much from the protection from participation in 
hostilities or recruitment since he or she is already fighting, or he or she is already a 
member of the armed forces.”209 Therefore, child combatants should not be excluded 
from the protections awarded to children under the CRC and treaties of Humanitarian 
Law.210  
The rules regulating the treatment of child combatants are part of the rules 
of International Humanitarian Law relevant to the child, fully applicable to 
the States Parties…Under International Humanitarian Law, captured child 
combatants are entitled to the extensive and vigorous protection granted to 
prisoners of war, notwithstanding the possibility to qualify child 
combatants as ‘unlawful combatants’. This protection includes important 
guarantees such as the right to humane treatment. ‘Child war criminals’ 
also receive a specific treatment with a view to their young age. However, 
                                               
207 Ang, Article 38: Children in Armed Conflicts, 26. 
208 Ang, Article 38: Children in Armed Conflicts, 28. 
209 Ang, Article 38: Children in Armed Conflicts, 28. 
210 Ang, Article 38: Children in Armed Conflicts, 28. 
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the situation of child combatants who are not captured is not explicitly 
regulated under International Humanitarian Law.211 
 
  
“International Human Rights Law on the other hand, differently than International 
Humanitarian Law, does not differentiate between ‘combatants’ and ‘civilians.’ Such 
categorization could logically be understood as going against the concept of human rights 
itself.” 212 In International Human Rights Law, children, are awarded certain legal 
protection available to them in times of peace and in times of war and “ the Committee 
on the Rights of the Child indeed predominantly speaks of the rights of ‘children’ in 
armed conflict, without making a further distinction”213 which allows us to conclude that 
all children are entitled to the same level of protections.214 
It is worthwhile to call attention once again for the sake of clarity on how 
differently International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law 
conceptualizes child soldiers. In International Human Rights Law, when a person below 
the age of eighteen is recruited, he or she is considered a child, as stipulated by the CRC; 
however, “the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols (International Humanitarian 
Law) use different age-limits on different protective measures for children…fifteen 
[being] the most common.”215  
                                               
211 Ang, Article 38: Children in Armed Conflicts, 28. 
212 Ang, Article 38: Children in Armed Conflicts, 29. 
213 Ang, Article 38: Children in Armed Conflicts, 29. 
214 Ang, Article 38: Children in Armed Conflicts, 29. 
215 “Rule 135: Children, Definition of children,” ICRC Handbook of Customary IHL: https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter39_rule135 
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So, a young recruit at age sixteen is considered a child soldier in International 
Human Rights Law, but may not be considered a child at all under International 
Humanitarian Law.   
An additional side note on misrepresentation of lex lata216 by the ICRC and the Office of 
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflicts   
 
Rule 136 of the ICRC Handbook of Customary International Humanitarian Law 
states that “children must not be recruited into armed forces or armed groups” and “the 
ICRC has recognized this rule as customary International Humanitarian Law as it reflects 
State practice…applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts.” 
The text also affirms that Additional Protocols I and II prohibitions are reflected in the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child…”217 As much as the last sentence is accurate, and 
reflection does not necessarily mean replication, we have seen earlier in the present 
chapter that the Additional Protocols prohibitions against the recruitment and use of 
children in armed forces and armed groups apply exclusively to those below the age of 
fifteen, and not for those older. 
 Therefore, the affirmation made by the ICRC found in the Handbook of 
Customary International Humanitarian Law that customary International Humanitarian 
Law as reflected in Additional Protocols I and II and the CRC prohibits the recruitment 
of children is in the best intention anachronic, and can only be found to be true before 
                                               
216 Lex lata is understood as: “Ratified law; the positive law currently in force, without modification to 
account for any rules subjectively preferred by the interpreter…” Fellmeth, Aaron and Maurice Horwitz. 
“Lex lata”, Guide to Latin in International Law. Oxford University Press 2009, 169. 
217 ICRC Customary IHL Database, “Rule 136: Recruitment of Child Soldiers”, https://International 
Humanitarian Law-databases.icrc.org/customary-International Humanitarian 
Law/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter39_rule136 
 
 
 
 
 
105 
1989 – the year in which the CRC raised the age limit of children to include all persons 
below eighteen. 218   
To better explain: The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions only 
prohibit the recruitment and use of children below fifteen, despite the fact that eleven 
years later the CRC has raised the age limit of childhood to eighteen, considering anyone 
under eighteen to be a child. Quite confusingly, the CRC has keeps the language used in 
the Additional Protocols, prohibiting the recruitment and use of children below the age of 
fifteen (and not eighteen). So, if the CRC were to outlaw/ban the recruitment of children, 
it would need to extend the prohibition of recruitment to all of those below the age of 
eighteen, which is not the case (the convention continues to prohibits the recruitment and 
use of those below fifteen).  
On its web page, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General for Children and Armed Conflicts states that: 
Human rights law declares eighteen as the minimum legal age for 
recruitment and use of children in hostilities. Recruiting and using 
children under the age of fifteen as soldiers are prohibited under 
international humanitarian law – treaty, and custom – and is defined as a 
war crime by the International Criminal Court. Parties to conflict that 
recruit and use children are listed by the Secretary-General in the annexes 
of his annual report on children and armed conflict.219 
 
After the exposition of the current chapter, we can easily reach the conclusion that 
the above statement does not accurately reflect the current status of international law. 
Recruitment of children fifteen and above by the armed forces is allowed by the CRC 
                                               
 
219 The United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Children and 
Armed Conflict, “Child Recruitment and Use,” https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/effects-of-
conflict/six-grave-violations/child-soldiers/. 
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which is recognized as a human rights treaty with possible universal application. OPAC 
itself allows for voluntary recruitment of those sixteen and above when following certain 
safe measures. At best, one can say that the use of children in hostilities is discouraged by 
legal authorities, but not forbidden by International Humanitarian Law or International 
Human Rights Law.     
  It is unfortunate (yet comprehensible) that the ICRC and the Special 
Representative, two important sources of information on the existing legislation of the 
topic of child protection and military recruitment, would inadequately represent existing 
law, thus allowing their concepts of how the law should function to override their 
commitment to adequately inform what the law is.  
The current chapter addresses the current laws (treaty law and customary law) 
related to the protection of children from recruitment and use in armed conflicts. 
International law partly addresses the problem of child soldiering by creating prohibitions 
for states and armed groups against the recruitment and use children under fifteen.  
The chapter calls attention to the permissive character of the current law, allowing 
the recruitment and use of children at and over the age of fifteen – under customary 
International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law – and sixteen for 
State parties to the OPAC (International Human Rights Law), thus clearly failing to 
protect those under eighteen.  
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Chapter 6: How International Law currently deals with child soldiers: a relationship 
marked by inconsistencies 
 
 
The predominant story of child soldiering as told by international organizations, 
and academics is one in which the child is placed almost exclusively in the place of the 
victim, despite the possibility of the child be accused of an international crime. However, 
some academics and UN officials have begun to challenge this singular story of the child 
victim. The present chapter presents a few of these divergent positions, which have 
embarked and opened the door to an investigation fed by legal considerations which 
frames a different story: If the child is legally recruited, he or she is competent enough to 
respond for his or her criminal acts. Authors such as Leveau have identified the position 
of child criminal responsibility as one licensed by international law. These differing 
accounts have instituted different sets of imageries questioning the overwhelming 
representation of the child victimhood.  
A discussion of the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility (MACR) 
To engage in a discussion of criminal responsibility (MACR) of children under 
international law, the first step is to delineate how criminal systems in general determine 
who can be subjected to criminal rules. In all domestic legal systems, an individual is 
considered capable of infringing criminal laws only after certain criteria are met, for 
example, a minimum age is required, as also the accused being considered legally 
competent.  
The minimum age by which can be considered a target of the criminal law is 
denominated ‘minimum age of of criminal responsibility’ or MACR. The aim of 
establishing an MACR is to answer the question: starting at what age may children be 
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understood as capable enough to be considered capable and culpable of infringing penal 
law? The MACR does not respond if children, overall, may or may not infringe criminal 
laws. The underlying assumption when fixing a MACR is that children are capable of 
breaching the law, and can be held legally responsible for their wrongdoing, but only 
upon reaching a certain age. The MACR then demarcates the beginning of legal 
competency when the child in the eyes of the criminal system is deemed legally capable 
of holding obligations and being subjected to penal accountability. 
The MACR set by policy makers and legal systems results in an “age–
competency connection” which “fixe[s] age limits, and forces the difficult link between 
competency and rights. Such a connection is made to establish, even though arbitrarily, a 
minimum functioning age at which an individual can be legally prosecuted for crimes.”220 
This age of minimum functioning is also intrinsically related to how childhood is seen 
and treated within that specific society. Thus allowing for a complex concept such as 
“childhood” which “…bundles together ideas and expectations about young people and 
their roles in societies, and, as such, its meaning is socially constructed and varies over 
time within and across cultures” [to be translated into more precise workable age limits 
which mark the boundaries of childhood and adolescence.] 221 It ideally expresses 
society’s acknowledgment “that the child has attained the emotional, mental and 
intellectual maturity to be held responsible for their  [criminal] actions…In nearly all 
                                               
220 Cipriani, Children’s Rights and the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility: A Global Perspective, 3. 
221 Cipriani, Children’s Rights and the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility: A Global Perspective, 2-
3. 
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countries, children above the age of criminal responsibility “may in principle be subject 
to arrest, detention, and imprisonment.”222  
     Below the MACR, the child is frequently presumed excused from criminal 
liability due to lack of legal competence, which can also be translated into the absence of 
mens rea (infancy defense). In other words: “children younger than the prescribed age are 
assumed legally incompetent in that context [criminal laws]. They still enjoy protection 
rights for their relevant interests, but not liberty rights to assert their interests on their 
own behalf.”223 What Cipriani is saying is that children below the MACR are vested with 
protection rights, rights given by the state and overseen by parents and guardians to 
guarantee some degree of guardianship, as well as fewer liberty rights, which are 
entitlements offered to individuals after they have achieved a certain level of maturity, 
such as the right to drink, to marry, to drive.  
Also, the MACR should not be confused with the age of majority. The age of 
majority indicates that the individual has attained the age to be considered a legal adult, 
capacity wise. So, if the person above the MACR is to violate criminal law, he or she will 
be potentially answerable to in the ‘adult penal system.’224  Differently, a child 
perpetrator who has achieved the age of MACR, but not the age of majority he or she is, 
in most cases, deemed answerable for her acts in a juvenile justice system. Less common 
is having a child who has reached the MACR subjected to an adult-oriented, formal 
                                               
222 Cipriani, “The minimum age of criminal responsibility,” https://www.penalreform.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/justice-for-children-briefing-4-v6-web_0.pdf, February 2013, para.2. 
223 Cipriani, Children’s Rights and the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility: A Global Perspective, 3. 
224 Cipriani, Children’s Rights and the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility: A Global Perspective, 
xiii. 
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criminal prosecution, but it can happen. The allocation of the child to a juvenile or adult 
justice system is entirely up to domestic authorities and legislation. In some countries and 
in the case of the United States, some states, depending on the crime and the age of 
accused, children can be tried by the adult criminal system despite having not achieved 
the age of majority.  
  So, at the domestic level, states adopt different MACRs based on their cultural 
understandings of childhood, ranging from as low as six up to eighteen years of age. The 
median age worldwide is twelve.225  
The legal treatment of the young, when accused of breaching penal laws is not 
exclusively determined by him/her having reached (or not) the minimum age, other 
factors are also taken in consideration when deciding upon culpability of a child such as 
the presence of duress or a mental illness (factors that would also affect an adult’s 
criminal responsibility).  
 In the international legal arena, Article 40.4 of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC) requires states to establish an MACR operational within national 
jurisdiction: “States shall seek to promote the establishment of a minimum age below 
which children shall be presumed not to have the capacity to infringe the penal law [again 
within the national system; and (b) Whenever appropriate and desirable, measures for 
dealing with such children without resorting to judicial proceedings, providing that 
                                               
225 Cipriani, Don. “The Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility.” Penal Reform International/ UKaid. 
N.p., Feb. 2013. Web. 6 Apr. 2017. 
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human rights and legal safeguards are fully respected.” 226 The present provision does not 
create the obligation for states to set a certain pre-established minimum age of criminal 
responsibility; states are at liberty to choose the minimum age applicable within their 
national jurisdiction, thus honoring historical and cultural differences in relation to the 
concept of childhood and perceptions of youth competence. The only stipulation made by 
the Committee of the CRC is states should to not fix the minimum age “too low bearing 
in mind the facts of emotional, mental and intellectual maturity.”227 
 In international criminal law, no universal MACR has been established, so it is 
not clear what the minimum age of criminal responsibility is with respect to those who 
have committed international crimes. In Happold’s words: “…it is unclear whether 
international law fixes a minimum age of criminal responsibility at all.” 228 Drumbl 
argues that states, having failed to produce any consensus on where the MACR should 
stands, mirror the position of the ICC of intentionally excluding persons under the age of 
eighteen at the time of the alleged offense from its jurisdiction. The exclusion was a 
result of the drafters failing to reach an agreement on whether children would be held 
accountable by the court. And after a consensus position failed to be reached, “the 
Working Group on General Principles agreed to impose a ‘jurisdictional solution’ 
reflected in in Article 26 simply stating that the Court would be unable to prosecute 
                                               
226 Articles 40 of the CRC also stipulates certain basic minimum standards of juvenile justice criteria which 
all State parties must abide by when holding a child (someone younger than eighteen) criminally 
responsible. These protections, established by an international human rights treaty, are to apply at all times 
(in times of conflict and in times of peace) and they address children in conflict with national law, not 
necessarily international law.   
227 Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2007 and Happold “The Age of Criminal Responsibility for 
International Crimes Under International Law,” 6.  
228 Happold, “The Age of Criminal Responsibility for International Crimes Under International Law,” 3-4. 
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persons who were under eighteen at the time of the commission of the crime.”229  
The ICC decision to exclude minors, according to the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia “ is purely jurisdictional in nature” and “the proposition that there 
was no criminal responsibility for crimes committed by persons under the age of eighteen 
‘is completely unfounded in law’ under either conventional or customary international 
law.”230 Going against the legal argument, Drumbl identifies a growing tendency “among 
states, UN agencies, global civil society, as well as those lawyers who operate and staff 
these institutions” to exclude those under eighteen from the jurisdiction of international 
or internationalized institutions.231  
 The absence of an international standard for MACR is seen by many academics 
and jurists as an obstacle when trying to determine where International Criminal Law 
stands on the issue of the individual responsibility of minors. As stated by Grover (2012), 
establishing a universal MACR is a pre–requisite for claims of responsibility or the 
prosecution of children by international courts: 
Formulating a universal minimum age of criminal culpability for 
international crimes will seem an absolute prerequisite if States wish to 
prosecute persons who were under 18 years old at the time they committed 
an international crime (i.e. war crime, crime against humanity or 
genocide) in a manner that is legally supportable regarding equity. The 
absence of such a universal minimum age is then an absolute bar, in 
principle at least, to the prosecution of children for international crimes.232  
 
                                               
229 Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute, 2007, 72.  
230 Oric, para. 400 (ICTY 30 June 2006) cited by Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary on the Rome Statute, 2007, 72.   
231 Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy, 117. 
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Grover here makes an important point: the establishment of an age of legal 
competence is an essential criterion for the attribution of individual criminal 
responsibility for those under eighteen. Without the institutionalization of such landmark, 
we are not sure where International Criminal Law stands on the issue of children’s 
criminal responsibility. 
Children before the UN ad hoc tribunals and the ICC 
 What we know is, up to date, no child has ever been prosecuted under 
international law, either by international criminal tribunals or by a domestic court 
utilizing international law. In the few instances in which child soldiers were brought to 
trial, they were tried for ordinary crimes under national legislation, and not for 
international crimes under international law.233  
 Until the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), no international court had 
included children (individuals below eighteen) under its jurisdiction. The International 
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) granted jurisdiction over ‘natural persons’ as stated in both Statutes 
(Arts. 6 and 5, respectively) which would technically include children, but no specific 
mention of children was made in either Statute, and no cases including children 
defendants were tried.234  
 
                                               
233 Happold, “The Age of Criminal Responsibility for International Crimes Under International Law,” 1. 
234 Leveau, “Liability of Child Soldiers Under International Criminal Law,” 41. 
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After the SCSL, nonetheless, two hybrid courts: the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the 
Special Panels for Serious Crimes for Timor-Leste, included minors between the ages of 
twelve and sixteen years in their Statutes, which would suggest that the norms and legal 
principles developed by the SCSL have exerted direct influence in the work of the most 
recent ‘hybrid’ courts.235   
Criminal responsibility of child soldiers under current International Law  
International criminal courts, more specifically the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) have codified the act of recruiting 
and using children below the age of fifteen in armed conflicts as the crime of child 
soldiering. The crime of child soldiering was given the status of an international crimes. 
236 “The international community and international human rights groups have [also] 
declared that child soldering is a grave abuse of children’s rights.”237 The blame for the 
crime of child soldering fails over, entirely, on to the adult recruiter or commander. Also, 
as we have seen, following rules of International Humanitarian Law the criminalization 
of child soldering only applies when the child is below fifteen, mainly due to the fact that 
international customary law (Article 38 of the CRC, for example) allows individuals from 
ages fifteen to seventeen to be legally recruited to serve in armed conflicts.  Children ages 
                                               
235 Schabas, William, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and 
Sierra Leone (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 44. 
236 In the SCSL Statute, the crime of “conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into 
the national armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities” was considered a serious 
violation of international humanitarian law (Article 4), while in the Rome Statute, the crime of was labeled 
under the category of war crimes (Article 8). 
237 Rivard, Lysanne,”Child Soldiers and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programs: The 
Universalism of Children’s Rights vs. Cultural Relativism Debate,” The Journal of Humanitarian 
Assistance, (August 23, 2010): https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/772. 
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fifteen to seventeen at the time of the recruitment fall into a legal gap of protection and 
are not condemned by international criminal law as targets of child soldiering. Instead, 
they are merely considered young soldiers. Also, as shown in previous chapters, 
International Humanitarian Law treats young soldiers as lawful combatants, who are 
legally entitled to the same level of protection as older soldiers (see the discussion in 
previous chapters regarding the status of legal combatant attributed to young soldiers). 
 The allegation that child soldiering violates children’s rights, while commonly 
found in the international discourse, carries inconsistencies. The recruitment of children 
for military purposes challenges moral concepts of childhood, no doubt, and it can be said 
to even run counter to the overall intention of most children’s rights treaties, yet, the 
enlistment of persons under eighteen in military service is still allowed under all 
international children’s treaties currently in force.    
 Freeland (2010) is also correct in highlighting the sense of inconsistency present 
in the legal treatment of the child involved in child soldiering: while the SCSL recognizes 
the potential criminal responsibility of those fifteen and over, the ICC refuses to exercise 
jurisdiction over those under the age of eighteen.   
On the one hand, international law by allowing legal recruitment at age fifteen yet 
not establishing a position on whether these young qualify for criminal 
prosecution seems to communicate exclusively that there is no criminal 
wrongdoing in engaging children of 15, 16 or 17 years in armed conflict, and if 
these children are involved in serious violations of international law, then this is 
just unfortunate. The ICC is not mandated to examine the actions of individuals 
under eighteen, even where they might have committed international crimes.238  
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It is difficult to reconcile the apparent desire of the international community to 
protect children under the age of 18 from participating in armed conflict with the 
criminalization of recruitment activities only in respect of children below the age 
of 15 years. One can surely accept an argument that the recruitment or use of 
children of, for example, 15 years of age does constitute (in the absence of other 
factors that may properly negate criminal responsibility) an action that is at odds 
with the basic norms that have now been set by the international community. Such 
an action could and should constitute an international crime and the definitions in 
the Rome Statute should be ‘upgraded’ accordingly…239  
 
Cassese clearly expressed the legal gaps in how current international law frames the 
issue of child soldiers and criminal accountability: “It follows that a state, a national 
liberation movement or insurgent [and national armies] may lawfully enlist children of 
sixteen or seventeen – but if these children engage in criminal conduct, they are not 
amenable to judicial process before the ICC (although these children could be brought to 
trial before national courts, assuming such courts have jurisdiction over them). 240   
Cassese is also on target identifying the ICC decision to exclude persons under the 
age of eighteen from the jurisdiction of the court (Article 26) as one which would not 
necessarily point to the existence of “…a substantive rule of criminal law whereby 
minors may not be held criminally responsible.” 241 “It follows that, under that provision, 
it would be lawful for a contracting party to bring to trial before its national courts 
persons under eighteen for allegedly committing war crimes if this were allowed under 
the relevant national legislation.” 242  
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Divergent positions: International law allows for the incrimination of children accused of 
war crimes  
 
 Against the morally inclined positions held by IOs, NGOs, and academics alike 
that children should not be targeted by international criminal law, and that legal 
provisions should instead focus on prohibiting crimes committed against children and not 
by children; there is a growing tendency among a few academics to offer a contrasting 
position.   
 Leveau’s article “Liability of Child Soldiers under International Criminal Law” 
(2013) successfully focuses on the responsibility of the child soldier and illustrates how 
international law does, in fact, allow for the exercise of criminal responsibility on those 
under the age of eighteen when accused of grave violations of international law. In the 
present article, the author brings attention to crimes committed by children, instead of 
crimes against children. She acknowledges children as perpetrators, and discusses their 
potential criminal responsibility under international criminal law. In her opinion 
“interpretation of [legal] instruments suggest that child soldiers could be prosecuted by 
international criminal tribunals,”243 while still having to respect certain specific juvenile 
justice standards, already established by international law. 
Leveau goes on to present three reasons why prosecution of those under eighteen 
should be available in international criminal law. First, she argues that bringing to justice 
those who have committed international crimes is the aim of international criminal 
justice; second, it is understood as authorized by international human rights law; and 
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third, most domestic systems already allow prosecutions of child soldiers and, in fact, 
some have done so. 244  
Leveau is categorical in defending the view that prosecution of child soldiers is 
allowed by international human rights law. According to her, international human rights 
law does not prohibit child prosecution. The CRC, for example, contains chapters 
specifically on children in conflict with the law (even though the convention does not 
explicitly authorize or prohibit the prosecution of children), thus acknowledging that the 
legal prosecution of children is possible, at least in theory and within domestic legal 
systems.245 The wide ratification of the CRC is for her, a strong indication that states 
agree that: “child prosecution could occur and a fortiori is authorized.”246  
The fact that an international treaty as widely ratified as the CRC 
recognizes that prosecution of children can occur at a domestic level 
impacts our understanding of international law. Indeed, provisions of the 
CRC have crystallized under customary international law. Indirectly, this 
indicates that the international community is not substantially opposed to 
the prosecution of children at the international level. 247  
 
A common position against the viable prosecution of child soldiers in 
International Law comes from critics who argue that even though children in most 
criminal system are deemed capable of forming mens rea for ordinary crimes, this does 
necessarily entail the competence to form the means rea necessary for an international 
crime. 248 These authors have pointed to the fact that international crimes, unlike most 
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ordinary crimes, require a more complex mens rea requirement, which may prove to be 
extremely difficult for a child to acquire. 249 To address this valuable line of questioning, 
Leveau presents the argument set forth by Happold (2008) in which he explains that with 
the exception of the crime of genocide, the international requirements for international 
crimes are not more complex than domestic crimes.  
Most international crimes [with the exception of genocide] … do not 
require proof of any special intent. They merely require knowledge of the 
existence of particular circumstances. Crimes against humanity have a 
contextual element, calling for proof that they were ‘committed as part of 
a widespread or systematic attack directed against the civilian population,’ 
but it needs only to be shown that ‘[t]he perpetrator knew that the conduct 
was part of such an attack’ (Rome Statute, Article 7). War crimes require 
that the prohibited conduct “took place in the context of and was 
associated with” an armed conflict but only require proof that ‘[t]he 
perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the 
existence’ of the conflict. In most cases, therefore, the problem would 
seem to be one of proof rather than of principle. For example, it’s hard to 
envisage a child soldier being successfully prosecuted for the international 
crime of aggression. However, this is because child soldiers do not hold 
sufficiently exalted rank to participate in decisions to wage aggressive 
war. Indeed, one might go further and say that there is no principled 
difference between the issues arising from attempts to hold children 
responsible for complex domestic and complex international crimes. At 
best, the argument is over-inclusive. In each case the difficulties will be 
the same and, as a result, the argument cannot be used to distinguish 
children’s legal responsibility for international crimes from their criminal 
responsibility in domestic law.250   
 
 In other words, according to existing international criminal law, as set by the ICC, 
a juvenile can indeed qualify as having met the mens rea criterion for the prosecution for 
international crimes, since “most international crimes … do not require proof of any 
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special intent. They merely require knowledge of the existence of particular 
circumstances [again with the exception of genocide].”251  
 One of the other main concerns of those who oppose the idea of children’s 
prosecution under International Criminal Law is the idea that prosecution can never be 
conducted in a way that can deliver proper rehabilitation to the child accused, as well as, 
be considered in the child’s best interest. Leveau makes a compelling counterargument 
explaining that if done with the intention of rehabilitation, holding a child criminally 
liable can, in fact, help the child return to society without the stigma of impunity:  
…by condemning a child to low sentences [which] may help them 
reintegrate into society while they are still young, and society would feel 
that the wrongs committed by child soldiers have been dealt with. It may 
also be more inclined to reaccept them and move forward.252“ Besides, 
one of the central aims of international criminal law is to bring justice to 
the victims and “one can hardly imagine how victims of child soldiers 
would reaccept these children as part of their community without feeling 
that justice had been done.”253   
 
To sum, despite the large majority of authors defending the position that children 
should not, as a matter of morals, or a matter of law, be liable for criminal prosecution 
under International Criminal Law, most recent (yet sparse) literature has successfully 
shown the existence of legal interpretations and lines of reasoning supporting the viability 
of children to be subject to the principle of individual criminal responsibility under 
international criminal law when accused of the commission of war crimes.  
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Chapter 7: International tribunals and the contribution of the SCSL to the emerging law 
on children’s criminal responsibility in International Criminal Law 
 
The current chapter argues in favor of the UN Security Council and the UN Secretary 
General, via the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, generating a legal rule 
which clearly establishes individual criminal responsibility on minors, starting at age 
fifteen, when accused of serious breaches of international law. This rule is influential 
towards the general development of international criminal law, since other international 
and domestic courts alike are able to use the precedent to bring juveniles to justice under 
the accusation of international crimes.  
However, before reaching this conclusion, the chapter starts with an overview of 
international criminal law and the workings of the international criminal tribunals. These 
two – international criminal law and international criminal courts –  are associated in the 
current analysis precisely because it is through the creation and functioning of 
international criminal courts that International Criminal Law has experienced its greatest 
development, expansion, and precision. Next, we will examine the workings of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, in particular its jurisdictional contribution as the first 
international court to include juveniles as viable subjects of its international criminal 
jurisdiction. The inclusion of minors is articulated in Article 7(1) of the court’s Statute. 
The Statute was first developed by the UN Secretary General, in consultation with the 
government of Sierra Leone, and has received support and authorization from the UN 
Security Council. It will be argued that the decision of the Statute’s authors to include 
jurisdiction over minors, despite not having framed it as compulsory, can nonetheless be 
used as evidence of law, inviting other courts to do so when ruling on similar cases. The 
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chapter concludes with a revealing interpretation: by including juveniles under the 
jurisdiction of the SCSL, the UN Secretary General has acknowledged that juveniles, 
after the age of minimum legal recruitment, set at age fifteen, can be considered viable 
subjects of the international criminal system. 
International criminal tribunals: an introduction  
By the end of the Second World War, Europe had witnessed a level of human 
catastrophe shocking to the international community, reaching what was considered a 
moral tipping point. Moved by the rationale “never again,” the Allies established, via a 
multilateral treaty (London Agreement of August, 8th 1945), the first International 
Military Tribunal (IMT) located in Nuremberg, Germany. The court aimed at convicting 
Nazi war officials for war crimes, crimes against humanity and waging aggressive war.254  
One year later, a second military tribunal, the International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East, also known as the Tokyo Tribunal took place following the same purpose. 
The Tokyo Tribunal was also established by an international agreement between the 
Allies towards the prosecution of Japanese war officials. Operating similarly to its 
predecessor and holding jurisdiction over the same list of crimes (crimes against peace, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity)255 the court successfully brought twenty-eight 
defendants to justice.256 
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  In terms of legacy, both courts inaugurated a new period in international law by 
institutionalizing the legal principle of individual criminal responsibility; a principle 
which acts imposing criminal responsibilities directly on to individuals without the need 
of State intermediation. As a result, an individual can be brought to justice exclusively 
through international mechanisms.257 
  The rationale behind the legal premise of individual’s criminal accountability was 
that: “never again” would state sovereignty shield those who have committed gross 
human atrocities, and “never again” would State sovereignty affect the obstruction of 
justice of those who seriously violated International Humanitarian Law. Individuals 
would receive protection from international law against wide-scale atrocities wherever 
they are performed.258 “The Nuremberg trials established that all of humanity would be 
guarded by an international legal shield…”259 
Efforts at creating an international individual accountability system were also a 
direct response to the incapacity or unwillingness of local courts to bring to trial those 
responsible for internationally criminal acts, as well as the desire shared by the Allies of 
sending a clear message to the rest of the world that human atrocities committed by a 
government would no longer be tolerated. Sovereignty would no longer act as a shield 
protecting authorities accused of committing atrocities. 
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 The legacy that started with the Nuremberg trials marked the birth of modern 
International Criminal Law. The codification of a branch of international law responsible 
for criminalizing violations of IHR and International Human Rights Law, including by 
governmental agents, through international and national courts was only possible through 
a process that pierced through the sacrosanct institution of sovereignty. 
The new legal paradigm introduced was well defined by Nuremberg’s famous 
declaration that “crimes against international law are committed by men, not abstract 
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of 
international law be enforced.”260 The perpetrators were to be held directly accountable 
“without the intermediary of the state wielding authority over such individuals,” even in 
cases when the accused was in fact acting as an official representative of a State.261 
The process, the establishment of individual criminal responsibility under 
international law, faced two main obstacles: first, in classical international 
law, states, not individuals, were the exclusive subjects. Therefore, the 
establishment of criminal norms in international law first required the 
recognition of the individual as a subject of international law. Second, it 
was necessary to overcome states‘ defensive attitude towards outside 
interference, which was rooted in the concept of sovereignty.262 
  
If we take a step back, before the establishment of the Nuremberg tribunal, it is 
important to mention that International Law traditionally did not address individuals, only 
states and state representatives. 263 Individuals, in their private capacity, were not 
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understood as capable of infringing international law 264 and any act performed by an 
individual was to be addressed by the State concerned and through the works of domestic 
courts. International law also did not prescribe punitive measures. When a sate was in 
violation of its international obligations, the accused state was under the duty to 
discontinue the violation and grant some form of reparation. Rules of international 
responsibility evolved through customs and were later codified by the International Law 
Commission in ‘Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ (2001) and 
submitted to the UN General Assembly.  
 The IMT challenged the traditional view by affirming that: “individuals [based on 
customs] have international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience 
imposed by the individual State.”265 In this statement, the court was mostly referring to 
obligations derived from International Humanitarian Law, already binding upon 
individuals before the creation of the IMT. Attempts to regulate warfare began earlier 
than the IMT, in, for example, the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907; however, the 
provisions of those conferences’ resulting treaties did not prescribe criminal penalties for  
violation, and were strongly limited by notions of State sovereignty.266  
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“The Hague Convention nowhere designates such practices [methods of waging war] as 
criminal, nor is any sentence prescribed, nor any mention made of a court to try and 
punish offenders.”267 
 From an institutional legal perspective, the creation of the IMT marked a turning 
point in international law. With the adoption of the Agreement and the Charter of the 
IMT, the Allies had created the first “genuinely international body of criminal law 
capable of universal application that brought together several different legal 
traditions.”268 Both of these courts were set to try “war criminals whose offenses have no 
particular geographical location whether they are accused individually or in their capacity 
as members of organizations or groups or both capacities.”269 The IMT Charter 
established that “individuals could be criminally liable as a matter of international law, 
rejecting in passing the Defense arguments that international law only provided liability 
for states, not individuals.”270  
 In addition, the IMT institutionalized the idea that individuals had international 
obligations as a matter of international law, and these obligations were to be given 
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precedence over their national duties and responsibilities: individuals were seen to “have 
international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the 
individual state. He who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in 
pursuance of the authority of the state if the state in authorizing action moves outside its 
competence under international law.”271 
 Possibly one of the most important outcomes of the IMT was the Court’s 
determination that the prohibition of the crimes under its jurisdiction [laid down in the 
Charter] did not constitute new law.272 In the view of the Tribunal, the Charter was the 
expression of international law existing at the time of its creation; the Charter merely 
codified the law. This conclusion is disputed by a number of jurists and scholars. “While 
some claimed that the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal merely codified existing 
principles, others were more forthcoming in acknowledging that, in fact, a great deal of it 
was new law… If there was no law to punish these crimes, it was the general view that 
law should be made. And so it was.”273  
 An important point to keep in mind is that subsequent international courts have 
also adopted the same position: to negate the creation of new law for the sake of not 
confronting the principle of legality.274  
                                               
271 Mettraux, Guénaël, “Trial at Nuremberg,” Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law, 11. 
272 Mettraux, Guénaël, “Trial at Nuremberg,” Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law, 11. Also 
see “Judgement of the Charter”: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judlawch.asp. 
273 Mettraux, Guénaël, “Trial at Nuremberg,” Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law, 7. 
274 The principle of legality expresses that “No one may be accused or convicted of a criminal offence on 
account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or 
international law at the time it was committed; nor may a heavier penalty be imposed than that which 
was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed.” “Rule 101. The Principle of Legality,” 
ICRC Customary Law Database, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule101  
 
 
 
 
 
 
128 
 The Nuremberg Tribunal heritage influenced other international law venues, such 
as the creation of the United Nations Genocide Convention (1948), the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and the Geneva Conventions on the Laws and 
Customs of War (1949). The International Military Tribunal also supplied a useful 
precedent for the trials of Japanese war criminals in Tokyo (1946-48); the 1961 trial of 
Nazi leader Adolf Eichmann in Israel (1906-62); and the establishment of tribunals for 
international crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia (1993) and in Rwanda 
(1994).275  
Bringing the accused to justice: domestic courts and international courts 
  When states are under the obligation to bring those accused of grave breaches of 
International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law to justice, the 
process is mainly done through their domestic courts.276 Domestic courts are a paramount 
element to the delivery of international justice.277 The obligation to bring those accused to 
justice does not exclusively rest on the State in which the crime occurred or the State 
from which the perpetrator or victims are nationals. These international obligations are 
shared by international society as a whole and any State that has custody of the accused 
may exercise jurisdiction over the case, and prosecute the accused.  
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If the State holding custody is not willing to prosecute in good faith, it must extradite to 
another that is ready to bring the accused to justice. 
Before 1945, domestic courts were generally the only way of bringing individuals 
to justice for violations of international law. However, these violations were judged as 
breaches of domestic law, and the crimes were considered common national crimes. Each 
country had a different set of criminal rules and procedures. While the latter still holds 
true, after 1945, the international community “…moved increasingly toward the 
development of a system of international jurisdictions, complementary to that of domestic 
courts to try people accused of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.”278  
Currently, gross violations of International Humanitarian Law and International 
Human Rights Law carry the obligation of prosecution. States are required either to 
prosecute and punish an individual accused of committing international crimes, or to 
extradite them so an interested State can do so.279 “Recalling that it is the duty of every 
State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international 
crimes.”280  
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The development of a system of international jurisdiction was possible through 
the establishment and operation of international courts, which can be divided analytically 
into three types (international ad hoc criminal courts, hybrid courts, and a permanent 
criminal court), established in two different settings (post-conflict or permanently). The 
first two types, ad hoc international criminal courts and other types of internationalized 
tribunals, such as hybrid courts, were created after the 1990s followed by serious armed 
conflicts, and were aimed at addressing serious violations arising exclusively from these 
armed conflicts. Common traits among these two type of courts was that they were 
United Nations’ involvement; they were operated temporarily and held a limited 
territorial jurisdiction (jurisdiction ratione loci). The major difference between these two 
(ad hoc courts and hybrid courts) was the first, ad hoc courts, were exclusively 
international courts, and thus the court followed and responded to international law, while 
the hybrid courts were composed of a combination of international and national judges 
and followed both international and domestic law.  
The third type of international criminal court is the permanent International 
Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC came from a prolonged desire of states to build a 
permanent court to address serious international crimes that could result in means of 
clashing jurisdiction. A permanent court would also serve to address cases in which states 
were unwilling to try due to political reasons, or possibly even lack of resources.281 
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Contributions of the international tribunals from post Second World War to the twenty 
first century 
 
International tribunals have operated since the beginning of the modern 
international system, with the purpose of settling disputes between states. These were not 
criminal courts, however, and they only addressed states. It is mainly with the Nuremberg 
trials after World War II, however, that ad hoc tribunals dealing with criminal cases 
against individuals were created to address the core international crimes, namely 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.282 It is safe to affirm that these 
international criminal courts have changed the landscape of international law, targeting 
mainly the individuals responsible for the planning and commission of gross human 
atrocities. The rationale behind their creation was to assure that when states were either 
unwilling or incapable of bringing the accused to justice through national legal channels, 
the international community as a whole might step in to ensure that serious violations of 
IL do not go unpunished.  
The ICTY and ICTR 
 The legacy created by the Nuremberg Tribunal allowed the emergence, years 
later, of the ICTY and the ICTR.  The years of 1993 (ICTY) and 1995 marked the 
creation of the first two “truly” international criminal tribunals to be ever established,283 
both were created by the UN Security Council as subsidiary organs (extensions) of the 
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UN under Chapter VII.284 These courts were brought to being under the terms of Article 
29 of the United Nations Charter, having the United Nations operating within a judicial 
nature.285 The establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR via Chapter VII of the UN 
Security Council served to “…ensure more expeditious establishment and universal 
application.”286    
 Both of these courts had limited temporal and territorial scope. The ICTY 
exercised authority over “persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in 
accordance with the provisions of the present Statute.” It has jurisdiction over grave 
breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of war, 
genocide, and crimes against humanity. While the ICTR had jurisdiction (its work ended 
in 2015) to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda or over Rwandan citizens 
responsible for such violations committed in the territory of neighboring states, between 
1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994. 
The ICTY Statute was drafted by the UN Office of Legal Affairs, and was 
approved and adopted by the UN Security Council without alteration.287 By comparison, 
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when developing the ICTR Statute, the UN Security Council did not request the 
involvement of the UN Secretary-General or the Office of Legal Affairs, it simply 
“closely mirrored the Yugoslavia Tribunal’s Statute…”288 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
A third international court was created by the United Nations in agreement with 
the government of Sierra Leone in 2002 and it aimed at bringing to justice those most 
responsible for the International Humanitarian Law violations occurred during the Sierra 
Leone civil war. The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) came as a result of “Sierra 
Leone’s request for UN assistance in establishing an independent tribunal to try those 
responsible for alleged crimes during its decade-long civil war.”289 A more detailed 
analysis of the SCSL’s characteristics and functioning will be covered subsequently in 
this chapter.  
 Other internationalized courts were created after the SCSL, such as the UN 
Special Panel for Serious Crimes in East Timor and the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). These two were hybrid courts fostered by UN initiative.290  
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289 Scharf, Michael and Margaux Day, “The ad hoc international criminal tribunals: launching a new era 
of accountability,” The Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law, 58. 
290 The ECCC was established by an agreement between the UN and the Royal Government of Cambodia 
in 2003 concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes committed during the period of the 
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alleged crimes committed between 17 April 1975 and 6 January 1979: 1) Senior leaders of Democratic 
Kampuchea; and 2) Those believed to be most responsible for grave violations of national and international 
law,” (https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/document/legal/agreement). 
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My analysis will not include hybrid courts; I am focusing exclusively on criminal courts 
of an international nature since these are the ones to affect more directly the development 
of International Criminal Law.  
The International Criminal Court  
 The International Criminal Court (ICC) is the only permanent international 
criminal court created by the international community. The ICC “investigates and, where 
warranted, tries individuals charged with the gravest crimes of concern to the 
international community: genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.”291 
Established in 2002, the ICC currently has 124 State parties to the Rome Statute.292 Its 
temporal jurisdiction applies from the establishment date onward, and extends to all those 
State parties.  
 The ICC operates differently than the UN based ad hoc courts. To begin with, it 
does not exercise primacy over national courts, the ICC instead has jurisdiction 
complementary to domestic courts, which means the court will try a case only if the 
country where the crime occurred, or any other country for the matter, has failed or is 
unwilling to bring the accused to justice. 
  The ICC may only bring charges against nationals from a State party, with a few 
exceptions to this directive, such as when the crime has occurred within a state that is 
                                                                                                                                            
The UN Special Panel for Serious Crimes in East Timor was established by the UN Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to try serious criminal offenses that occurred during 1999.  The 
Special Panels operated between the years of 2000 to 2006, http://www.crimesofwar.org/commentary/east-
timor-ten-years-on-justice-denied/, Jan. 14. The Special Panel was not a criminal court per se, but part of 
the process managed by the United Nations of reconstructing and revitalizing the justice system of East 
Timor.  
291 “About the ICC,” https://www.icc-cpi.int/about. 
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party to the ICC; when a case is referred to the ICC Prosecutor by the UN Security 
Council. Third, when the nonparty State has consented to have its nationals prosecuted.293   
The importance of international courts 
International courts (ad hoc and non-ad hoc) were and are still important for 
several reasons. First, these courts were created to bring those most responsible for 
human atrocities (serious violations of International Humanitarian Law and International 
Human Rights Law) to justice through international mechanisms when national courts 
were incapable or unwilling to do it, thus, avoiding international impunity, and honoring 
the victims’ rights to justice. Second, regarding jurisprudential legal development, the 
international courts exercise the role of: 
ascertaining the existence and content of customary rules, interpreting and 
clarifying treaty provisions, and elaborating-according to general 
principles-legal categories and constructs for the application of 
international criminal rules. The result is that the rapid development of 
substantive international criminal law is mainly due to judicial 
decisions.294 
 
Finally,  “…many of the core jurisdictional principles and jurisprudence 
developed by them (international courts in general) will influence decisions of the 
International Criminal Court, and remain an important subsidiary source of customary 
international law.”295  
                                               
293 Akade, Dapo, “The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Nationals of Non- Parties: 
Legal Basis and Limits,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 1 (2003), 618–650, 
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294 Cassese, Antonio, “International Criminal Law.” International Law, ed. Evans (2003), 726. 
295 Sadat, Leila. “Understanding the complexities of international criminal tribunal jurisdiction,” The 
Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law, eds. Schabas and Bernaz (New York: Routledge, 
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So, one can safely conclude from the above remarks that the work of one 
international court, whether ad hoc or not, can greatly influence the functioning of the 
others. 
A deeper look at the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
Following the bloodshed that occurred during Sierra Leone’s civil conflict, former 
President Kabban of Sierra Leone sent a letter dated12 June 2000 to the UN Secretary 
General requesting UN’s assistance in the creation of “a credible court” to try the worst 
offenders of the Sierra Leone conflict.296 As a result, the UN Secretary General persuaded 
the UN Security Council to adopt Resolution 1315 (2000), which authorized the UN 
Secretary General to negotiate a bilateral treaty, between the UN and the government of 
Sierra Leone, for the establishment of such a court.297 The negotiations were conducted 
by the UN Secretary General, with authorization and under scrutiny of the UN Security 
Council, as well as with guidance/counsel of UN legal advisers.  The negotiation resulted 
in the  UN-Sierra Leone Agreement and its annexed Statute which received the last UN 
Security Council approval before it was signed by the UN Secretary General and Sierra 
Leone in January 2002.298   
The Court operated from 16 January 2002 to 26 September 2013. September 2013 
marked the date of the court’s final ruling delivered by the Appeals Chamber upholding a 
                                               
296 See UN Doc. S12000786 cited by Jalloh, Consolidated Legal Texts for the Special Court for Sierra 
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297 Jalloh, Consolidated Legal Texts for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 170. 
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50-year sentence to former Liberian President Charles Taylor.299  Taylor had been found 
guilty in April 2012 of five counts of crimes against humanity, five counts of war crimes 
and one count of other serious violations of international humanitarian law perpetrated by 
Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels, who he supported.300  
 The SCSL as its predecessors, the IMT, the Tokyo Tribunal, the ICTY, and ICTR, 
all exercised the power to determine their own jurisdiction. “This power, known as the 
principle of ‘Kompetenz-Kompetenz’ in German or ‘la compétence de la compétence’ in 
French, is part, and indeed a major part, of the incidental or inherent jurisdiction of any 
judicial or arbitral tribunal, consisting of the ‘jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction’, as 
stated by the SCSL Appeals Chamber” following the ICTY Tadić decisions. 301  In other 
words, The SCSL “…is empowered to pronounce on the validity and legality of its 
creation.”302  
 The jurisdiction of the SCSL was directed toward the prosecution of persons who 
“bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 
1996, including those leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the 
establishment of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.”303  
                                               
299 Gberie, Lansana, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone rests – for good,” Africa Renewal (2014), 
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 Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, which were created as subsidiary organs of the UN 
under Chapter VII of the Charter, the SCSL followed a design inaugurated by the IMT, 
that is, it was created by an international treaty, between the UN and the government of 
Sierra Leone. 304 The SCSL was negotiated between the UN and the Government of 
Sierra Leone, which makes this Court the first criminal tribunal to be established by an 
agreement between the UN and one of its Member states.305  The Appeals Chamber of the 
SCSL has affirmed the agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone as one 
operative ‘between all members of the United Nations and Sierra Leone’ making it ‘an 
expression of the will of the international community.’306 What does it mean, in terms of 
treaty obligations, to have the UN as one of the parties to a bi-lateral treaty? Would this 
mean that the obligations derived from the treaty would also apply to all the UN 
members? That would appear to be the case, however, this idea raises uncertainties and is 
not bound by the rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. As expressed by 
Articles 34 – 36 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, treaties do not create 
obligations to third parties. Meaning only those who have consented to be bound by a 
treaty are expected to follow its provisions. One exception is treaties that were concluded 
via a UNSC resolution based on Chapter VII, as was the case with the Statutes of the 
ICTY and the ICTR. In this case, the obligation for compliance extends to all State 
members (of the UN).  
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But if this is not the case, as it was not with the SCSL, then what does it mean, in 
practical terms, for the UN to be one of the parties to the treaty? I am not certain that 
there is an answer to this question yet. 
That being said, having the UN as one of the parties to a treaty certainly offers a 
greater level of political legitimacy (for more info see the work of Inis Claude, 1966) and 
legal validity since the UN has defined as one of its central roles, as established by the 
General Assembly, the development and promotion of international law. 307 For this task, 
the Assembly created in 1948 the International Law Commission (ILC) aimed at 
promoting “the progressive development of international law and its codification.” 
(Article 1 of the Statute of the International Criminal Law). ‘Progressive development’ is 
defined as “the preparation of draft conventions on subjects which have not yet been 
regulated by international law or in regard to which the law has not yet been sufficiently 
developed in the practice of States” and ‘codification’ as “the more precise formulation 
and systematization of rules of international law in fields where there already has been 
extensive State practice, precedent and doctrine” (Article 15 of the International Criminal 
Law Statute).308  
Another factor which brings legitimacy to the SCSL is the “high level of 
involvement of the Security Council in the in the establishment of the court included, but 
not limited to, approving the Statute of the Special Court and initiating and facilitating 
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arrangements for the funding of the Court.”309 Schabas (2006) has argued that despite the 
SCSL not being a UN Security Council subsidiary organ, the Council exercised immense 
influence on its creation and operation. The Council explicitly authorized the creation of 
the SCSL by Resolution 1315, and was directly involved in the drafting of the Statute of 
the court. In exchange communications between the UN Secretary General and the 
Security Council, the Council set its preferences for certain parts of the Statute and on 
every point, the view of the Council prevailed.310 Finally, the Security Council authorized 
the draft that became the final version of the Statute.311 
How international criminal courts operate 
 
International courts are bound per excellence only by international law as 
explained by ICTY Judge Cassese. In reference to the ICTY Cassese expresses that: 
“This International Tribunal is called upon to apply international law, in particular, our 
Statute and principles and rules of international humanitarian law and international 
criminal law. Our International Tribunal is a court of law; it is bound only by 
international law.“312  
                                               
309 Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra 
Leone, 55 about Taylor, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction para. 37 (ICTY 21 May 2004).   
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Domestic law may be used by international courts when the court finds that the 
“applicable law instruments are inadequate for the solution of legal problems.”313 All 
three UN based ad hoc courts (ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL) have Statutes that “make specific 
reference to the possible application of the national criminal law of the State where the 
crime was committed. In the case of the ICTY and ICTR, this occurs in the sentencing 
provisions, while in the SCSL Statute national law is given a more prominent 
role…incorporating some offenses drawn from the national law.”314 
The Special Court officially functions with a “mixed jurisdiction and composition 
format”315 (ratione materiae jurisdiction), which means “the Prosecutor could invoke 
either or both international and Sierra Leonean law to prosecute offenders.”316 In fact, 
domestic law may be used when the court finds that the “applicable law instruments are 
inadequate for the solution of legal problems.”317 Despite the Special Court exhibiting 
some national features, it is recognized and treated as a UN-established international 
court: “a creature of international law, not domestic law”318 and “…independent of Sierra 
Leonean courts and possessing the distinct legal personality of an international 
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organization that permits it to operate in the sphere of international law.”319 Being labeled 
an international court meant the SCSL was an independent court, created by international 
law and operating under international law, as determined by the Ratification Act of 2002 
(signed by the Parliament of Sierra Leone).320  
Sources of law of the international courts  
The principal legal instrument of all three ad hoc tribunals is the Statute, followed 
by the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE).321 The Statute spells out the structure, the 
current law under which the court will follow, and the jurisdiction and limitations of the 
international courts. It functions similarly to setting down the operational “rules of the 
game,” while the RPE sets the procedural rules of how the court is to operate.  
When the Statutes [or the Rules of Procedure and Evidence] do not provide 
appropriate legal answers to cases, the Courts may exercise the liberty of diverting from 
these instruments in the interest of justice, and / or more commonly, the Tribunals have 
acted as if there were a provision in the statutes inviting them to apply customary law as 
residual law.322 The reason the drafters of the Statutes of international Tribunals attributed 
                                               
319 SCSL Ratification Act 2002. 
320 Ratification Act of 2002 was established that the SCSL is not part of the Judiciary of Sierra Leone and 
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international customary law a place as residual law is to avoid violating the principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege or principle of legality if a party to the conflict has not adhere to 
a specific treaty.323 The principle of legality holds that no one can be considered guilty of 
a crime if their act or omission was not considered a penal offense under the referent 
legal system at the time it was committed.324  
As an illustration of how customary law is recognized as a predominant source of 
law is the ICTR Appeals Chamber’s affirmation that “[t]he International Tribunal 
is…governed by its own Statute and by the provisions of customary international law, 
where these can be discerned.”325  
Perhaps the most significant concerns of the international Courts is to reinforce 
their compliance with the principle of legality through the use of customary law when 
applying and interpreting their Statutes, because all three tribunals exercise jurisdiction 
over crimes committed before their establishment, as well as prospectively. When the 
ICTY Statute was drafted, the Secretary-General and the Security Council sought to 
avoid potential challenges of not confirming with the principle of legality and made 
explicit that the Tribunal’s subject-matter jurisdiction to offenses was “beyond any doubt 
                                                                                                                                            
of criminal law are also the foundation for criminal defenses the defenses of international criminal law such 
as such as minimum age or mental incapacity, drawing upon general principles of law recognized by all 
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part of customary law so that the problem of adherence of some but not all States to 
specific conventions does not arise.”326 In Schabas’ opinion “the statement made by the 
Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council327 has been used to justify what 
amounts to an interpretative presumption regarding the relationship between the principle 
of legality and customary law. Next, Schabas cites a pronouncement by by the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber:328  
 “...in case of doubt and whenever the contrary is not apparent from the text of a 
statutory or treaty provision, such a provision must be interpreted in light of, and in 
conformity with, customary international law. In the case of the Statute, it must be 
presumed that the Security Council, where it did not explicitly or implicitly depart from 
general rules of international law, intended to remain within the confines of such 
rules.“329  
 Customary law is also fundamental when determining which crimes fall within 
the jurisdiction of the Court for the same reason of staying in compliance with the 
principle of legality. The UN Secretary General stated quite clearly in his report on the 
establishment of the ICTY, that the Tribunal would only be able to prosecute offenses 
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that were unquestionably recognized as customary international law:330 “the International 
Tribunal only has jurisdiction over offenses that constituted crimes under customary 
international law at the time the alleged offenses were committed” as previously 
stipulated by one of the Trial Chamber of the ICTY.331 One again, the ICTY Chamber 
clarified that “the only reason behind the stated purpose of the drafters that the 
International Tribunal should apply customary international law was to avoid violating 
the principle of nullum crimen sine lege if a party to the conflict did not adhere to a 
specific treaty.”332 
 Keeping conformity with international customs is also the rule when a certain 
provision of the Statute requires clarification. If the judges were to conclude that a 
specific provision in the Statute was inconsistent with existing customary international 
law “such that the discrepancy could not be resolved by interpretation, they would have 
no choice but to declare the impugned provision to be inoperative.”333   
 Leading us to conclude that international customary law is an essential guide 
when creating and operating any international court; it guides the development of Statutes 
and Rules of Procedure and Evidence and courts apply customary law as residual law 
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whenever the existing treaty rules do not enlighten or provide guidance on a certain case. 
Schabas (2006) has taken one step forward supporting the argument, as expressed by 
most international courts statutes, that the list of crimes under the court’s jurisdiction, 
reflects customary law. Such position has also been affirmed by the Trial Chambers of 
ICTY: “The ICTY determined that the crimes covered by Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the 
Tribunal’s Statute reflect customary international law. The Blaskić Appeals Chamber, 
quoting the Hadzihasanović case, stated, in the context of a discussion of nullum crimen 
sine lege, that “it has always been the approach of this Tribunal not to rely merely on a 
construction of the Statute to establish the applicable law on criminal responsibility, but 
to ascertain the state of customary law in force at the time the crimes were committed.”334 
Overall, if we take a step back, the strategy to affirm conformity with current law, and 
more specifically customary law has been the strategy used by most international courts 
past and present.  
 The claim that international courts has followed international customary law when 
creating its documents as well as adjudicating its cases is bound to provoke controversy 
when applied to the provision contained in Article 7(1) of the Statute of the SCSL, which 
grants the Court authorization to exercise “jurisdiction over persons who were fifteen 
years of age at the time of the alleged commission of the crime.” The rule was written by 
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the UN Secretary General in consultation with the government of Sierra Leone and the 
UN Security Council, and received the full support of the Security Council. Therefore, 
Article 7(1) is a product of international law-making coming from the UN Secretary 
General and the Security Council, and provides a clear indication of the UN’s position 
and where it believes customary law stands on the issue of children’s criminal 
responsibility under international law. 
How important was the Special Court’s decision to include minors as liable to individual 
criminal prosecution to the development of international criminal law?  
 
 There are two steps when attempting to answer the above question. First, by 
showing how international courts influence each other’s work, in this case, how the 
SCSL’s decision to include children under its jurisdiction serves as guidance for other 
international courts or for national courts applying international criminal law to do so as 
well. The second step, which can also be seen as a complement to the first attempt, is to 
argue that the Statute of the SCSL, which included that children fifteen years of age and 
older could be brought to the court, is an expression of established international law. This 
in practical terms means that the decision of the Court to include juveniles can be 
understood as providing evidence (for other international courts or national courts) of an 
existing rule of international law on the issue of juvenile justice when minors are accused 
of serious breaches of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights 
Law.  
It is important to mention that despite the level of cooperation and even similarity 
between international criminal courts -- which is fundamental to the enlargement and 
refinement of International Criminal Law – these courts are not under an obligation to 
 
 
 
 
 
148 
follow the doctrine of precedence. The doctrine of precedence or Stares Decisis: “is a 
doctrine according to which when a court has once laid down a principle of law as 
applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all 
future cases, where the facts are substantially the same.”335 In other words, the doctrine of 
precedence consists of an authoritative way of legal reasoning and decision making 
predominantly found in common law systems, in which, an “international judge seems to 
feel bound by the jurisprudence of another court” or even previous decisions of the same 
court. 336 The decision to take into consideration judicial rulings from external other 
courts is a discretionary practice: courts can choose to do so if they wish, and judicial 
decisions count as evidence of law, not necessarily as sources of law. However, the use of 
judicial decisions by international courts has been gaining space in International Criminal 
Law, as expressed by Terris, Romano, and Swigart in a study conducted in 2007. The 
authors concluded that international judges, even though they are at liberty to choose 
their paths of reasoning, have been entertaining the use of other courts’ decisions when a 
lack of precedent is evident.337  
Seeking guidance from other court’s decisions has not been the traditional path set 
by international courts; this is the reason why the work of Terris, Romano, and Swigart is 
so revealing. As stated in the Statute of the ICJ, the three main sources utilized by the 
                                               
335 Kaczorowska, Public International Law, 859. 
336 Terris et al., The international judge: an introduction to the men and women who decide the world’s 
cases (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 120.   
337 Terris et al., The international judge: an introduction to the men and women who decide the world’s 
cases (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 120.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
149 
court are: treaties, customary law, and general principles of law. If no law on the matter 
in question can be found in these three sources, then the court may utilize previous 
judicial decisions and the writings of jurists as evidence of the law, or divert from the 
sources and decide ex aequo et bono (from equity and goodness), if the parties agree. The 
list and explanation of the sources of International Law sources are found in chapter two 
of the present dissertation.   
The sources of international law utilized by the ICC and the various tribunals 
differ somewhat from the ICJ’s list, and include first, to be given precedence over the 
others: The Statute, followed by the Elements of Crimes and the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence. If legal guidance on the issue at hand is not to be found within these sources, 
then “the second tier in the hierarchy of sources consists of applicable treaties and the 
principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the 
international law of armed conflict.”338 According to Schabas, “this second tier in the 
hierarchy of sources corresponds to the sources of international law as set out in Article 
38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, although the wording is quite 
original.”339 It is only with the ICJ’s source list that one will find ‘judicial decisions’ 
listed as a source of international law.   
 We can also identify international courts’ cooperation in the statement given by 
the ICTY Trial Chambers about the court‘s legal sources: 
The primary sources on which the ICTY relies are other decisions of the 
ICTY and decisions of the Rwanda Tribunal, with an emphasis on 
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Appeals Chamber decisions. As a secondary source, the ICTY may be 
‘guided by the case-law of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the 
tribunals established under Allied Control Council Law No. 10, and the 
Tribunal for East Timor.’340 Furthermore, the ICTY may apply 
customary international law, and it may apply treaty law, so long as the 
treaty ‘(i) was unquestionably binding on the parties at the time of the 
alleged offense; and (ii) was not in conflict with or derogating from 
peremptory norms of international law, as are most customary rules of 
international humanitarian law.’341  When applying treaties, the ICTY 
recognized that it should interpret conventions in conformity with 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.342 
So, the ICTY main sources for deciding its cases emanate from the 
ICTY itself, and other international courts, as well as from customary 
law.343  
 
Another indication of how the ICTY and ICTR can make a “significant 
contribution to the general corpus of international criminal law is expressed in Article 
20(3) of the Special Court of Sierra Leone’s Statute which allows the court to be guided 
by the decisions of the joint ICTY/ICTR Appeals Chamber.344 The article stipulates that: 
“the judges of the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court shall be guided by the decisions 
of the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda. In the interpretation and application of the laws of Sierra Leone, they shall be 
guided by the decisions of the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone.”345  In Cryer’s words, “the 
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Special Court “will apply the decisions of the ICTY and ICTR for their persuasive value, 
with necessary modifications and adaptations, taking into account the particular 
circumstances of the Special Court.”346  
 In addition, as a rule, international courts have been profoundly influenced by 
their predecessors347: the ICTY was highly influenced by the Statute and the workings of 
the Nuremberg Tribunal, which also determined how the Tokyo Tribunal would operate. 
And when developing the Statute of the ICTR, the UNSC largely adopted the text of the 
Statute of the ICTY (with a few minor differences regarding the scope of jurisdiction), 
acknowledging the proximity of these two international courts.348  
 After having established that Statutes and the case law of one court exercises 
significant influence on the work of other international courts, it is safe to affirm that the 
SCSL decision to include children starting at age fifteen under its jurisdiction should not 
be seen differently; it is thus evidence of law on the issue, and invites other courts to 
adopt this position if they wish..  So, even though applying past decisions are not legally 
required in IL, following the rulings and jurisdictional decisions of other international 
courts (or even the same court) may be the most efficient way of identify where the law – 
if any –stands, thus avoiding non liquet (a situation in which the law on the issue is not 
clear, preventing the court from ruling).   
                                               
346 Cryer, Robert, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International Criminal Law 
Regime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 170. 
 
348 Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra 
Leone, 30-31. 
 
 
 
 
 
152 
 Another possible reason why legal precedent can serve as guidance with regard to 
existing law in international criminal law (in this case, differently than in the doctrine of 
State International Responsibility as framed by International Law) is that in international 
criminal law, the same obligations apply to all individuals. All individuals carry the 
obligation of following International Humanitarian Law, and any serious violation may 
give rise to individual criminal responsibility.  
Why fifteen was the chosen age by the UN Secretary General to act as the MACR in the 
Statute of the SCSL? 
 
  We have seen that international customary law, as codified in Additional 
Protocols I and II, as well as by Article 38 of the CRC, sets the minimum age of legal 
recruitment (MALR) at fifteen. Below fifteen, international law criminalizes the practice 
of recruiting and using children in combat, however, in the child is fifteen or older, he/she 
according to customary international law, can legally be recruited and used in hostilities. 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone has followed the legal provisions set by International 
Humanitarian Law conventions when setting fifteen as the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility (MACR) in its Statute. Happold argued the choice of age made by the UN 
Secretary General as “mirroring” previous customary International Humanitarian Law 
rules, such as Articles 77 of Additional Protocol I and Part 4 of Additional Protocol II, as 
well as, Article 38 of the CRC provisions “on the ground that if children under fifteen are 
too young to be recruited, they must be too young to be held responsible for their 
actions.”349  
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As a conclusion, I suggest that the decision of the UN Secretary General, 
approved by the UN Security Council, to set the MACR for the SCSL was based on the 
MALR set by international humanitarian law. 
Concluding remarks on the jurisprudential contributions of the SCSL applicable to the 
debate on children’s criminal responsibility in international criminal law 
 
 The first contribution of the SCSL to the debate on children’s criminal 
responsibility under IL was the court’s establishment of a minimum age of criminal 
responsibility set at fifteen years of age. Granting the SCSL the competence to bring to 
justice those starting at age fifteen is equivalent to saying that fifteen is the MACR 
operational under the jurisdiction of the SCSL: “the United Nations specified fifteen as 
the age of criminal responsibility in the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.”350 
Fifteen was the considered by the UN Secretary General and the UN Security Council as 
the age by which minors already possess a general understanding of the criminal laws as 
well as the legal competence to be held responsible for any violations.351 Because the 
SCSL is per excellence an international court, and international courts influence each 
other, this provision may be used by other courts, international or national, as legal 
evidence of law when seeking to bring those age fifteen or above to justice when accused 
of serious breaches of International Humanitarian Law.  
 The argument that international law has allowed for the creation of an evidence of 
law which allows for courts to bring individuals starting at age fifteen to trial was 
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reinforced by an International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Trial 
Chamber ruling in 2006 which established that was ‘no rule in convention or customary 
international law against criminal liability for a war crime committed by an individual 
below the age of 18 existed.”352 Therefore, nothing in IL forbids a child from being held 
criminally responsible for breaches of IL. If though, the confirmation comes in a negative 
form: no rule in IL forbids prosecution of persons under eighteen, we can consider this an 
important yet timid step towards the acknowledgment of a rule set by the Statute of the 
SCSL.   
 The second contribution of the SCSL is possibly the most important. The UN 
Secretary General and UN Security Council decision, reflected in the SCSL’s Statute, to 
include persons fifteen and over, can be interpreted as an expression of court stating that 
juveniles starting at age fifteen, are capable of committing international crimes, and thus 
are to be regarded, at least, a priori as viable subjects of international criminal law 
(emphasis added).   
To consider someone or some entity as a subject in IL, it must first be established 
that the individual or entity has rights and responsibilities within the referent legal 
system. If they do not, then there are no individual obligations that can be breached, and 
the individual cannot be deemed responsible. Having a “legal personality” within a legal 
system entails rights, and in return means bearing certain responsibilities under the legal 
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system that empowers them.353 If these obligations are not met, they affect other legal 
subjects, and give rise to a system of accountability, in this case, criminal accountability 
since the laws breached were international criminal rules. The following chapter will 
extend on the concept of legal personality and the importance of being considered a 
subject of a legal-political system.  
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Chapter 8: Final remarks on the presumed legal competence of children at the age of 
fifteen and over and individual criminal responsibility 
 
  
Chapter eight is composed of a brief exposition of the concept of legal personality 
as it is conceived and utilized in International Law. The illustration serves the purpose of 
reinforcing the conclusion reached in the previous chapter which points to the Statute of 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone as the first evidence of existing law attributing the 
status of subject of international criminal law to minors involved in serious breaches of 
International Humanitarian Law starting at age fifteen. Next, the chapter will present a 
section I believe to be an essential complement to further the discussion of the legal 
competence of children as framed by existing international law and criminal 
responsibility. This second part of the chapter has been developed to guide future 
research on the topic.   
Legal Personality in International Law 
 Asking about legal personality is inquiring whether an entity holds some form of 
standing or status within a legal system; in other words, it is asking whether the entity is 
“somebody” in that particular normative system. “The importance of an entity being 
recognized as a subject of international law is that without international legal personality 
it does not exist in international law, i.e. its acts will not be recognized in international 
law…”354  
  A subject of international law, or an entity holding international legal personality, 
holds rights and obligations under international law, besides having the capacity to “act” 
                                               
354 Kaczorowska, Public International Law, 82. 
 
 
 
 
 
157 
within that legal system, for example, to enter into legal relationships, such as 
undertaking legal obligations, or bringing claims on their behalf (or other entities behalf) 
to assure that their rights and entitlements are not being infringed by others.355 And “apart 
from the legal considerations, when an entity is regarded a subject of international law, it 
is granted political recognition from other subjects of international law” as a somebody in 
the present system. 356 In other words, having legal personality provides a sense of 
existence within the international legal system, which affects how others acknowledge 
and treat you.  
 Those that “exist” within a legal system are granted rights, and in return, they also 
hold certain responsibilities: “Being a subject of any legal system involves being subject 
to responsibilities as well as enjoying rights.”357 If these obligations are not met, they 
affect other legal subjects, and give rise to a system of accountability. The system of 
accountability in international law is called international responsibility. To recap, only 
those who have obligations in the first place as a consequence of being a subject of the 
system, hold the capacity to violate these obligations, and thus generating a system of 
accountability and responsibility.   
Inquiring whether children can be considered subjects of international law should 
anticipate the question of individual responsibility. In other words, it does not make sense 
to engage in a discussion of responsibility before one is certain if the entity in question 
has obligations to fulfill within the legal system in the first place. The rationale is that one 
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must be entitled to obligations before one can violate them and be held responsible for 
these violations. If the person has no obligations, there is nothing to be made legally 
accountable for. That being said, the inquiry regarding whether children hold 
international obligations under international law (as adults do) even though very rarely 
addressed in the literature (if dealt with at all), should be addressed first, precisely 
because, in International Law, legal personality is directly related and a pre-requisite of 
international responsibility. 
 States as primary subjects and the place of the individual 
Traditionally, states were the only subjects of the international legal system. 
“[T]hey alone had the capacity to make claims on the international plane in respect of 
breaches of international law, capacity to make treaties and other binding international 
agreements, and the ability to enjoy privileges and immunities from national 
jurisdiction.”358 states remain are still the main subjects of the law. Yet in the last century, 
more entities actively participating in the making of international relations were 
considered making the legal personality list, such as international organizations and 
individuals.  
The state, and some state-like entities, are still the one with full legal personality, 
while the other entities are considered by most to be “partial” subjects of or “participants” 
in international law.  
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This configuration reflects the dominant view that international law is still a 
largely State-based system, in which the participation of other subjects varies widely 
depending on the consent of states.359  
 As we can notice, not all subjects of international law are the same, that is, they 
do not have the same legal standing. This was confirmed by the ICJ in its Advisory 
Opinion on the Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations in 
which the Court held the opinion that: “subjects of law in any legal system are not 
necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights’ which allowed the 
court to make a “…distinction between partial and full legal personality.” 360  
The trajectory of individuals in international law is quite interesting. 
Traditionally, the actions of individuals did not give rise to any international 
responsibility on them; “international responsibility only applied when the actions of 
individuals were attributed to the State, and the State was internationally responsible.”361 
Currently, individuals, as framed by most jurists, are considered “partial” subjects of IL. 
The partial character is explained by them having obligations directly placed upon them 
by IL (International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law more 
specifically), while at the same time, the creation and enforcement of their rights is still 
largely dependent upon action and the political will of the states. Individuals in rare 
instances are legally capable representing themselves before international tribunals, they 
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are contingent on states developing and enforcing their human rights – as well as the need 
to initiate and participate on claim against another State accused of violating his or her 
human right. In arrangements in which the individual has direct access to regional and 
international courts to bring a claim against a state, the claims must need to go through 
the domestic justice mechanism first (what it called exhaust domestic legal remedies) 
before it claim can be considered at the regional or international level.   
Individuals, therefore, can be characterized as holding a a “handicapped status” in 
International Law as described by Judge Higgins: for once they have direct criminal 
responsibility imposed on them for violations of treaty and customary law, but still 
largely need the State to fully guarantee the creation, as well as, the observance and 
protection of their human rights. Individuals are also dependent on the State when it 
comes to seeking justice for a human rights violation, thus needing to file claims / 
opening juridical processes in international courts. 
 Moreover, in terms of international obligations, individuals have legal 
requirements placed directly onto them by International Human Rights Law and 
International Humanitarian Law, which means, that all persons are subjected to a set of 
uniform duties emanating from these legal regimes, and in case of serious breach of these 
duties, courts (domestic or international) may hold them personally and directly 
accountable.  
 if individuals – mainly understood as, adults with full societal citizenship, are 
considered ‘partial,’ ‘incomplete,’ or even ‘handicapped’ subjects of international law, 
then what can be said of children? Children are mostly understood as ‘non-adults, adults 
in the making, still not equipped with moral, psychological and physical capacities of an 
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adult, yet they are still considered an individual, a person, just not one fully sui juris. 
  Answering the question about the legal personality of children requires a more 
elaborated analysis of whether children have the same “rights” and “obligations” under 
IL as adults. We know that children hold international rights. The main example of 
international children’s rights is the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In this 
convention, children are granted the traditional types of rights – protective rights – rights 
that assure that their interests are taken into consideration, while still being represented 
by adults, as well as more novel participation/liberty rights. These novel types of rights 
act of fulfilling the purpose of which is to guarantee that every child has an active voice 
regarding their life and their development. As expressed by UNICEF: “Children are 
entitled to the freedom to express opinions and to have a say in matters affecting their 
social, economic, religious, cultural and political life. Participation rights include the 
right to express opinions and be heard, the right to information and freedom of 
association.  Engaging these rights as they mature helps children bring about the 
realization of all their rights and prepares them for an active role in society.”362  
 Children also carry obligations like adults. For instance, all children are obligated 
to follow International Humanitarian Law in times of conflict, as well as to not infringe 
other people’s internationally guaranteed rights. In fact, these obligations, emanating 
from International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Rights are 
addressed to all individuals including children (despite not having found data on the 
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issue). Someone holding rights and obligations under a legal system is to be considered a 
subject (even though partial) of that legal system. So, it is safe to conclude that the status 
of the individual as person in international law would also include those under the age of 
eighteen.  
Tadros’ concept of status-responsibility 
 Inquiring about the legal responsibility of children is also inquiring about the 
status of children within the international criminal system. When we talk about the 
individual holding the capacity to be bound by a legal system, we are qualifying the 
individual as someone who is a subject of the criminal system. For Tadros, the question 
of who is a responsible agent as far as the criminal law is concerned is a question of 
status, and he calls this “status-responsibility.”363 In Tadros’ analysis, being capable of 
holding status-responsibility in the criminal system is equivalent to being considered a 
viable target of the criminal laws. When inquiring about whether the object in question is 
capable of holding status responsibility, Tadros is interested in determining whether the 
individual is capable of understanding norms in general. Tadros, therefore, is not asking 
if the individual in question is necessarily capable of committing a particular act.364 
“Capacity plays a role assessing status-responsibility, but that is capacity in the general 
sense rather than capacity to do, think, feel or evaluate differently from the way in which 
one does.” 365  
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Logically, if one is not capable of exercising competence in general, that individual ought 
to be excluded from criminal responsibility, even if the actus reus conditions of a 
criminal offense were fulfilled.366   
 In the penal laws of most legal systems, international criminal law included, a 
person is only to be held culpable and, consequently, punishable, if his or her behavior 
contains two necessary requirements: a wrongful act (actus reus) and a guilty mind (mens 
rea). These two requirements need to be present for the construction of the concept of 
“crime” in criminal law. “To be guilty of a crime, particularly about serious offenses, it is 
not enough simply to have done a particular prohibited act; there must also be the 
element of a guilty mind.”367 If the element of mens rea (guilty mind) is absent, then it is 
possible that the person may be excused from criminal responsibility. With children, the 
lack of mens rea is mainly presumed (defense of infancy), and, children may escape 
criminal liability for their acts. When a minor is brought to trial, it falls to the prosecution 
“to establish by evidence or informed admission that the child defendant had sufficient 
understanding of the nature of the offense.”368 So, determining whether a child meets the 
requirement of mens rea is largely case-specific and context–dependent, thus better set on 
a case–by–case basis. 
 However, the above discussion addressing the criteria for determining guilt for a 
particular act is not the same as inquiring broadly about the viability and requirements of 
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‘legal personality.’ The question of whether an individual can be considered a priori a 
subject of the criminal system must be addressed first. 
 To ask about Tadro’s status-responsibility of the agent (condition to be potentially 
held responsible in the criminal system) it is not only necessary to prove that the acts 
constituting a crime were committed. For one to be attributed criminal responsibility, it is 
essential to establish that the individual who acted or failed to act meets what Tadros 
calls status-responsibility.  Status responsibility is “the aspect of responsibility that an 
agent requires fulfilling to be held responsible for any of his actions.” 369 As such, the 
inquiry reflects the answer to the question: who is a responsible agent as far as the 
criminal law is concerned?370 As such, the present reflection inquires on the agent’s place 
within the criminal law system, in other words, if the agent to be considered someone 
who is a viable target of the criminal laws or not?  
 Duff adds that criminal norms also perform a communicative function, and are 
aimed at those who have the capacity to understand them: “The criminal law speaks to 
those whom it claims to bind…” 371 The same opinion is shared by Tadros: “The criminal 
law aims to communicate through its norms.”372 This pertains only to those who hold the 
minimum standards for the law’s comprehension.  
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To those who do not understand its norms, criminal law remains uncommunicative, and 
consequently, they cannot be held responsible for the criminal justice system.373  
 Also, the criminal law presents itself not only as a set of coercive threats, but also 
as a system of moral obligations, standards, and concerns, which demand citizens’ 
obedience. By the same token, citizens who are incapable of appreciating these norms 
cannot legitimately be subjected to them.374 In other words, being able to understand the 
standards of criminal law at the moment when the criminal offense was committed as 
well as the time the trial is performed is essential for the attribution of criminal 
responsibility.375   
 As established in the previous chapter, by including those starting at the age of 
fifteen under its jurisdiction, the SCSL has made the case for people under the age of 
eighteen to be considered viable subjects of international penal laws, therefore viable for 
criminal prosecution if the criteria of mens rea and actus reus are fulfilled. According to 
the brief analysis here of what it means to be a subject of a legal system, we can conclude 
that the court has acknowledged (via the works of the UN Secretary General and the 
Security Council) these children hold the general capacity to understand the international 
laws by which all persons must abide by.  
A note on duress 
 I have intentionally not delved into the question of whether children are de facto 
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capable of understanding and abiding by the criminal laws currently in place. My 
exclusive concern is how current international law acknowledges and treats children 
involved in the commission of serious breaches of humanitarian law. Therefore, the 
discussion of whether the element of duress – more specifically, whether children 
recruited and used in military actions have genuinely chosen to do so or they were simply 
responding to violence or extreme external pressure – can be considered a viable excuse 
for criminal responsibility is bracketed. The lack of discussion of duress does not 
necessarily reflect the position of the author finding it less fundamental for the debate on 
criminal responsibility. And I can even say that in the case of children, framed as less 
competent decision makers, duress is a viable central excuse of criminal responsibility. 
However, duress like other possible excuses of individual responsibility such as 
‘diminished mental capacity’, were addressed by the ICC and the ad hoc criminal courts 
as mitigating factors in the sentencing phase of international criminal cases; therefore, it 
arises only after it has been established whether the person in question is legally 
competent to be considered a viable subject of the penal laws and has not excused from 
criminal responsibility. 376 For the current work, the question of legal subjectivity is the 
only concern. 
MACR, liberty rights, and legal competence 
A complementary way of assessing whether children are considered a priori 
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legally competent to bear individual criminal responsibility for serious breaches of 
international law requires more elaboration, focusing on the MACR established by the 
SCSL at age of fifteen which also corresponds to the liberty right given to children by 
International Humanitarian Law towards early enlistment.  
Here, I will simply start the conversation, indicating my intention of continuing 
the work on future research projects.   
Children, from a very early age, due their presumed vulnerability and incapacity 
for moral reasoning, in most societies, and in international law, children are awarded 
protection rights:  
Protection rights are claims that other people owe some duty to protect 
vital interests of the right-holder. For instance, the rights to education, 
health, and physical safety are protection rights, which refer to 
fundamental interests of all people. The majority viewpoint is that children 
enjoy protection rights, but that they may or may not be able to exercise 
liberty rights for themselves depending on the exact context and their 
capacity in that context.377 
  
As children develop and are acknowledged by their society they “progressively 
acquire liberty rights by passing successive age limits, each denoting legal competency 
and responsibility in different areas.”378 Liberty rights are similar to ‘adult’ rights; they 
carry a prerogative that the rights holder has achieved enough maturity to be enabled to 
exercise such rights, and thus, liberty rights entitles the right holder 
to   act   with   freedom   in   specific   contexts – in the sense that there is no restriction 
on them – by triggering the duty to others [and the government] not to interfere. Specific 
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liberty rights include, for example, the rights to free speech, to freedom of religion, and to 
vote. 
  In short, the law prescribes age limits to attest to children’s legal competence, and 
when the child has achieved a certain age that reflects a presumed ability to exercise 
certain ‘adult activities,’ such as to marry, drive, drink, it is assumed by society that he or 
she has attained the maturity necessarily to exercise these activities with responsibility. 
Lawmakers ultimately encapsulate in one age, at one point in time, in a particular socio-
political-cultural context, some batch of ideas about children’s capabilities and society’s 
expectations about children’s appropriate role. According to Cipriani (2009) achieving 
the age of legal competence “demarcates the onset of a particular liberty right.”.   
 The legal age of competence in the United States, for example, which determines 
the liberty right to drive is sixteen; to marry is eighteen (with a few exceptions, juveniles 
age sixteen may engage in marriage with parental consent), to join the army is seventeen 
with parental consent, eighteen without; to vote is eighteen; to drink is twenty-one. 
The younger and (presumably) less competent the child, the more protection 
rights and the fewer liberty rights are awarded. The reciprocal is also true. The older and 
more mature the child becomes, legal competence in certain areas is assumed, more 
liberty rights are given, and fewer protections rights are offered. It is essential to notice 
that legal competence functions as the intermediary element which measures / 
presupposes the exercise of liberty rights. As explained by Cipriani:   
There is an inverse relationship between the protection rights and liberty… 
with competency as the pivot point. With less competence, protection 
rights come to the fore and liberty rights drift to the rear; yet with greater 
competency, liberty rights take greater prominence. Competence [then] 
adopts a central role in the predominant rights discourse; an individual 
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generally must have the relevant competence to assert a given liberty right 
for himself or herself.379   
 
 With regard to individual responsibility and liberty rights, Cipriani establishes a 
direct correspondence between one’s attainment of a liberty right and the obligation 
derived from this right: “to respect and protect a competent individual’s choices – 
[which] necessarily assign responsibility for choices and actions back to the individual 
who makes them.”380   
Legal competence and criminal responsibility 
 Upon reaching the stipulated age of legal competence “children may potentially 
bear criminal responsibility for their actions, and the state can first legitimately levy – in 
legal terms – criminal sanctions against them.”381 Legal competence to bear criminal 
responsibility is reflected in the minimum age of criminal responsibility (MACR), which 
was presented previously. Discussion about an MACR is equivalent to deliberation about 
the establishment of an age at which children are presumed legally capable of infringing 
penal laws. Therefore, it should be noticed and properly highlighted the existence of a 
direct relationship between being age-competent to infringe criminal law and being age-
competent to be held accountable by criminal law for such infringements. In fact, being 
capable of violating criminal law, as a consequence, allows one to be held criminally 
responsible for such a violation (unless the individual has a viable excuse that would 
exempt his or her criminal responsibility).  
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The right to enlist as a liberty right that entails correlative individual responsibility  
Before we engage the question of how liberty rights enable individual 
responsibility, it is necessary to take a step back and ask an introductory question what 
rights are and how they relates to responsibility. In Cipriani’s words, rights “in the 
broadest sense, are a special or justified type of claim, or a claim against someone whose 
recognition as valid is called for by some set of governing rules or moral principles… 
Such recognition both justifies and distinguishes rights from other types of claims.”382 
Wesley Hohfeld, a Law Professor from the early twentieth century, dedicated his 
career to building an analytical framework to illuminate how legal relationships between 
rights and what he called ‘their correlatives’ played out. He achieved this by 
deconstructing what legal scholars would attribute to the concept of a ‘right,’ and 
analyzing the internal structures and relationships among different fundamental 
conceptions of legal rights.383 Hohfeld identified four different building blocks (or 
entitlements) composing the idea of legal rights: rights, privileges, powers, and 
immunities. These four elements had four corresponding correlatives: duty, no right, 
liability, and disability, respectively. Putting it in practice: “for each entitlement, there is 
always a unique and distinct correlative disablement and vice versa. Thus, for every right 
in A, there must be a correlative duty in B. For every privilege in A, there must be a 
                                               
382 Cipriani, Children’s Rights and the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility: A Global Perspective, 16. 
383 Singer, Joseph, “Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from 
Bentham to Hohfeld,” Wisconsin Law Review, no. 975 (1982), 986-7, 
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distinct dyads of legal relations.”384  
The dyads of “rights-correlatives” “signify that these interests exist on opposing 
sides of a pair of persons involved in a legal relationship.385 
For the current work, the goal is not to explain all the elements and their 
correlative relationships, but rather to focus on the element of “privilege” simply because 
a privilege functions much like a liberty rights, entitling the holder to exercise the 
referent act awarded by the right without interference, without being impeded. A 
privilege is correlated with a no-right, meaning that if someone (A) hold a privilege to do 
X, then nobody, besides A himself, holds the right to impede A from doing X.  We can 
say, for the purpose of analysis that privilege in Hohfeldian terms is equivalent to our 
conception of liberty right.  
How do MACR and MALR, liberty rights, legal competency and individual criminal 
responsibility all tie together to answer the question of criminal responsibility of children 
under International Criminal Law?  
 
A child, after reaching a certain age, is seen by society as legally competent to 
exercise a particular liberty right, for example, the right to drive. If the child has chosen 
to enjoy the right in question and is at fault in a lethal car accident, he or she may have 
breached criminal rules. By being considered legally capable of driving in the first place, 
the child would be a priori legally capable of and obligated to answer for his or her acts 
under the criminal justice system.   
                                               
384 Schlag, Pierre, “How To Do Things With Hohfeld,” Law and Contemporary Problems 78, no. 1 (2015): 
187, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol78/iss1/8. 
385 Singer, “The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld”, 986-87. 
correlative . . . (and so on and so forth). The rights and their correlatives form four 
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Legal competence goes both ways; it enables the liberty right to be exercised (in 
the presence of choice), and it qualifies the right-holder for individual responsibility if the 
right in question is exercised in a way that constitutes a crime. 
A similar rationale applies to the relationship between the minimum age of legal 
recruitment (MALR) and the rule/principle of individual criminal responsibility under 
International Criminal Law. When an individual is deemed mature enough to be granted a 
liberty right and has chosen to exercise it, the very same legal regime which enables the 
child to enlist by recognizing them as legally competent – International Humanitarian 
Law – qualifies them as legally competent to exercise individual responsibility in case of 
serious breaches of International Humanitarian Law in the course of that exercise.  In 
other words, the criteria for individual responsibility derive from the presumed legal 
competence that also enables the attribution of a liberty right. Being considered legally 
capable of being lawfully recruited and serving on the battlefield by International 
Humanitarian Law also qualifies the individual to be held legally accountable for 
violations of International Humanitarian Law when performing the acts that this liberty 
right has enabled him or her to perform. Therefore, legal competence is a two-way street. 
This argument is essential because it shows that the notions of liberty rights and legal 
accountability share the same pre-requisite: the presumed legal competence of the 
individual. 
By authorizing juveniles starting at age fifteen to join the military, International 
Humanitarian Law treats the child who has attained the minimum age of legal 
recruitment as presumptively legally competent to serve in the military.  
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This position is reflected in Articles 77 of Additional Protocol I; part 4 of 
Additional Protocol II and Article 38 of the CRC.  
The goal here is not to challenge the current law by instead arguing that a minor at 
such an early age is neither psychologically nor emotionally competent to understand 
what joining the armed forces entails. Rather, as stated before, the goal is simply to 
highlight the fact that International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights 
Law, as currently presented, understand someone as young as fifteen as fully legally 
capable of exercising the act of joining the armed forces and engaging in armed conflict, 
and as a consequence, it understands them to be legally competent to respond to any 
criminal acts they may have committed while on the battlefield. 
This chapter of the dissertation has attempted to start a second and 
complementary line of reasoning for establishing children as legally competent to bear 
responsibility for their violations of International Humanitarian Law. The new line of 
reasoning presented in the current chapter stems from the analysis that international law – 
by allowing children starting at age fifteen to legally enlist – grants them liberty rights 
and thus presumes them legal competent to join the army. I cannot emphasize enough 
that liberty rights as expressed by Cipriani (2009) presuppose legal competence, which 
functions as a pre-condition for the attribution of individual criminal responsibility. 
Having said this, the chapter provided a starting point for a subsequent research project 
which complements and reinforces the conclusion arrived in the present work: 
International Law recognizes persons under eighteen as legally capable of joining the 
military and exercising individual criminal responsibility for serious breaches of 
international law when certain conditions are met.       
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
Recapitulation of purpose and findings / relationship with previous research 
 This dissertation sought to provide a legal analysis on the status of children and 
children who have committed serious international offenses under International Criminal 
Law.  
I have argued that, in general, when someone is accused of these serious acts, 
framed as international crimes by international courts, International Criminal Law 
possesses the capacity to hold the accused directly accountable under the law through 
domestic and international mechanisms. It is quite clear that all people must abide by 
International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, and that serious 
breaches of these legal regimes give rise to individual criminal responsibility. However, 
when the accused is someone younger than eighteen, thus considered a child under 
international legal standards (International Human Rights Law), International Criminal 
Law has not yet provided a clear position on their status. So the question of whether 
children bear individual criminal responsibility under international law remains mostly 
unanswered in nearly all published literature.    
 Contrary to the general understanding propagated by most published works that 
there is no established law on the issue of child criminal under international criminal law, 
the present work can be considered one of the few which shines a different light on the 
topic, showing how the current law has initiated a legal path towards the viability of 
holding juveniles accused of international crimes criminally accountable for their acts. 
The research points to the UN Secretary General’s drafting of Article 7.1 of the Statute of 
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the Special Court for Sierra Leone which generates evidence of international law on the 
issue of child criminal responsibility. The decision of the UN Secretary General to 
include juveniles under the jurisdiction of the Special Court, despite not carrying the 
weight of mandatory precedent, can be used by other international courts as important 
guidance as to where the law is in this specific topic. The move to include juveniles, as 
set forth by the UN Secretary General and approved by the UN Security Council, should 
be considered revolutionary and adequately acknowledged as an immense step towards 
achieving a legal position, in International Criminal Law, on child criminal responsibility.  
Revolutionary for at least two reasons: first, it changes the main legal discourse from 
framing children exclusively as victims to legally contemplating them as viable 
perpetrators of international crimes and subjects of the international criminal system.  
 The present work also suggests a relational link between first, the minimum age 
of legal recruitment as established by international law, second, the presumed legal 
competence attributed to minors starting at age fifteen, and finally, the individual 
criminal responsibility of minors who violate international law in the course of exercising 
their right to serve and fight. 
Limitations of the research (anticipation of criticism) 
 A legal positivist analysis, like the one presented, undoubtedly has its limitations. 
First, we should realize that the topic in question, the criminal accountability of children, 
is very controversial, and most available inquiries are pervaded with moral interpretations 
and political criticisms. The current work neither explores the moral and political sides of 
the problem nor of the legal system’s composition; therefore, as an example, it 
intentionally fails to addresses important questions such as why the legal system is as it is 
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and whose interests does it serve?  Nor does it investigate whether the existing laws 
should be interpreted in a way that allows for the element of fairness, justice to be 
accounted for. Also, it does not raise the question whether the current law is effective and 
if so, to whom. Another limitation is the lack of analysis related to the language used, 
precisely if it is embedded with notions of power, or how language is used to perform 
actions. The analysis also does not delve into questions of legitimacy and how the way 
law is perceived affects the functioning of legal system. These are a few of the inquiries 
that, despite being fascinating and of the utmost importance, are left out of the current 
legal positivist analysis.  
Therefore, as mentioned previously, the exclusive interest of a legal positivist 
analysis (as the one here developed) is to focus on whether there is law on a specific 
issue, where the law is to be the found, and how the existing source of the law affects its 
use. 
Problems arising from the research 
 After scrutinizing the existing research on the question and finding it quite 
challenging to locate the question of children potential criminal responsibility under 
international criminal law within existing literature, I noticed that the discussion of 
potential criminal responsibility of child soldiers in IL and IR literature takes place under 
a different head; it is in fact framed as inquiry into where a universal MACR should be 
set. And after reading most of the current works on child soldiers and legal 
accountability, I concluded that my research question regarding the individual criminal 
responsibility of children under international criminal law and the discussion of a 
universal MACR were indeed equivalent inasmuch as they both aimed at constructing a 
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space of responsibility for individuals under eighteen at the international level. The 
primary difference between my research question and the MACR debate was how these 
two problems were framed. While I framed the inquiry in more legal-theoretical terms, 
addressing the structure of International Criminal Law, and focusing on the concept of 
individual criminal responsibility, the discussion on MACR at the international level tend 
to follow policy concerns and answers to more practical issues. 
Implications of my findings/ contributions 
1. This dissertation has found clear evidence of law on the issue of children’s criminal 
responsibility under International Law in the Statue of the SCSL, which can be used by 
other international courts, thus contributing to the creation and the development of an 
emerging general rule of International Criminal Law on the issue.  
2. This dissertation also suggests that the SCSL by including juveniles starting at age 
fifteen under the jurisdiction of the court has understood them as viable subjects of the 
international criminal system, and therefore as presumably legally capable of being 
criminally responsible for their criminal acts. 
3. Overall, this dissertation has extended the field of International Criminal Law by 
identifying and elucidating the existence of law on the issue of children’s criminal 
responsibility for grave violations of international law. 
Recommendations (for research; for action/policy change) 
 
 The finding that International Law allows juveniles to answer criminally for 
serious violations of international law, quite honestly, does not (and should not) come as 
a surprise if one expects some level of consistency within a legal system. By allowing 
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children, starting at age fifteen, to legally enlist and be used in armed conflicts – which in 
my opinion is preposterous, and can only be understandable if one is looking at recruiting 
children narrowly in terms of some type military gains, that is, if early enlistment does, in 
fact, generate military advantage – international law has since pre-determined or strongly 
influenced its later position on the issue of children’s viable criminal treatment for those 
who have reached the age of legal recruitment. It is logically consistent that someone 
who is perceived as legally competent to enlist, is also, as the other side of the same coin, 
to be perceived as legally competent by the same legal system to answer individually for 
any serious violations they commit while performing the task he or she was authorized to 
do.  Therefore, if one wishes to confront the issue of the presumed legal competence 
given to minors starting at age fifteen, then states should strongly revise international 
rules granting these children the right of early enlistment.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
179 
Bibliography 
 
Akade, Dapo. 2003. “The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Nationals 
of Non- Parties: Legal Basis and Limits.” Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 1: 618-50. 
http://www.oxfordjournals.org/our_journals/jicjus/2003award.pdf. 
 
Akehurst, Michael. 1975. “The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law.” British 
Yearbook of International Law 47, (1): 273-85. 
http://bybil.oxfordjournals.org/content/47/1/273.extract. 
 
Alter, Karen J. 2005. “International Courts Are Not Agents! The Perils of the Principal-
Agent Approach to Thinking About the Independence of International Courts.” 
American Society of International Law 99: 138-41. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25659991. Accessed December 04, 2015. 
 
Amann, Diane M. 2005. “The Child Rights Convention and International Criminal 
Justice.” Nordic Journal of International Law 84: 248-69. 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/279239723_The_Child_Rights_Conve
ntion_and_International_Criminal_Justice. 
 
American Red Cross. 2011. “Prosecution of Violations of IHL.” 
http://www.redcross.org/images/MEDIA_CustomProductCatalog/m4640075_IH
L_ProsecutionofViolations.pdf. 
 
Amnesty International UK. 2000. “Press Release: Sierra Leone: The Statute of the 
Special Court Must Make All Recruitment of Children under 15 a Crime.” 
October 23. https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/statute-special-court-
must-make-all-recruitment-childrens-rights-under-15-crime. Accessed February 
5, 2016. 
 
Amnesty International. 2000. “Sierra Leone: Recommendations on the Draft Statute of 
the Special Court.” November 14. 
https://www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/000143.html. 
 
Ang, Fiona. 2005. A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child: Article 38: Children in Armed Conflicts. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers. 
______.2006. Participation Rights of Children. Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2006. 
 
Aptel, Cecile. 2010. “Children and Accountability for International Crimes: The 
Contributions of the International Criminal Courts.” In Innocenti Working Paper 
2010-20. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
180 
Archard, David. 2004. Children, rights and childhood. 2nd ed. London: Routledge. 
______. 2011. “Children’s Rights.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-children/. 
 
Archard, David, and Colin M. Macleod. 2002. The moral and political status of children. 
Oxford Scholarship Online.  
 
Asquith, Steward. 1996. “When Children Kill Children: The Search for Justice.” Sage 
Journals 3: 99-116. http://chd.sagepub.com/content/3/1/99.abstract. 
 
Austin, John. 1832. The Province of Jurisprudence Determined. London: John Murray,  
 
Avalon Project. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/. Accessed March 11, 2016. 
 
Baimu, Evarist. 2009. “International Protection of Children.” In Max Plank Encyclopedia 
of Public International Law, Oxford Public International Law. 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e904?rskey=kNAAma&result=1&prd=EPIL. 
 
Baron, Marcia. 2005. “Justification and Excuses.” Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 2: 
387-406. Accessed: 3 May, 2017. 
 
Bayles, Michael D. 1982. “Character, Purpose and Criminal Responsibility.” Law and 
Philosophy 1, (1): 5-20. Accessed January 01, 2016. 
 
BBC News. 2007. “Under-18’s Were Deployed to Iraq.” News Media. BBC News. 
Feb.04.http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk/6328771.stm. 
______. 2015.“Anzac Day Terror Plot: Blackburn Boy Sentenced to Life.” BBC, October 
2, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-34423984. Accessed August 3, 2015. 
 
Bennion, Francis. 2009. “Mens rea and defendants below the age of discretion.” Criminal 
Law Review: 757-70. http://www.francisbennion.com/pdfs/fb/2009/2009-031-
crim-lr-doli-in-capax.pdf. Accessed Apr. 25, 2017. 
 
Boeck, Filip, and Alcinda Honwana, eds. 2005. Makers & Breakers: Children & Youth in 
Postcolonial Africa. Africa World Press. 
 
Borda, Aldo. 2013. “Precedent in International Criminal Courts and Tribunals.” 
Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 2 (2): 287-313. 
http://joomla.cjicl.org.uk/journal/article/112. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
181 
Boven, Theo Van. 2010. “The United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for the Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law.” United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law. 
http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ga_60-147/ga_60-147_e.pdf. 
 
Breen, Claire. 2006.“From Paternalism to (Partial) Autonomy: The Evolution of 
Children’s Rights in New Zealand.” New Zealand Journal of History 40: 91-101. 
http://www.nzjh.auckland.ac.nz/docs/2006/NZJH_40_1_08.pdf. 
 
Brett, Rachel, and Margareth McCallin. 1998. Children: The Invisible Soldiers. Edited by 
Radda Barnen. Vol. 2. Stockholm: Save the Children.  
 
Briggs, Herbert. 1952. “New Dimension in International Law.” The American Political 
Science Review 46, (3): 667-98. www.jstor.org/stable/1952278. Accessed 
December 13, 2013.  
 
Brons, Kathryn. 2013. Assessing the Innocence and Victimization of Child Soldiers. 
Master diss., University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL: 1-59. 
http://acumen.lib.ua.edu/content/u0015/0000001/0001380/u0015_0000001_0001
380.pdf 
 
Bueren, Geraldine Van, and André Alen. 2006. A Commentary on the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Leiden: Nijhoff. 
 
Cassel, Douglass. 2001.“Empowering United States Courts to Hear Crimes Within the 
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court”” New England Law Review 35, 
no. 421. http://www.nesl.edu/userfiles/file/lawreview/vol35/2/cassel.pdf. 
 
Cassese, Antonio. 2003. “International Criminal Law.” In International Law, edited by 
Evans Malcolm. 1st ed.  
______. 2005. International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
______. 2008. International Criminal Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
______. 2009. “Aut Dedere Aut Judicare.” In The Oxford Companion to International. 
  
Charlesworth, Hillary. 2002. “International Law: A Discipline of Crisis.” The Modern 
Law Review 65, no. 3: 377-92. www.jstor.org/stable/1097579. 
 
Child Rights International Network. “Minimum Ages of Criminal Responsibility in the 
Americas” https://www.crin.org/en/home/ages/Americas. Accessed May 20, 
2017. 
 
Child Soldiers International. 2012. “Louder Than Words: An Agenda to End State Use of 
Child Soldiers.” http://child-soldiers.org/global_report_reader.php?id=562. 
Accessed February 03, 2016. 
 
 
 
 
 
182 
CIA. World FactBook. “Military Service Age and Obligations.” 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2024.html. 
 
Cipriani, Don. 2009. Children’s Rights and the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility: 
A Global Perspective. Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate Pub. 
______. 2013. “The minimum age of criminal responsibility.” Penal Reform 
International/ UKaid. N.p., Accessed 6 Apr. 2017. 
 
Clapham, Andrew. 2003. “Issues of Complexity, Complicity and Complementary: from 
the Nuremberg trials to the dawn of the new International Criminal Court.” From 
Nuremberg to The Hague: The Future of International Criminal Justice, edited 
by Sands, Phillipe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 31. 
 
Claude, Inis L. 1996. “Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United 
Nations,” In International Organization 20 (03): 367-79. doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300012832. Accessed April 12, 2017. 
 
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. 2008. “Child Soldiers Global Report 2008- 
Summary.” http://www.child-soldiers.org/global_report_reader.php?id=97. 
Court for Amnesties and Truth Commissions.” Edited by A. Von Bogdandy and 
R. Wolfrum. Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 7 (2003): 553-90. 
http://www.mpil.de/files/pdf3/mpunyb_seibert-fohr_7.pdf. 
 
Crane, David. 2008. “Prosecuting Children in Times of Conflict: The West African 
Experience.” Human Rights Brief 15, (3): 11-17. 
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1029&cont
ext=hrbrief. 
 
Crawford, James R. 2006. “State Responsibility.” Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law. 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e1093?rskey=Av0dbV&result=1&prd=EPIL. 
 
Crawford, James, and Simon Olleson.  2010. “The Nature and Forms of International 
Responsibility.” In International Law, edited by Malcolm Evans, 3rd ed. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press: 441-71. 
 
Cryer, Robert, Håkan Friman, Darryl Robinson, and Elizabeth Wilmshurst. 2007. An 
Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure. 1st ed. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Cryer, Robert. 2005. Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International 
Criminal Law Regime. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
183 
Detrick, Sharon, J. E. Doek, and Nigel Cantwell. 1992. The United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child: A Guide to the “Travaux Préparatoires” Dordrecht: 
M. Nijhoff Publishers. 
 
Detrick, Sharon. 1999. A commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. The Hague: M. Nijhoff Publishers. 
 
Drumbl, Mark. 2012. Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
_____. 2015. “The Ongwen Trial at the ICC: Tough Questions on Child Soldiers.” Open 
Democracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/mark-
drumbl/ongwen-trial-at-icc-tough-questions-on-child-soldiers. Accessed January 
20, 2016. 
 
Drury, Ian. 2015. “UK Sent ‘children’ to Iraq and Afghanistan despite Government Ban.” 
Daily Mail. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2050684/UK-sent-children-
Iraq-Afghanistan-despite-Government-ban.html. 
 
Duff, Anthony. 2003. “I Might Be Guilty, But You Can’t Try Me”: Estoppel and Other 
Bars to Trial.” Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law: 245-59. 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/osjcl/Articles/Volume1_1/Commentary/duff.pdf.		
______. 2009. “Legal and Moral Responsibility.” Philosophy Compass 4.6: 978-86. 
Wiley Online Library.  
______.2013. “Theories of Criminal Law.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/criminal-law/. 
 
Earls, Felton. 2011. “Children: From Rights to Citizenship.” American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 633: 6-16. www.jstor.org/stable/27895957. 
Accessed September 5, 2015. 
 
Feinberg, Joel. 1970. “The Nature and Value of Rights.” The Journal of Value Inquiry 4: 
243-57. 
 
Feldman, Allen. 2002. “X-Children and the Militarization of Everyday Life: Comparative 
Comments on the Politics of Youth, Victimize and Violence in Transitional 
Societies.” International Journal of Social Welfare 11, (4): 286-99. 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2397.00238/abstract. 
 
Fellmeth, Aaron, and Maurice Horwitz. 2011. Guide to Latin in International Law. 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Felton, John. 2008. “Child Soldiers.” CQ Researcher Press Library. 
http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqrglobal2008070000. 
Accessed September 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
184 
Finnin, Sarah. 2012. “Mental Elements Under Article 30 of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: A Comparative Analysis.” International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 61 (2): 325-59. 
 
Finnis, John. 2011. “The Truth in Legal Positivism.” In The Autonomy of Law, edited by 
Robert P. George, 195-214. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580088.003.0008 
 
Fionda, Julia, ed. 2001. Legal Concepts of Childhood. Hart Publishing. 
 
Fottrell, Deirdre. 2000. Revisiting Children’s Rights: 10 Years of the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child. The Hague: Kluwer Law International. 
 
Freeland, Joseph. 2010. “How International Law Deals with Child Soldiers.” ALTA Law 
Research Series. http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ALRS/2010/10.html. 
 
Freeland, Steven. 2005. “Child Soldiers and International Crimes: How Should 
International Law Applied?” New Zealand Journal of Public and International 
Law 3 (2): 303-28. http://www.victoria.ac.nz/law/centres/nzcpl/publications/nz-
journal-of-public-and-international-law/previous-issues/volume-32,-november-
2005/freeland.pdf. 
 
Frulli, M. 2000. “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Some Preliminary Comments.” 
European Journal of International Law 11 (4): 857-69. Accessed October 10, 
2015. 
 
Gardner, John. 2003. “The Mark of Responsibility.” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
23:157-71.  
 
Gberie, Lansana. 2014. “The Special Court for Sierra Leone rests – for good.” Africa 
Renewal Online. http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2014/special-
court-sierra-leone-rests-–-good. Accessed March 24, 2017. 
 
Glanville, Luke. 2010. “The Antecedents of ‘Sovereignty as Responsibility.’” European 
Journal of International Relations. 
http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/17/2/233.short?rss=1&ssource=mfr. 
 
Gorski, Simone. 2013. “Individuals in International Law.” Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law. 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e829?rskey=dC9WxL&result=1&prd=EPIL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
185 
Graditzky, Thomas. 1998. “Individual Criminal Responsibility for Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in Non-International Armed 
Conflicts.” International Review of the Red Cross. 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jp4l.htm. 
 
Green, Leslie. 2009. “Legal Positivism.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2009. 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/legal-positivism/>. Accessed 
March 24, 2017. 
 
Greenwood, Christopher. 2008. “Sources of International Law: An Introduction.” UN 
Office of Legal Affairs. http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ls/Greenwood_outline.pdf. 
 
Greppi, Edoardo.1999. “The Evolution of individual criminality under international law.” 
International Review of the Red Cross 835. 
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=
0ahUKEwih643nru3SAhVU22MKHZwzCNsQFggaMAA&url=http%3A%2F%
2Fwww.umass.edu%2Flegal%2FBenavides%2FFall2004%2F397G%2FElectroni
c%2520Reserve%2F12%2520Greppi.doc&usg=AFQjCNHeEDIHO6B18MyAw
yxK7D-dwF1o5w&bvm=bv.150475504,d.amc 
 
Grover, Sonja. 2012. Child Soldier Victims of Genocidal Forcible Transfer Exonerating 
Child Soldiers Charged with Grave Conflict-related International Crimes. 
Berlin: Springer. 
 
Happold, Matthew. 2000. “Child Soldiers in International Law: The Legal Regulations of 
Children’s Participation in Hostilities.” Netherlands International Law Review 1 
(XLVII): 27-52. http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/26771. 
______.2006. “The Age of Criminal Responsibility for International Crimes Under 
International Law.” In From Peace to Justice Series International Criminal 
Accountability and Rights of Children, edited by Karin Arts and Vesselin 
Popovski: 69-84. Hague Academic Press.	
______. 2008.“Child Soldiers: Victims or Perpetrator?” University of La Verne Law 
Review:56-87. HeinOline.  
 
Haque, Adil. 2008.“Answering For Crime: Responsibility and Liability In Criminal Law, 
by R.A. Duff.” Review of Answering For Crime: Responsibility and Liability In 
Criminal Law, by R.A. Duff. Rutgers School of Law Newark, May 2008. 
Accessed February 8, 2016.  
 
Hart, H. L. A. 1969. Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hart, Jason. 2006. “Saving Children: What Role for Anthropology?” Anthropology Today 
22, (1):1-8. http://anthro.vancouver.wsu.edu/media/Course_files/anth-302-barry-
hewlett/hart-saving-children.pdf. Accessed January 05, 2016. 
 
 
 
 
 
186 
Hartmann, Michael E. 2003. “International Judges and Prosecutors in Kosovo: A New 
Model for Post-Conflict Peacekeeping.” United States Institute of Peace. 
http://www.usip.org/publications/international-judges-and-prosecutors-in-
kosovo-new-model-post-conflict-peacekeeping. 
 
Helle, Daniel. 2000. “Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict to the Convention on the Rights of the Child.” International Committee 
of the Red Cross. 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jqqe.htm. Accessed 
February 03, 2016. 
 
Hencaerts, Jean-Marie. 2005. “Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A 
Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed 
Conflict.” International Review of the Red Cross 07 (857):175-259. 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/review/review-857-
p175.htm. Accessed February 2015. 
 
Heppner, Kevin. 2002.“My Gun Was as Tall as Me”: Child Soldiers in Burma. New 
York, NY: Human Rights Watch. 
 
Higgins, Rosalyn. 1994. Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use it. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hirby, J. “What You Can Legally Do When You’re 18.” The Black’s Law Dictionary. 
http://thelawdictionary.org/article/what-you-can-legally-do-when-youre-18/. 
 
Hohfeld, Wesley N. 1917. “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning.” Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 4378: 710-70. 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5383&context=f
ss_papers. 
 
Honwana, Alcinda. 2005. “Innocent and Guilty: Child-Soldiers as Interstitial and Tactical 
Agents.” In Makers & Breakers: Children & Youth in Postcolonial Africa, edited 
by Alcinda Honwana and Filip Boeck: 31-52. Africa World Press. 
 
Hoover, Joseph. 2014. “Moral Practices: Assigning Responsibility in the International 
Criminal Courts.” Law and Contemporary Problems 76: 263-86. 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol76/iss3/8. 
 
Horder, Jeremy. 1996. “Determinism, Liberalism, and Criminal Law.” Current Legal 
Problems, 49. https://www.princeton.edu/jpia/past-issues-1/2001/8.pdf.  
 
Hulme, Karen. “Child Soldiers in International Law- Review.” The Modern Law Review 
Limited 71 (2008): 496-99. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-
2230.2008.00703_2.x/abstract. 
 
 
 
 
 
187 
Humanium. “Together for Children’s Rights.” https://www.humanium.org/en/. Accessed 
February 04, 2016. 
 
ICRC. 1949. “Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949.” https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/380 
______. 1977. “Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 
I), 8 June 1977.” https://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/470. 
______. 1977. “Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol II).” https://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/475?OpenDocument. 
______. 2005. “Rule 135: Children Affected by Armed Conflict Are Entitled to Special 
Respect and Protection.” https://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule135. 
______. 2010. “Children Protected Under International Humanitarian Law: Overview.” 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/protected-persons/children/overview-
protected-children.htm. 
______. 2010. ICRC. Rule 151: Persons Protected under IHL. 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/protected-persons/overview-protected-
persons.htm. Accessed February 03, 2016 
______. 2014. “Geneva Conventions.” https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-
customary-law/geneva-conventions. Accessed February 04, 2016. 
 
International Council on Human Rights. 1999. “Taking Duties Seriously: Individual 
Duties in International Human Rights Law: A Commentary.” 
http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/10/103_report_en.pdf. 
 
International Criminal Court. “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.” 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-
0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf. 
 
International Labour Organizations. 2015.“Child Labour and Armed Conflict.” 
http://www.ilo.org/ipec/areas/Armedconflict/lang--en/. Accessed November 
2015. 
 
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. “Human Rights.”. http://www.iep.utm.edu/hum-
rts/. Accessed March 2015. 
 
Jalloh, Charles. 2007. Consolidated Legal Texts for the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 
Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.  
______. 2011. “Special Court for Sierra Leone: Achieving Justice?” Michigan Journal of 
International Law: 395-460. 
http://search.proquest.com.jproxy.lib.ecu.edu/docview/867094271/fulltext/55519
2246F434153PQ/8?accountid=10639. Accessed January 22, 2016. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
188 
______. 2015. “The Contribution of the Special Court for Sierra Leone to the 
Development of International Law.” RADIC, 2007, 165-207. Accessed 
November 10, 2015. 
 
Kaczorowska, Alina. Public International Law. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2010. 
 
Kassier, Glenn. “The zombie claim that 300,000 children are used as child soldiers.” The 
Washington Post, January 22, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-
checker/wp/2016/01/22/the-zombie-claim-that-300000-children-are-used-as-
child-soldiers/. Accessed March 24, 2017. 
 
Kittichaisaree, Kiangsak. International Criminal Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001. 
 
Kress, Claus. “International Criminal Law.” Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law. March 2009. 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e1423?rskey=OAHNkL&result=7&prd=EPIL. 
 
Lazarev, Nikolai. 2005. “Hohfeld’s Analysis of Rights: An Essential Approach to a 
Conceptual and Practical Understanding of the Nature of Rights.” Murdoch 
University Electronic Journal of Law 9.   
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MurUEJL/2005/9.html. 
 
Legal Information Institute Cornell University Law School. 2007. “In Rights of the 
Child: Proceedings of the International Conference, Ottawa 2007 Infancy.” 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/infancy. Accessed February 5, 2016. 
 
Leiter, Brian. 2010. “Why Legal Positivism?” Draft of December 10, 2009 for 
presentation at the AALS panel on “Legal Positivism: For and Against” with 
Leslie Green, Mark Greenberg, & Jeremy Waldron, New Orleans, January 9, 
2010. 
	 
Lenk, Hans. 2015. “What Is Responsibility?” Philosophy Now. 
 
Leveau, Fanny. 2013. “Liability of Child Soldiers Under International Criminal Law.” 
Osgoode Hall Review of Law and Policy 4, no. 1: 36-66. 
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&cont
ext=ohrlp. 
 
Lineberry, Cate. 2011. “The Boys of War.” The New York Times, October 4. 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/04/the-boys-of-war/?_r=0. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
189 
Mackenzie, Ruth, and Philippe Sands. 2003. “International Courts and Tribunals and the 
Independence of the International Judge.” 44: 271-85. http://www.pict-
pcti.org/publications/PICT_articles/mackenzie2.pdf. Accessed February 3, 2016. 
 
Maclean, Sally. 2006. “Child Cruelty or Reasonable Punishment? A Case Study of the 
Operation of the Law and the Courts 1883-1903.” New Zealand Journal of 
History 40, no. 1: 7-24. 
http://www.nzjh.auckland.ac.nz/docs/2006/NZJH_40_1_03.pdf. 
 
Maher, Gerry. 2005. “Age and Criminal Responsibility.” Ohio State Journal of Criminal 
Law, 493rd ser., 2: 493-512. 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/osjcl/files/2012/05/Maher-PDF-4-11-
05.pdf. 
 
Mann, Howard. 1987. “International Law and the Child Soldier.” The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 36, no. 1 (January): 32-57. 
www.jstor/org/stable/760458. 
 
Marten, James Alan., ed. 2002. Children and War: A Historical Anthology. New York: 
New York University Press. 
 
Mbembe Binda, Me Elvis. “Decreasing the Age of Criminal Majority in Rwanda, an 
Issue to Rethink About.” Reflexions Juridiques et Socio-Politiques Sur La 
Region des Grands Lacs Africains http://bindael.weebly.com/criminal-majority-
in-rwanda.html. 
 
McCorquodale, Robert. 2010. “The Individual and the International Legal System.” In 
International Law, edited by Malcolm Shaw, 284-310. 3rd ed. Oxford and New 
York : Oxford University Press, 2010. 
 
Mettraux, Guénaël. 2011. “Trial at Nuremberg.” In Routledge Handbook of International 
Criminal Law, edited by William Schabas and Nadia Bernaz. New York: 
Routledge: 5-16.   
 
Morales, Alba. 2014. “Dispatches: US Should Stop Prosecuting Kids as Adults.” Human 
Rights Watch. March 11. https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/11/dispatches-us-
should-stop-prosecuting-kids-adults. 
 
Nmehielle, Vincent O., and Charles C. Jalloh. 2006. “The Legacy of The Special Court 
for Sierra Leone.” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 30: 107- 
124.http://heinonline.org.jproxy.lib.ecu.edu/HOL/Print?collection=journals&han
dle=hein.journals/forwa30&id=357. Accessed January 22, 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
190 
No Peace Without Justice and UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre. 2002. “International 
Criminal Justice and Children.” Accessed February 2015. 
http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/ICJC.pdf. 
 
Nollkaemper, Andre, and Jann Kleffner. 2004. Internationalized Criminal Courts: Sierra 
Leone, East Timor, Kosovo and Cambodia. Edited by Cesare Romano. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Northwestern Law: Pritzker Legal Research Center. “Sources of International Law.” 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/library/research/international/gettingstarted/so
urcesofintllaw/. Accessed February 18, 2016. 
 
Nouwen, Sarah. 2006. “‘Hybrid Courts’: The Hybrid Category of a New Type of 
International Crimes Courts.” Utrecht Law Review 2, 2 (December 5). 
https://www.utrechtlawreview.org/articles/abstract/10.18352/ulr.32/. 
 
Nybondas, Maria. 2004. “The Relationship Between Individual Criminal and Command 
Responsibility.” Journal of International Criminal Justice. 
 
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed 
Conflict. 2011. “Children and Justice During and in the Aftermath of Armed 
Conflict.” https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/publications/WorkingPaper-
3_Children-and-Justice.pdf.  
 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 2007. “UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment N°10 ...” 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/docs/CRC.C.GC.10.pdf. Accessed 
February 04, 2016. 
 
Oxford Reference. “Gillick Competence.” 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.2011080309585266. 
Accessed February 05, 2016. 
 
Palmisano, Giuseppe. 2001. “Fault.” Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law. Paper presented at a conference on Judicial Independence at the 
Crossroads: Developing an Interdisciplinary Research Agenda, held at the 
University of Pennsylvania School of Law, Mar. 31–Apr. 1. 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e1955?rskey=WE0mrG&result=8&prd=EPIL. 
 
Paust, Jordan P., M. Bassiouni, Jimmy Gurule, Leila Sadat, and Bruce Vagaries. 2006. 
International Criminal Law: Cases and Material. 3rd ed. Carolina Academic 
Press.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
191 
Pittman, Thomas, and Matthew Heaphy. 2008. “Does the United States Really Prosecutes 
Its Service Members for War Crimes? Implications for Complementarity before 
the International Criminal Court.” Leiden Journal of International Law 21: 165-
183. http://www.amicc.org/docs/LJIL_2008_21-1_Pittman_Heaphy.pdf. 
 
Pocar, Fausto. 2002. “To What Extent Is Protocol I Customary International Law?” 
International Law Studies 78. https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/71feb041-
f08d-4e4a-ac23-7c161c4d26ab/30--To-What-Extent-Is-Protocol-I-Customary-
Interna.aspx. 
 
Poulatova, Chaditsa. 2013. Children and Armed Conflict. Newcastle, UK: Cambridge 
Scholars. 
  
Provost, René. 2016. “Targeting Child Soldiers.” Web log post. EJIL:Talk! Blog of the 
European Journal of International Law, 12 Jan. Web. 6 Apr. 2017. 
 
Rangoolie, Monique. 2001. “Prosecution of Sierra Leone’s Child Soldier: What Message Is the 
UN Trying to Send?” Journal of Public and International Affairs 12:145-61.  
 
Reilly, Anne. 2017. “Affirmative Defenses in International Criminal Proceedings.” 
In Defense Perspectives on International Criminal Justice?, edited by Collen 
Rohan and Gentian Zyberi. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Rikhof, Joseph. 2008. Child Soldiers: Should They Be Punished? Montréal, QC: Wilson 
& Lafleur (W&L). 
 
Rivard, Lysanne. 2010. “Child Soldiers and Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration Programs: The Universalism of Children’s Rights vs. Cultural 
Relativism Debate.” The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, August 23. 
https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/772. Accessed March 25, 2017 
 
Rivet, Annabelle Karen. 2014. The Criminal Liability of Child Soldiers in International 
Criminal Law: Does Restorative Justice Offer a Balance Between the Rights of 
the Victim and the Right of the Child Perpetrator? LLM diss., University of 
Pretoria.  
 
Romero, Joshua A. 2004. “The Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Juvenile Soldier 
Dilemma.” Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 2, no. 1. 
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1011
&context=njihr. 
 
Rosen, David M. 2005. Armies of the Young: Child Soldiers in War and Terrorism. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
192 
Rosen, David M. 2012. Child Soldiers: A Reference Handbook. Santa Barbara, CA: 
ABC-CLIO. 
 
Sadat, Leila. 2011. “Understanding the complexities of international criminal tribunal 
jurisdiction.” In Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law, edited by 
William Schabas and Nadia Bernaz, 197-210. New York: Routledge. 
 
Scarman, Gillick. “The Age of Criminal Responsibility.” Law Teacher.net. 
http://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/criminal-law/age-of-criminal-
responsibility.php. 
 
Schaack, Beth Van, and Ronald C. Slye. 2014. International Criminal Law and its 
enforcement: cases and materials. 3rd ed. MN: Foundation Press. 
 
Schabas, William, and Nadia Bernaz. 2011. Routledge Handbook of International 
Criminal Law. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. 
 
Schabas, William. 2006. The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006. 
______. 2007. “Defences.” An Introduction to International Criminal Court, 226-320. 
3rd ed. Cambridge University Press. 
______. 2010. The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007 and 2010. 
 
Scharf, Michael and Margaux Day. 2011.“The ad hoc international criminal tribunals: 
launchinga new era of accountability.” In Routledge Handbook of International 
Criminal Law, edited by William Schabas and Nadia Bernaz, 51-66. New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Schlag, Pierre. 2015. “How to do Things With Hohfeld.” Law and Contemporary 
Problems 78, no. 1: 185-234. http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol78/iss1/8. 
 
Seibert-Fohr, Anja. 2003. “The Relevance of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court for Amnesties and Truth Commissions.” Edited by A. Von 
Bogdandy and R. Wolfrum. Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 7: 553-
90. http://www.mpil.de/files/pdf3/mpunyb_seibert-fohr_7.pdf. 
 
Shelton, Dinah. 2009. “Form, Function, and the Power of International Courts.” Chicago 
Journal of International Law 9, no. 2: 537-71. Accessed November 10, 2015. 
http://search.proquest.com.jproxy.lib.ecu.edu/docview/237210811?pq-
origsite=summon. 
 
Simma, Bruno, and Andreas L. Paulus. “The Responsibility of Individuals for Human 
Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts.” The American Journal of International 
 
 
 
 
 
193 
Law, April 1999, 302-16. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2997991. Accessed January 
18, 2016. 
 
Singer, Joseph. 1982. “The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from 
Bentham to Hohfeld.” Wisconsin Law Review, no. 975: 980-1059. 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/jsinger/files/jurisprudence.pdf.	
 
Singer, Peter W. 2005. “Child Soldiers: The New Faces of War.” Brookings Institution. 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2005/1/winter 
islamicworld singer/singer20051215. 
______. Children at War. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006. 
 
Somasundaram, Days. 2002. “Child Soldiers: Understanding the Context.” Bmj 324 
(7348): 1268-271. 
 
State Side Legal. 2010. “Emancipation and Military Service.” 
http://statesidelegal.org/emancipation-and-military-service. 
 
Steel, Michelle. 2008. “Child Soldiers.” Vision. 
http://www.vision.org/visionmedia/social-issues/child-soldiers/6684.aspx. 
Accessed December 1, 2014. 
 
Tadros, Victor. 2005.Criminal Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Tedeschi, Doug, and Erin Rodgers. 2005. “Tackling A Brave New World: A Guide to the 
Basics of International Law.” The Writing Center - Georgetown University Law 
Center. http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ga_60-147/ga_60-147_e.pdf. 
 
Terris, Daniel, Cesare P. R. Romano, and Leigh Swigart. 2007. The international judge: 
an introduction to the men and women who decide the world’s cases. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
The American Non Governmental Organizations Coalition for the International Criminal 
Court. “The International Criminal Court and Children’s Rights.” 
http://www.amicc.org/docs/childrenFAQs.pdf. 
 
The Guardian. 2000. “Two little boys.” News Media. The Guardian July 27. 
https://www.theguardian.com/g2/story/0,3604,347432,00.html 
 
The International Center for Transitional Justice. “Criminal Justice.” 
https://www.ictj.org/our-work/transitional-justice-issues/criminal-justice. 
Accessed February 01, 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
194 
The International Law Commission, Second Session Source. 1950. “The Trial of the 
Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal”.” International 
Organization 4 (4): 714-21. Accessed May 1, 2017. 
 
The Letric Law Library. “The Infancy Defense.” http://www.lectlaw.com/mjl/cl032.htm. 
Accessed February 5, 2016. 
 
The Redress Trust. 2006. “Victims, Perpetrators or Heroes? Child Soldiers before the 
International Criminal Court.” 
http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/childsoldiers.pdf. Accessed May 
2017. 
 
The Robert H. Jackson Center. “The Influence of the Nuremberg Trial on International 
Criminal Law.” Edited by Tove Rosen: https://www.roberthjackson.org/speech-
and-writing/the-influence-of-the-nuremberg-trial-on-international-criminal-law/. 
 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone. “The 
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.” 
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/scsl-statute.pdf. 
 
Trakman, Leon, and Sean Gatien. 1999. Rights and Responsibilities. University of 
Toronto Press. 
 
Trial International. “Universal Jurisdiction.” http://www.trial-
ch.org/en/resources/international-law/universal-jurisdiction.html. 
 
UK Aid and Penal Reform International. 2013. “The Minimum Age of Criminal 
Responsibility.” Justice for Children Briefing. February 2013. 
http://www.penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/justice-for-children-
briefing-4-v6-web_0.pdf. 
 
UN Audiovisual Library of International Law. “Convention on the Rights of the Child 
and Optional Protocols Thereto.” Accessed March 01, 2015. 
 
UN Docs. “Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1924.” http://www.un-
documents.net/gdrc1924.htm. Accessed February 04, 2016. 
 
UNAMSIL. “Documents on the Establishment of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone.”http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/spcourt.htm. 
 
UNGA. 2005. “Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for 
Children and Armed Conflict to the General Assembly.” UN General Assembly 
Official Document. September 7. 
http://www.unicef.org/emergencies/files/report_SRSG_cac.pdf. 
______. 2008.“Report of the Committee on the Rights of the Child.” General Assembly 
 
 
 
 
 
195 
Official Records Sixty-third Session Supplement No. 41. 2008. 
https://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/policy_and_research/u
n/63/A_63_41.pdf. 
 
______. 2014. “Secretary-General’s Annual Report on Children and Armed Conflict 
Documents Continued Child Suffering in 23 Conflict Situations.” May, 14. 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/68/878. 
______. 2014.“Children and Armed Conflict: Annual Report of the Secretary General.” 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/68/878.  
 
UNICEF and UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and 
Armed Conflict. 2003. “Children and Armed Conflict: International Standards 
for Action.” http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/HSNBook.pdf. 
 
UNICEF. 1996.“Report of Graca Machel: Impact of Armed Conflict on Children.” 1996. 
http://www.unicef.org/graca/a51-306_en.pdf. 
______. 1997. “Cape Town Principles and Best Practices on the Recruitment of Children 
into the Armed Forces and on Demobilization and Social Reintegration of Child 
Soldiers in Africa.” 
http://www.unicef.org/emergencies/files/Cape_Town_Principles(1).pdf.  
______. 1998. “Juvenile Justice.” UNICEF Innocenti Digest. http://www.unicef-
irc.org/publications/pdf/digest3e.pdf. 
______. 2003. “Guide to the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict.” http://www.unicef.org/sowc06/pdfs/option_protocol_conflict.pdf. 
______. 2007. “From Words to Action Final Conference Report.”. 
http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/icwac_report.pdf. Accessed February 4, 2016. 
______. “The Convention on the Right of the Child: Guiding Principles: General 
Requirement for All Rights.” 
http://www.unicef.org/crc/files/Guiding_Principles.pdf. 
 
United Nations of Human Rights-Office of the High Commissioner. 2000. “Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict.” 
______. “Convention on the Rights of the Child.” 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CRC.aspx. Accessed May 
2017. 
 
UNSC. 2000. “Annex to the Letter Dated 9 August 2000 from the Permanent 
Representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations Addressed to the President 
of the Security Council.” News release, June 12, 2000. 
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Establishment/S-2000-786.pdf. 
______.2000. “Resolution 1315 Adopted by the Security Council at Its 4186th Meeting, 
on 14 August 2000.” UN Security Council. August 14, 2000. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/605/32/PDF/N0060532.pdf?OpenElement. 
______. 2000. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court 
 
 
 
 
 
196 
for Sierra Leone.”. October 4. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/661/77/PDF/N0066177.pdf?OpenElement. 
 
 
______. “Letter Dated 22 December 2000 from the President of the Security Council 
Addressed to the Secretary-General.” December 22, 2000. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/812/77/PDF/N0081277.pdf?OpenElement.  
______. 2001. “Letter Dated 12 January 2001 from the Secretary-General Addressed to 
the President of the Security Council.” January 12, 2001. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/211/71/PDF/N0121171.pdf?OpenElement.  
______. 2001. “Letter Dated 31 January 2001 from the President of the Security Council 
Addressed to the Secretary-General.” January 31, 2001. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/234/97/PDF/N0123497.pdf?OpenElement 
______. 2001. “Letter Dated 23 July 2001 from the President of the Security Council to 
the Secretary-General.” UN Security Council. July 23, 2001. http://daccess-
ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/465/28/PDF/N0146528.pdf?OpenElement. 
______. 2001. “Letter Dated 26 December 2001 from the Secretary-General to the 
President of the Security Council.” December 28, 2001. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/718/52/PDF/N0171852.pdf?OpenElement.  
______. 2003. “Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for 
Children and Armed Conflict to the Security Council.” UN General Assembly 
Official Document. November 10. 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2003/1053. 
______. 2004. “Letter Dated 26 February 2004 from the Secretary-General Addressed to 
the President of the Security Council.” March 10, 2004. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/265/77/PDF/N0426577.pdf?OpenElement.  
  
Vaha, Milla, and Leena Vastapuu. 2016. “Rafting Muddy Waters: Girl Soldiers and 
Complex Moral Agencies.” Paper prepared for International Studies Association 
Annual Convention, Atlanta, March 16-19. 
 
Vandewiele, Tiny. 2006. A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child Optional Protocol: The Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts. 
Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
 
Vinopal, Kelly. 2015. “Researching Public International Law.” American Society of 
International Law: 2-33. 
https://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/ERG_PUBLIC_INT.pdf. 
 
Vyver, Johan. 2004.“The International Criminal Court and the Concept of Mens Rea in 
International Criminal Law.” University of Miami International & Comparative 
Law Review 12: 57-149. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1940084. 
 
 
 
 
 
197 
International Law. 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e1445?rskey=4TDkKG&result=1&prd=EPIL. 
 
Walter, Christian. 2007. “Subjects of International Law.” Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law. 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e1476?rskey=GrMcLz&result=1&prd=EPIL. 
 
Waschefort, Gus. 2010. “Justice for Child Soldiers? The RUF Trial of the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone.” International Humanitarian Legal Studies 1: 184-204.  
______. 2014. International Law and Child Soldiers (Studies in International Law). Hart 
Publishing Limited.  
 
Werle, Gerhard. 2005. “Grounds for Excluding Criminal Responsibility.” In Principles of 
International Criminal Law: 138-47. 
 
Williams, Sarah. 2014. “Hybrid International Criminal Tribunals.” Oxford 
Bibliographies. Working Paper N.3. 
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-
9780199796953-0069.xml.  
 
Zgonec-Rožej, Miša. 2010. International Criminal Law Manual. London: International 
Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI). 
  
 
Wagner, Markus. 2013. “Non-State Actors.” Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
 
 
 
 
 
198 
VITA 
 
ANA PAULA VON BOCHKOR PODCAMENI 
 
2013  M.A. in International Relations at Florida International University 
in Miami, Florida. 
2009    Doctorate Fulbright Scholarship 
2007  M.A. in International Relations in International Relations at 
Institute of International Relations (IRI) at Pontifical Catholic 
University in Rio de Janeiro. 
2006  Visiting faculty at Brown University, Exchange program with 
Pontifical Catholic University in Rio de Janeiro.  
2003  B.A. in Social Sciences at Pontifical Catholic University in Rio de 
Janeiro. 
2003  Lato sensu course in International Relations at Institute of 
International Relations (IRI) at PUC- Rio.  
2012 - 2017  Teaching Assistant at Florida International University in Miami, 
Florida. 
Conference Presentations  
 
2017  Junior Symposium presentation: The Special Court for Sierra 
Leone’s contribution to an emerging rule favoring children’s 
criminal responsibility in International Criminal Law, ISA annual 
meeting, Baltimore, MD (February). 
 
2013  Methodology Workshop, ISA northeast meeting, Providence, RI 
(November).  
